This paper examines the costs and determinants of order aggressiveness. Aggressive orders have larger price impacts but smaller opportunity costs than passive orders. Price impacts are amplified by large orders, small firms, and volatile stock prices. To minimize the implementation shortfall, the optimal strategy is to enter buy (sell) orders at the bid (ask). Aggressive buy (sell) orders tend to follow other aggressive buy (sell) orders and occur when bid–ask spreads are narrow and depth on the same (opposite) side of the limit book is large (small). Aggressive buys are more likely than sells to be motivated by information.

China has an A-share market that is open only to local investors and a B-share market that is open only to foreign investors. Contrary to what has been observed in other markets with a similar segmented structure, the China B shares trade at a discount relative to the A shares. We show that the phenomenon can still be explained by basic economic principles. Specifically, the existence of the H-share and the “red-chip” markets in Hong Kong provide good substitutes for the B-share market. We find that when more H shares and red chips are listed in Hong Kong, the B-share discount becomes larger. This is consistent with the model of differential demand elasticity proposed by Stulz and Wasserfallen (Stulz, R., Wasserfallen, W., 1995. Review of Financial Studies 8, 1019–1057).

California's longstanding requirement that most women receive time-and-a-half pay for workhours beyond eight in one day was extended to men in 1980. Analyzing Current Population Survey data from 1973, 1985, and 1991, we find that this overtime penalty substantially reduced the amount of daily overtime worked by California men relative to men in other states. Comparisons that use women to control for California-specific shocks show even stronger effects. The estimates imply a price elasticity of demand for overtime hours of at least 20.5.

This paper provides a consistent international comparison of the patterns of growth in Canadian and U.S. industries. While much previous work has been done comparing sectoral (total factor) productivity in these two countries, the methods are not entirely comparable. Our approach here is to use methods and definitions that are almost identical for the two countries and therefore to provide a better sense of the relative productivity performance of the two countries. Our methodology for international comparisons of growth in output, inputs, and productivity is based on the economic theory of production. We use measures of labor and capital that take into account the changing composition of the labor force and capital stocks (relatively more educated and older workers, and relatively more equipment compared to structures). We find that, during the 1961–1973 period, Canadian industries were able to bring their productivity levels closer to U.S. levels, and they also had a higher rate of output growth. However, the growth in output and productivity slowed down after 1973 in both countries. As a result, the gap in the level of productivity between the Canadian and U.S. industries has remained virtually unchanged since 1973. Looking closely at the sources of industrial output growth, we find that input growth is the predominant source of the growth for almost all industries in the two countries over the 1961– 1995 period. Productivity growth contributes, on average, only about 20 percent of the growth of industrial output in the two countries over this period.

A recent paper in this Journal by Kaplan and Zingales reexamines a subset of firms from work of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen and criticizes the usefulness of investment-cash flow sensitivities for detecting financing constraints. We show that the Kaplan and Zingales theoretical model fails to capture the approach employed in the literature and thus does not provide an effective critique. Moreover, we describe why their empirical classification system is flawed in identifYing both whether firms are constrained and the relative degree of constraints across firm groups. We conclude that their results do not support their conclusions about the usefulness of investment-cash flow sensitivities.

A Theory of Rigid Extremists and Flexible Moderates with an Application to the U.S. Congress by S. Brock Blomberg and Joseph E. Harrington. Published in volume 90, issue 3, pages 605-620 of American Economic Review, June 2000

We derive an expression for the critical stock price for the American put. We start by expressing the put price as an integral involving first‐passage probabilities. This approach yields intuition for Merton's result for the perpetual put. We then consider the finite‐lived case. Using (1) the fact that the put value ceases to depend on time when the critical stock price is reached and (2) the result that an American put equals a European put plus an early‐exercise premium, we derive the critical stock price. We approximate the critical‐stock‐price function to compute accurate put prices.

We study the pricing effects of dividend and earnings announcements by taking advantage of the unique setting in Japan where managers simultaneously announce the current year's dividends and earnings as well as forecasts of next year's dividends and earnings. Defining surprises as deviations from analysts' forecasts, we find that share price reactions are significantly affected by earnings surprises, especially management forecasts of next year's earnings. The information content of dividends is marginal and is restricted to announcements of next year's dividends. Consistent with Modigliani and Miller's dividend irrelevance proposition, current dividend surprises have no material impact on stock prices in Japan.

This paper extends the theory of non‐cash auctions by considering the revenue and efficiency of using different securities. Research on bankruptcy and privatization suggests using non‐cash auctions to increase cash‐constrained bidder participation. We examine this proposal and demonstrate that securities may lead to higher revenue. However, bidders pool unless bids include debt, which results in possible repossession by the seller. This suggests all‐equity outcomes are unlikely and explains the high debt of reorganized firms. Securities also inefficiently determine bidders' incentive contracts and the firm's capital structure. Therefore, we recommend a new cash auction for an incentive contract.

Knowledge Spillovers and Patent Citations: Evidence from a Survey of Inventors by Adam B. Jaffe, Manuel Trajtenberg and Michael S. Fogarty. Published in volume 90, issue 2, pages 215-218 of American Economic Review, May 2000