We study the determinants and consequences of cross-listings on the New York and London stock exchanges from 1990 to 2005. This investigation enables us to evaluate the relative benefits of New York and London exchange listings and to assess whether these relative benefits have changed over time, perhaps as a result of the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. We find that cross-listings have been falling on US exchanges as well as on the Main Market in London. This decline in cross-listings is explained by changes in firm characteristics instead of by changes in the benefits of cross-listing. We show that after controlling for firm characteristics there is no deficit in cross-listing counts on US exchanges related to SOX. Investigating the valuation differential between listed and non-listed firms (the cross-listing premium) from 1990 to 2005, we find that there is a significant premium for US exchange listings every year, that the premium has not fallen significantly in recent years, and that it persists when allowing for time-invariant unobservable firm characteristics. In contrast, no premium exists for listings on London's Main Market in any year. Firms increase their capital-raising activities at home and abroad following a cross-listing on a major US exchange but not following a cross-listing in London. Our evidence is consistent with the theory that an exchange listing in New York has unique governance benefits for foreign firms.

We model the demand-pressure effect on prices when options cannot be perfectly hedged. The model shows that demand pressure in one option contract increases its price by an amount proportional to the variance of the unhedgeable part of the option. Similarly, the demand pressure increases the price of any other option by an amount proportional to the covariance of their unhedgeable parts.

Many investors purchase mutual funds through intermediated channels, paying brokers or financial advisors for fund selection and advice. This article attempts to quantify the benefits that investors enjoy in exchange for the costs of these services. We study broker-sold and direct-sold funds from 1996 to 2004, and fail to find that brokers deliver substantial tangible benefits. Relative to direct-sold funds, broker-sold funds deliver lower risk-adjusted returns, even before subtracting distribution costs. These results hold across fund objectives, with the exception of foreign equity funds. Further, broker-sold funds exhibit no more skill at aggregate-level asset allocation than do funds sold through the direct channel. Our results are consistent with two hypotheses: that brokers deliver substantial intangible benefits that we do not observe and that there are material conflicts of interest between brokers and their clients. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

From 1988 to 2003, the average change in managerial ownership is significantly negative every year for American firms. We find that managers are more likely to significantly decrease their ownership when their firms are performing well and more likely to increase their ownership when their firms become financially constrained. When controlling for past stock returns, we find that large increases in managerial ownership increase Tobin's q. This result is driven by increases in shares held by officers, while increases in shares held by directors appear unrelated to changes in firm value. There is no evidence that large decreases in ownership have an adverse impact on firm value. We rely on the dynamics of the managerial ownership/firm value relation to mitigate concerns in the literature about the endogeneity of managerial ownership.

We examine short selling in US stocks based on new SEC-mandated data for 2005. There is a tremendous amount of short selling in our sample: short sales represent 24% of NYSE and 31% of Nasdaq share volume. Short sellers increase their trading following positive returns and they correctly predict future negative abnormal returns. These patterns are robust to controlling for voluntary liquidity provision and for opportunistic risk-bearing by short sellers. The results are consistent with short sellers trading on short-term overreaction of stock prices. A trading strategy based on daily short-selling activity generates significant positive returns during the sample period.

Compared to mutual funds, hedge funds prefer smaller, opaque value securities, and have higher turnover and more active share bets. Decomposing returns into three components, we find that hedge funds are better than mutual funds at stock picking by only 1.32% per year on a value-weighted basis, and this result is insignificant on an equal-weighted basis or with price-to-sales benchmarks. Hedge funds exhibit no ability to time sectors or pick better stock styles. Surprisingly, we find only weak evidence of differential ability between hedge funds. Overall, our study raises serious questions about the perceived superior skill of hedge fund managers.

This paper explores the relationship between information uncertainty and auditor reputation revealed by the failure of Arthur Andersen (AA). AA’s reputation deteriorated considerably when it announced on January 10, 2002, that it had shredded documents related to its audit of Enron. AA’s demise was sealed on March 14, 2002, with its indictment for obstruction of justice. We find that on these dates the clients of AA and other Big Five auditors that are characterized by higher information uncertainty experience relatively larger share price declines compared to clients with lower information uncertainty. The findings suggest that the market relies more heavily on auditor reputation for higher information uncertainty firms, which implies that the value of an audit is greater when a firm is harder to value. Our results highlight the importance of information uncertainty in financial markets: where there is a shock to auditor reputation, firms with greater information uncertainty suffer the largest losses.

The aim of this paper is to study whether a child's schooling choices are affected by the schooling choices of other children. Identification is based on a randomized targeted intervention that grants a cash subsidy conditional on school attendance to a subgroup of eligible children within small rural villages in Mexico (PROGRESA). This policy change spills over to ineligible children if social interactions are relevant. Results indicate that the eligible children tend to attend school more frequently, and the ineligible children acquire more schooling when the subsidy is introduced in their local village. Moreover, the overall effect of PROGRESA on eligible children is the sum of a direct effect due to cash transfers and an indirect effect due to changes in peer group schooling. Interestingly, the social interactions effect is almost as important as the direct effect.

Two key issues in the literature on female labor supply are (i) whether persistence in employment status is due to unobserved heterogeneity or state dependence, and (ii) whether fertility is exogenous to labor supply. Until recently, the consensus was that unobserved heterogeneity is very important and fertility is endogenous. Hyslop (1999) challenged this. Using a dynamic panel probit model of female labor supply including heterogeneity and state dependence, he found that adding autoregressive errors led to a substantial diminution in the importance of heterogeneity. This, in turn, meant he could not reject that fertility is exogenous. Here, we extend Hyslop (1999) to allow classification error in employment status, using an estimation procedure developed by Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Keane and Sauer (2005). We find that a fairly small amount of classification error is enough to overturn Hyslop's conclusions, leading to overwhelming rejection of the hypothesis of exogenous fertility.

We showed 10-second, silent video clips of unfamiliar gubernatorial debates to a group of experimental participants and asked them to predict the election outcomes. The participants' predictions explain more than 20 percent of the variation in the actual two-party vote share across the 58 elections in our study, and their importance survives a range of controls, including state fixed effects. In a horse race of alternative forecasting models, participants' forecasts significantly outperform economic variables in predicting vote shares, and are comparable in predictive power to a measure of incumbency status. Participants' forecasts seem to rest on judgments of candidates' personal attributes (such as likeability), rather than inferences about candidates' policy positions. Though conclusive causal inference is not possible in our context, our findings may be seen as suggestive evidence of a causal effect of candidate appeal on election outcomes.