ABSTRACT We have two primary objectives in this study. First, we examine the frequency of attaining simultaneous equilibrium on spot and forward foreign exchange markets and on domestic and foreign securities markets. Second, we measure the profitability of covered interest arbitrage and one‐way arbitrage. Our empirical analysis has been conducted using real‐time quotations. The empirical results indicate that: (a) the markets are efficient in the sense that profit opportunities from traditional covered interest arbitrage are rarely available; and (b) the frequency of attaining simultaneous market equilibrium is surprisingly low, thus opening the door for one‐way arbitrage.

[Much of the past research in accounting ethics has focused on whether accountants conform to prescribed codes of professional ethics. Other research has been normative in nature, recommending what constitutes appropriate ethical conduct or focusing on the accountant's responsibility in society. This study selects a different approach by testing a multivariate measure of how accountants make ethical judgments. Data were gathered with the assistance of the Institute of Certified Management Accountants and the Institute of Management Accountants (formerly the National Association of Accountants). Accountants were asked to respond on bipolar scales to realistic scenarios involving ethical decisions. Several tests for construct validity produced supportive results for the hypothesized three-dimensional measure, with the dimensions being moral equity, relativism, and contractualism. First, we developed a questionnaire with four scenarios concerning ethical issues. Each scenario ended in a particular action taken by an individual. Responses to that action were recorded on eight bipolar scales, representing the three dimensions above. The questionnaire was mailed to 500 randomly selected certified management accountants resulting in a 62.8 percent response rate. Second, the results from a factor analysis and a traditional reliability coefficient test suggest that a high degree of internal consistency exists for each dimension of the measure. The appropriate factor loadings ranged from a low of 0.68 to a high of 0.92, while the reliability coefficients varied from 0.75 to 0.92. Next, the content validity of the three-dimensional measure was checked by comparing it with a global ethical/unethical measure. Again, the results support the hypothesis that the multivariate measure captures the appropriate domain of content. Adjusted R2 -values ranged from 0.59 to 0.76 when the global measure was regressed against the multivariate measure. Finally, a sense of predictive validity was obtained by comparing the multivariate measure with a behavioral intention measure for the respondent. Adjusted R2 -values ranged from 0.45 to 0.76 for the four scenarios tested, indicating that the three-dimensional measure "explains" a respectable portion of the variance in the behavioral intention of the individual. The multidimensional measure developed in this study may be a guide for future research into how accountants make ethical judgments. Such knowledge can be used in turn to develop useful codes of conduct, create ethical organizational cultures, and direct ethical training for and by accountants.]

The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act was enacted to monitor minority and low-income access to the mortgage market. The data collected for this purpose show that minorities are more than twice as likely to be denied a mortgage as whites. Yet variables correlated with both race and creditworthiness were omitted from these data, making any conclusion about race's role in mortgage lending impossible. The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston collected additional variables important to the mortgage lending decision and found that race continued to play an important, though significantly diminished, role in the decision to grant a mortgage. Copyright 1996 by American Economic Association.

ABSTRACT Much of the research on corporate restructuring has examined the causes and aftermath of extreme changes in corporate governance such as takeovers and bankruptcy. In contrast, we study restructurings initiated in response to product market pressures by “normal” corporate governance mechanisms. Such “voluntary” restructurings, motivated by the discipline of the product market and internal corporate controls, will play a relatively more important role in the 1990s due to a weakening in the discipline of the takeover market. Our data suggest that the firms retrenched quickly and, on average, increased their focus. There is no evidence of abnormally high levels of forced turnover in top managers. There is, however, a significant and rapid cut of 5% in the labor force. Further, the cost of goods sold to sales and labor costs to sales ratios both decline rapidly, more than 5% in the first two years after the negative earnings. The firms cut research and development, increased investment, and also reduced their debt/asset level by over 8% in the first year after the negative earnings. We also document the reasons management and analysis reported for the negative earnings. Overwhelmingly the firms blame bad economic conditions and, to a lesser extent, foreign competition.

Much of the research on corporate restructuring has examined the causes and aftermath of extreme changes in corporate governance such as takeovers and bankruptcy. In contrast, we study restructurings initiated in response to product market pressures by “normal” corporate governance mechanisms. Such “voluntary” restructurings, motivated by the discipline of the product market and internal corporate controls, will play a relatively more important role in the 1990s due to a weakening in the discipline of the takeover market. Our data suggest that the firms retrenched quickly and, on average, increased their focus. There is no evidence of abnormally high levels of forced turnover in top managers. There is, however, a significant and rapid cut of 5% in the labor force. Further, the cost of goods sold to sales and labor costs to sales ratios both decline rapidly, more than 5% in the first two years after the negative earnings. The firms cut research and development, increased investment, and also reduced their debt/asset level by over 8% in the first year after the negative earnings. We also document the reasons management and analysis reported for the negative earnings. Overwhelmingly the firms blame bad economic conditions and, to a lesser extent, foreign competition.