Multi-asset class, multimarket central counterparties (CCPs) are becoming less uncommon as a result of merges between specialized (single-asset class, single market) CCPs and market demands for greater capital efficiency. Yet, traditional CCP risk management models often lack the necessary sophistication to estimate potential losses relative to the closeout process of a defaulter’s portfolio in a multi-asset class, multimarket environment. As a result, multi-asset class, multimarket CCPs usually rely on a simplified silo approach for risk calculation which not only fails to deliver efficiency, but may also increase systemic risk. The CORE (Closeout Risk Evaluation) approach, on the other hand, provides conceptual and mathematical tools necessary for robust and efficient central counterparty risk evaluation in multi-asset class and multimarket environments, acknowledging the portfolio dynamics involved in the closeout process as well as important “real life” market frictions.

Prior work in emerging markets provides evidence that better corporate governance predicts higher market value, but very little evidence on the specific channels through which governance can increase value. We provide evidence, from a natural experiment in Korea, that reduced tunneling is an important channel. Korean legal reform in 1999 changed the board structure of “large” firms (assets extgreater2 trillion won) relative to smaller firms. In event studies of the reform events, we show that large firms whose controllers have incentive to tunnel earn strong positive returns, relative to mid-sized firms. In panel regressions over 1998–2004, we also show that better governance moderates the negative effect of related-party transactions on value and increases the sensitivity of firm profitability to industry profitability (consistent with less tunneling).

Faced with numerous potential catastrophes—nuclear and bioterrorism, mega-viruses, climate change, and others—which should society attempt to avert? A policy to avert one catastrophe considered in isolation might be evaluated in cost-benefit terms. But because society faces multiple catastrophes, simple cost-benefit analysis fails: even if the benefit of averting each one exceeds the cost, we should not necessarily avert them all. We explore the policy interdependence of catastrophic events, and develop a rule for determining which catastrophes should be averted and which should not. (JEL D61, Q51, Q54)

Credit default risk for an obligor can be hedged with either a credit default swap (CDS) or a constant maturity credit default swap (CMCDS). We find strong evidence of persistent differences in the hedging cost associated with the two comparable contracts. Between 2001 and 2006, it would have been more profitable to sell CDS and buy CMCDS while after the crisis between 2008 and 2013 the opposite strategy was profitable. Panel data tests indicate that for our sample period the implied forward CDS rates are unbiased estimates of future spot CDS rates. The changes in the company implied volatility is the main determinant of trading inefficiencies, followed by the changes in GDP and in the interest rates before the crisis, and the changes in sentiment index and in the VIX after the crisis.

Unemployment Insurance benefit durations were extended during the Great Recession, reaching 99 weeks for most recipients. The extensions were rolled back and eventually terminated by the end of 2013. Using matched CPS data from 2008-2014, we estimate the effect of extended benefits on unemployment exits separately during the earlier period of benefit expansion and the later period of rollback. In both periods, we find little or no effect on job-finding but a reduction in labor force exits due to benefit availability. We estimate that the rollbacks reduced the labor force participation rate by about 0.1 percentage point in early 2014.

We extend traditional agency theory by exploring the roles for formal measures when managerial behavior is not governed by rules, formulas, or contracts. Part I describes relational incentive contracts with informal weights on formal performance measures. More importantly, it also explores how formal measures could be used in models of informal management, such as adaptation and coordination, politics and influence, leadership, and informal authority. Part II considers the benefits from allowing key stakeholders to develop their own, potentially inferior, performance measures. The collaboration to create a “balanced scorecard” of performance measures can help change an organization's culture.

ABSTRACT We examine how strategic trade affects expected returns in a large economy. In our model, both a monopolist (strategic) informed trader and uninformed traders consider the impact of their demands on prices. In contrast to settings with price-taking traders, private information never eliminates a priced risk, and can lead to higher risk premiums. Also unlike settings with price-taking informed traders, risk premiums decrease in response to an increase in liquidity-motivated trades in diversified portfolios. These differing effects arise because a privately informed strategic trader conceals her trades by taking small positions relative to the magnitude of noise trades. Although prices partially reveal her information and reduce uncertainty, a concomitant decrease in her risk absorption dominates and leads to higher risk premiums. Similar to settings with price-taking traders, private information affects expected returns only via factor loadings and risk premiums on existing payoff risks—it introduces no new priced risks, and factor loadings (betas) explain all cross-sectional differences in expected returns.

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It has been proposed that geography influences economic growth for many reasons. Previous analyses of comparative development seem to have sidestepped the question of location-dependent depreciation. However the construction of new measures of tropical cyclone exposure enables us to consider the potential impact of this single source of capital depreciation. Using an estimate of asset destruction due to tropical cyclones, we identify the “sandcastle depreciation” rate, and find support for location-dependent depreciation by looking at average growth rates. This leads us to propose that heterogeneous and geographically-dependent depreciation rates may play an important role in global patterns of economic development.

This paper explores the impact of the introduction of the widely viewed MTV reality show 16 and Pregnant on teen childbearing. Our main analysis relates geographic variation in changes in teen childbearing rates to viewership of the show. We implement an instrumental variables (IV ) strategy using local area MTV ratings data from a pre-period to predict local area 16 and Pregnant ratings. The results imply that this show led to a 4.3 percent reduction in teen births. An examination of Google Trends and Twitter data suggest that the show led to increased interest in contraceptive use and abortion.