ABSTRACT We study how nonfinancial firms’ operating risks change after bank competition increases. By exploiting the 1990s staggered regulatory reforms across U.S. states that allowed interstate banking and branching, we show that out-of-state bank entry was associated with lower borrower risk-taking on average. Large, profitable, safe, and geographically diversified firms signed up as new clients of large entrant banks, which offered larger and cheaper loans that reflected their higher efficiency and risk reduction through geographical diversification. We argue that these large banks could substitute for local relationship lending with more data collection from branches in multiple states. Firms that began borrowing from entrant banks increased capital expenditures and project-specific financing and kept R&D expenses stable but reduced R&D risk. Firms that continued borrowing from incumbent banks paid higher interest rates and increased their risk, suggesting that their credit access fell. States that opened up more had bigger changes in these outcomes. Data availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G21; G28; G32.

Platform-based information sharing among competing firms presents challenges for antitrust authorities, yet effective remedies remain unclear. Drawing inspiration from the Informed Sources retail gasoline antitrust case, we develop a theoretical model that offers policy guidance for disrupting anticompetitive coordination facilitated through price-sharing platforms. Removing only one firm from a platform may be ineffective for disrupting such coordination. However, competitive benefits can emerge if (i) at least two firms lack platform access, and (ii) the costs of price leadership are sufficiently high. More broadly, coordinating price increases becomes more difficult when multiple firms cannot quickly observe or respond to rivals' prices.

ABSTRACT We examine the economic implications of digital traffic on firms’ financial performance, stock valuation, and financial surprises. Our analysis shows that timely flows of digital traffic are contemporaneous and leading indicators of firms’ revenue and profitability—both gross and operating. Moreover, we show that digital traffic contains novel information about firms’ future performance that is not entirely reflected in stock prices, analyst forecasts, or historical (i.e., time series) financial metrics. Notably, digital-traffic-based investment strategies are lucrative and generate substantial abnormal returns. Importantly, we also adduce evidence that corroborates our conjecture about the underlying economic mechanism that explains the valuation implications of digital traffic: These are driven by firms with consumer-oriented websites that facilitate sale transactions. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: E32; G32; O33.

We analyze how the legal enforceability of noncompete agreements (NCAs) affects labor markets. Using newly constructed panel data, we find that higher NCA enforceability diminishes workers? earnings and job mobility, with larger effects among workers most likely to sign NCAs. These effects are far-reaching: increasing enforceability imposes externalities on workers across state borders, suggesting broad effects on labor market dynamism. We show that enforceability affects wages by reducing outside options and preventing workers from leveraging tight labor markets to increase earnings. We motivate these findings with a model of search and bargaining. Finally, higher NCA enforceability exacerbates gender and racial earnings gaps.

ABSTRACT Following securities law violations, regulators can require firms to hire a corporate monitor to implement reforms that limit future misconduct and protect investors. We examine the determinants of including a corporate monitor as equitable relief in an enforcement action, as well as their effectiveness in promoting positive change at a firm. Using a structural equation model that jointly determines monetary and nonmonetary sanctions, we find that monitor assignments are related to the nature of the offense, violation severity, and investor harm. We also find that monitors with targeted accounting oversight responsibilities are associated with improved corporate culture, a higher likelihood of financial restatements during their tenure, and enhanced financial reporting credibility at the firms they oversee relative to enforcement firms without such monitors. Although corporate monitors can foster positive change, their impact depends on the scope of their responsibilities. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: K22; M14; M41; M42; M48.

ABSTRACT We investigate whether differences in the mix of financial covenants in debt contracts (i.e., covenant heterogeneity) reflect—and provide a way for lenders to elicit, or screen—borrowers’ pre-contractual private information about their future risk profile. Consistent with adverse selection theories, we predict and find that borrowers with higher future risk negotiate loans with covenants that are less sensitive to performance, compared to borrowers with lower future risk. We differentiate between screening and incentive explanations for this finding and provide evidence that screening accounts for a substantial portion of this overall relation. Our study highlights how, in addition to shaping borrowers’ incentives through monitoring, covenant heterogeneity reflects borrowers’ future risk profiles and can help lenders screen accordingly. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G21; G32; G34.

ABSTRACT We examine how the SEC’s 2014 Municipalities Continuing Disclosure Cooperation initiative (MCDC) affects disclosure compliance in the municipal bond market. The MCDC granted favorable settlement terms to municipal debt issuers and underwriters who voluntarily self-reported having violated SEC disclosure requirements. Although underwriters participated widely, most municipal issuers did not participate in the MCDC initiative despite having publicly observable disclosure violations. We find that, after the MCDC, official statements were less likely to contain false claims about past compliance—particularly when underwriters had participated—suggesting improved underwriter oversight of the initial bond offering. However, contrary to the SEC’s intention, we observe a 9 percent post-MCDC decrease in issuers’ compliance with continuing disclosure requirements compared with a control group of voluntarily disclosing issuers. Our findings provide no evidence that the MCDC improved continuing disclosure compliance; rather, the MCDC may have instead exacerbated noncompliance by exposing the weaknesses of the existing regulatory regime. JEL Classifications: G24; G28; H74; M40; M41.

ABSTRACT We empirically analyze firm‐level uncertainty generated from extreme weather events, guided by a theoretical framework. Stock options of firms with establishments in a hurricane's (forecast) landfall region exhibit large implied volatility increases, reflecting significant uncertainty (before) after impact. Volatility risk premium dynamics reveal that investors underestimate such uncertainty. This underreaction diminishes for hurricanes after Sandy, a salient event that struck the U.S. financial center. Despite constituting idiosyncratic shocks, hurricanes affect hit firms' expected stock returns. Textual analysis of calls between firm management, analysts, and investors reveals that discussions about hurricane impacts remain elevated throughout the long‐lasting high‐uncertainty period after landfall.

ABSTRACT The concept of materiality has acquired great significance in sustainability reporting. Through the theoretical bricolage of boundary objects and boundary work and drawing upon 91 interviews, we trace materiality’s evolving role across four interconnected episodes. Our findings show that materiality begins as a multivisionary object that draws the attention of largely unconnected groups. As different actors become more aware of each other, materiality becomes a meeting point object, and then a discursive and bridge-like object for them to talk about their relationships. However, the subsequent escalation of competitive boundary work turns materiality into a divisive institutional object that inhibits cooperation. Moving beyond a view of materiality as a way to distinguish significant information within corporate reports, our analysis fleshes out the visionary and relational roles that materiality has performed in sustainability reporting for a broad range of field-level actors to see themselves and their relationships to others in new lights.

Using a natural experiment from a retail gasoline antitrust case, we study how asymmetric information sharing affects oligopoly pricing. Empirically, price competition softens when, following case settlement, information sharing shifts from symmetric to asymmetric, with one firm losing access to high-frequency granular rival price data. We provide theory and empirics illustrating how strategic ignorance creates price commitment, leading to higher price-cost margins. Using a structural model, we find substantial profit-enhancing effects of asymmetric information sharing. These results provide a cautionary tale for antitrust agencies regarding the potential unintended consequences of limiting price information sharing among firms.