We analyze a dynamic game between consumers and the sole seller of a durable good. Unlike previous analyses, we assume that there exists a finite collection of buyers rather than a continuum. None of the main conclusions of the literature on durable-goods monopoly survives this change in assumption. Coase's conjecture that a durable-goods monopolist cannot earn supracompetitive profits in the continuous-time limit, Bulow's proposition that renting a durable is always more profitable than selling it, and Stokey's proposition that precommitting to a time path of prices is always optimal are all false when the set of buyers is finite. Thus the assumption of a continuum of consumers--so innocuous and useful a simplification in other contexts--has proved misleading in the context of durable-goods monopoly.

Successful platforms attract not just many users, but also those of the right kind. 'The right kind of user' is one who can either be directly monetized or who differentially attracts other valuable users. Bonacich centrality on the network of user sorting with direct value of monetization captures this feedback loop and thus characterizes the value of user characteristics. We use this value to determine optimal steady-state platform design and reliable means for platforms to reach such a steady state. We apply these results respectively to explain the dynamic growth strategy of social networks and urban development policies of cities.

IRBs can disallow high incentives they deem coercive. A vignette study on MTurk concerning participation in medical trials shows that a substantial minority of subjects concurs. They think high incentives cause more regret, and that more people would be better off without the opportunity to participate. We model observers as judging the ethicality of incentives by partially using their own utility. The model predicts that payments are repugnant only to the extent that they affect the participation decision, and more so for larger transactions. Incentivizing poorer participants is more repugnant, and in-kind incentives are less repugnant than monetary incentives.

We compare the structure and performance of private (non-GSE) mortgage-backed securities sold by large issuers vs. those sold by small issuers over the period 2000–2006. Securities sold by large issuers have less subordination—a greater fraction of the deal receiving AAA rating—than those sold by small issuers. Prices for AAA-rated and non-AAA rated tranches sold by large issuers fell more when the market turned down than those sold by small issuers, and this difference was concentrated among tranches issued between 2004 and 2006. These results suggest that rating agencies grant favorable ratings to large issuers, especially during market booms.

Why Are Recessions Good for Your Health? by Douglas L. Miller, Marianne E. Page, Ann Huff Stevens and Mateusz Filipski. Published in volume 99, issue 2, pages 122-27 of American Economic Review, May 2009

Although the increase in non-GAAP earnings metrics has drawn unfavorable attention from regulators and standard setters, it can provide valuable experience for investors. We investigate whether experience with non-GAAP earnings metrics influences investors’ pricing of non-GAAP exclusions. We measure experience as the frequency with which managers or analysts provide non-GAAP earnings over the prior eight quarters and find that experience aids in the pricing of non-GAAP exclusions. Absent prior experience with non-GAAP earnings metrics, investors appear to overestimate the persistence of exclusions at the earnings announcement, which corrects in the following months. Cross-sectional tests suggest that experience facilitates investors’ pricing of non-GAAP exclusions by reducing their information processing costs.

We provide evidence that choices over small-stakes bets are consistent with assumptions of some payoff calibration paradoxes. We then exploit the existence of detailed information on individual wealth of our experimental subjects in Denmark and directly estimate risk attitudes and the degree of asset integration. We discover that behavior is consistent with partial, rather than full, asset integration. The implied risk attitudes from estimating these specifications indicate risk premiums and certainty equivalents that are a priori plausible. This theory and evidence suggest one constructive solution to payoff calibration paradoxes.

We ask whether mutual funds’ flows reflect the incentives of the brokers intermediating them. The incentives we address are those revealed in statutory filings: the brokers’ shares of sales loads and other revenue, and their affiliation with the fund family. We find significant effects of these payments to brokers on funds’ inflows, particularly when the brokers are not affiliated. Tracking these investments forward, we find load sharing, but not revenue sharing, to predict poor performance, consistent with the different incentives these payments impart. We identify one benefit of captive brokerage, which is the recapture of redemptions elsewhere in the family.

Using 40 countries’ subnational data, we estimate age-specific mortality-temperature relationships and extrapolate them to countries without data today and into a future with climate change. We uncover a U-shaped relationship where extre6me cold and hot temperatures increase mortality rates, especially for the elderly. Critically, this relationship is flattened by higher incomes and adaptation to local climate. Using a revealed-preference approach to recover unobserved adaptation costs, we estimate that the mean global increase in mortality risk due to climate change, accounting for adaptation benefits and costs, is valued at roughly 3.2% of global GDP in 2100 under a high-emissions scenario. Notably, today’s cold locations are projected to benefit, while today’s poor and hot locations have large projected damages. Finally, our central estimates indicate that the release of an additional ton of CO2 today will cause mortality-related damages of $36.6 under a high-emissions scenario, with an interquartile range accounting for both econometric and climate uncertainty of [−$7.8, $73.0]. These empirically grounded estimates exceed the previous literature’s estimates by an order of magnitude.