Prior research finds that unrealized gains/losses on cash flow hedges are negatively associated with future earnings, and that investors and analysts fail to anticipate this association. These studies speculate that this mispricing is due to either poor derivatives disclosures or the accounting model for cash flow hedges. We examine whether enhanced mandatory derivatives disclosures set forth in FAS 161 improve users' understanding of firms' hedging activities and offer three main findings. First, we find that this mispricing does not persist after FAS 161. Second, we find that the correction of mispricing is greatest when disclosure might help investors most. Finally, we find that analyst forecast accuracy improves after FAS 161. Overall, our results suggest that the enhanced mandatory derivative disclosures required by FAS 161 improved users' understanding of the effects of derivative and hedging activities on future firm performance and firm value—and consequently mitigated investor mispricing.

We present a simple, linear asset pricing model of the cross section of Mortgage‐Backed Security (MBS) returns. MBS earn risk premia as compensation for their exposure to prepayment risk. We measure prepayment risk and estimate risk loadings using prepayment forecasts versus realizations. Estimated loadings on prepayment risk decrease monotonically in securities' coupons relative to the par coupon, consistent with the predicted effect of prepayment on bond value. Prepayment risk appears to be priced by specialized MBS investors. The price of prepayment risk changes sign over time with the sign of a representative MBS investor's exposure to prepayment shocks.

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires that insurers spend a minimum amount of their premium revenue on policyholder benefits. The Act specifies enforcement via a combination of insurer self-reporting, government examinations, and payment of policyholder rebates in cases where insurers fail to meet the required spending amount. We find that insurers' reported estimates are consistently overstated in situations in which more accurate estimates would have triggered rebate payments; publicly traded insurers (particularly those exhibiting poor financial reporting quality) exhibit the strongest evidence of strategic over-estimating. In aggregate, we estimate that approximately 14 percent of insurers engage in strategic over-estimates, and that insurer over-estimates resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars in underpaid policyholder rebates. Our study illustrates how a combination of regulatory design choices and lax oversight can weaken the effectiveness of accounting-based regulation and have substantial economic consequences.

Informed by Perceptual Deterrence Theory, we conduct multiple experiments to investigate when and how auditor actions can help deter manager opportunism. In Study 1A, we find that managers are less likely to use real earnings management (REM) when they expect auditors to both increase scrutiny and communicate their observations to the board. However, this effect occurs only when managers' operational decisions are inconsistent (versus consistent) with peer behavior. Study 1B findings suggest that increased auditor scrutiny alone (without auditor-board communication) is not likely to deter REM. In Study 2, we find that increased auditor scrutiny with communication to the board effectively deters both accruals-based earnings management (AEM) and REM, reducing the total level of manager opportunism. However, without communication, increased auditor scrutiny deters AEM, but also induces more REM. Our findings highlight the importance of auditor-board communication and demonstrate how auditor actions can contribute to the deterrence of manager opportunism. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

Although formal guidance instructs firms to avoid issuing lengthy and boilerplate risk factor disclosures, regulators and users of financial statements note these disclosures are excessively long and boilerplate. The persistence of these characteristics is surprising given that prior research finds that firms disclosing lengthy and boilerplate risk factors experience negative capital market consequences. We investigate two potential sources of firms' incentives to issue such disclosures by examining how judicial and regulatory assessments of firms' risk factor disclosures correlate with the disclosure length and boilerplate. Results suggest that lengthier and more boilerplate risk factor disclosures are less likely to be considered inadequate under judicial and regulatory review. Further analysis finds that when risk factor language is assessed as adequate in judicial review, industry peers borrow that language more frequently, and that judicial assessments of risk factor disclosures prompt industry peers to lengthen their risk factor disclosures.

We examine the effect of performance-based pay on misreporting intended to benefit a social mission. We show that performance-based pay decreases people's propensity to misreport for a social mission in a not-for-profit setting (Experiment 1). We similarly show that in a for-profit setting, performance-based pay also decreases misreporting propensity for a social mission, although not for a non-social mission (Experiment 2). Finally, using a framed field experiment with participants attending a conference hosted by a real charity, we show that performance-based pay reduces actual misreporting when misreporting leads to more donations for the charity (Experiment 3). These results are consistent with our theory suggesting that, relative to fixed pay, performance-based pay imposes additional costs on misreporting employees' self-concepts of benevolence and honesty.

A central challenge in securing property rights is the subversion of justice. We present a model of a polluter whose discharges harm multiple owners, and we compare property rules, liability rules, and regulation on efficiency grounds. We provide conditions under which property rules are preferred to liability rules, thus verifying the Calabresi-Melamed conjecture. Regulation that enforces partial abatement may be preferred to either of the extreme rules. An empirical analysis of water quality in the United States before and after the Clean Water Act shows that the effects of regulation are consistent with several predictions of the model.