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ESG shareholder engagement and downside risk

Review of Finance 2024 28(2), 483-510 open access
We show that engagement on environmental, social, and governance issues can benefit shareholders by reducing firms’ downside risks. We find that the risk reductions (measured using value at risk [VaR] and lower partial moments) vary across engagement types and success rates. Engagement is most effective in lowering downside risk when addressing environmental topics (primarily climate change). Further, targets with large downside risk reductions exhibit a decrease in environmental incidents after the engagement. We estimate that the VaR of engagement targets decreases by 9 percent of the standard deviation after successful engagements, relative to control firms.

Gender Pay Gap and Cultural Values

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2026 61(1), 511-546 open access
Employing a cross-country sample, we examine how a population’s underlying cultural values help explain gender compensation variation across corporate executives. The results show that the cultural differences, embedded in societies long before the board’s compensation decisions, have significant explanatory power for the observed gender gap in executive compensation. Using an Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition combined with variables previously shown to be fundamental determinants of executive compensation, we find that adding cultural measures increases the model’s explanatory power of the gender compensation gap from 44% to 95%. We use further identification strategies to support causal inference.

Defined Contribution Pension Plans: Sticky or Discerning Money?

Journal of Finance 2015 70(2), 805-838
Participants in defined contribution (DC) retirement plans rarely adjust their portfolio allocations, suggesting that their investment choices and consequent money flows are sticky and not discerning. However, participants’ inertia could be offset by DC plan sponsors, who adjust the plan's investment options. We examine these countervailing influences on flows into U.S. mutual funds. We find that flows into funds from DC assets are more volatile and exhibit more performance sensitivity than non‐DC flows, primarily due to adjustments to the investment options by the plan sponsors. Thus, DC retirement money is less sticky and more discerning than non‐DC money.

Conflicts of interest in sell-side research and the moderating role of institutional investors

Journal of Financial Economics 2007 85(2), 420-456
Because sell-side analysts are dependent on institutional investors for performance ratings and trading commissions, we argue that analysts are less likely to succumb to investment banking or brokerage pressure in stocks highly visible to institutional investors. Examining a comprehensive sample of analyst recommendations over the 1994–2000 period, we find that analysts’ recommendations relative to consensus are positively associated with investment banking relationships and brokerage pressure but negatively associated with the presence of institutional investor owners. The presence of institutional investors is also associated with more accurate earnings forecasts and more timely re-ratings following severe share price falls.

CEO Incentives for Risk-Taking and Compensation Duration

The Accounting Review 2024 99(6), 247-270 open access
When determining new equity grants, corporate boards face a tradeoff between the CEO’s incentives generated from the grant’s duration versus those arising from the convexity of the embedded equity risk. We hypothesize and find that boards lengthen the horizon of new compensation grants in the presence of greater pre-existing compensation sensitivity to stock return volatility (vega). In addition, consistent with our hypothesis, we find stronger results in the presence of greater left-tail risk. Further, employing two exogenous shocks to left-tail risk, we provide evidence consistent with our hypothesis that grant horizons are related to risk incentives. Our analysis of the interaction of these two incentive mechanisms provides new insights on compensation contracting.

Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors

Journal of Finance 2016 71(6), 2905-2932 open access
We survey institutional investors to better understand their role in the corporate governance of firms. Consistent with a number of theories, we document widespread behind‐the‐scenes intervention as well as governance‐motivated exit. These governance mechanisms are viewed as complementary devices, with intervention typically occurring prior to a potential exit. We further find that long‐term investors and investors that are less concerned about stock liquidity intervene more intensively. Finally, we find that most investors use proxy advisors and believe that the information provided by such advisors improves their own voting decisions.

Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long‐Term Perspective

Journal of Finance 2001 56(6), 2265-2297
We report evidence on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover during the 1971 to 1994 period. We find that the nature of CEO turnover activity has changed over time. The frequencies of forced CEO turnover and outside succession both increased. However, the relation between the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and firm performance did not change significantly from the beginning to the end of the period we examine, despite substantial changes in internal governance mechanisms. The evidence also indicates that changes in the intensity of the takeover market are not associated with changes in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.

Climate Risk Disclosure and Institutional Investors

Review of Financial Studies 2023 36(7), 2617-2650 open access
Through a survey and analyses of observational data, we provide systematic evidence that institutional investors value and demand climate risk disclosures. The survey reveals the investors have a strong demand for climate risk disclosures, and many actively engage their portfolio firms for improvements. Empirical analyses of holdings data corroborate this evidence by showing a significantly positive association between climate-conscious institutional ownership and better firm-level climate risk disclosure. We establish further evidence of institutional investors’ influence on firms’ climate risk disclosures by examining a shock to the climate risk disclosure demand of French institutional investors (French Article 173).