Most of the evidence on consumption‐based asset pricing is based on seasonally adjusted consumption data. The consumption‐based models have not worked well for explaining asset returns, but with seasonally adjusted data there are reasons to expect spurious rejections of the models. This paper examines asset pricing models using not seasonally adjusted aggregate consumption data. We find evidence against models with time‐separable preferences, even when the models incorporate seasonality and allow seasonal heteroskedasticity. A model that uses not seasonally adjusted consumption data and nonseparable preferences with seasonal effects works better according to several criteria. The parameter estimates imply a form of seasonal habit persistence in aggregate consumption expenditures.

Using transaction data on the S&P 100 index options, we study the effect of valuation simplifications that are commonplace in previous research on the timeseries properties of implied market volatility. Using an American‐style algorithm that accounts for the discrete nature of the dividends on the S&P 100 index, we find that spurious negative serial correlation in implied volatility changes is induced by nonsimultaneously observing the option price and the index level. Negative serial correlation is also induced by a bid/ask price effect if a single option is used to estimate implied volatility. In addition, we find that these same effects induce spurious (and unreasonable) negative cross‐correlations between the changes in call and put implied volatility.

This paper provides an analysis of the predictable components of monthly common stock and bond portfolio return. Most of the predictability is associated with sensitivity to economic variables in a rational asset pricing model with multiple betas. The stock market risk premium is the most important for capturing predictable variation of the stock portfolios, while premiums associated with interest rate risks capture predictability of the bond returns. Time variation in the premium for beta risk is more important than changes in the betas.

We survey 384 financial executives and conduct in-depth interviews with an additional 23 to determine the factors that drive dividend and share repurchase decisions. Our findings indicate that maintaining the dividend level is on par with investment decisions, while repurchases are made out of the residual cash flow after investment spending. Perceived stability of future earnings still affects dividend policy as in Lintner (1956. American Economic Review 46, 97–113). However, 50 years later, we find that the link between dividends and earnings has weakened. Many managers now favor repurchases because they are viewed as being more flexible than dividends and can be used in an attempt to time the equity market or to increase earnings per share. Executives believe that institutions are indifferent between dividends and repurchases and that payout policies have little impact on their investor clientele. In general, management views provide little support for agency, signaling, and clientele hypotheses of payout policy. Tax considerations play a secondary role.

This article uses a unique dataset to study how firms managed liquidity during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Our analysis provides new insights on interactions between internal liquidity, external funds, and real corporate decisions, such as investment and employment. We first describe how companies used credit lines during the crisis (access, size of facilities, and drawdown activity), the characteristics of these facilities (fees, markups, maturity, and collateral), and whether managers had difficulties in renewing or initiating lines. We also describe the dynamics of credit line violations and the outcome of subsequent renegotiations. We show how companies substitute between credit lines and internal liquidity (cash and profits) when facing a severe credit shortage. Looking at real-side decisions, we find that credit lines are associated with greater spending when companies are not cash-strapped. Firms with limited access to credit lines, in contrast, appear to choose between saving and investing during the crisis. Our evidence indicates that credit lines eased the impact of the financial crisis on corporate spending.

Given the cross-sectional and temporal variation in their liquidity, emerging equity markets provide an ideal setting to examine the impact of liquidity on expected returns. Our main liquidity measure is a transformation of the proportion of zero daily firm returns, averaged over the month. We find that it significantly predicts future returns, whereas alternative measures such as turnover do not. Consistent with liquidity being a priced factor, unexpected liquidity shocks are positively correlated with contemporaneous return shocks and negatively correlated with shocks to the dividend yield. We consider a simple asset-pricing model with liquidity and the market portfolio as risk factors and transaction costs that are proportional to liquidity. The model differentiates between integrated and segmented countries and time periods. Our results suggest that local market liquidity is an important driver of expected returns in emerging markets, and that the liberalization process has not fully eliminated its impact.

Ninety-two percent of the 1348 North American executives we survey believe that improving corporate culture would increase firm value. A striking 84% believe their company needs to improve its culture. But how can that be achieved? Our paper provides some guidance by documenting the following: executives’ views on what corporate culture is and how it operates, distinguishing between stated values and everyday norms; the extent to which culture is perceived to influence value creation (productivity, mergers), ethical choices (compliance, short-termism), and innovation (creativity, risk-taking); and a list of obstacles that can prevent culture from being where it should be (inattentive leaders, misaligned incentive compensation). Finally, we provide evidence that the executives’ survey responses are consistent with external data.

We analyze a panel of over 28,400 S&P 500 return forecasts by CFOs to examine whether the extent of CFOs’ miscalibration—providing forecast confidence intervals that are too narrow—decreases over time. We find no improvement with task repetition nor evidence of learning, that is, no improvement in response to past performance. Across CFOs, miscalibration appears to be a persistent personal trait. We find some evidence that the degree of miscalibration is related to birth cohort and stock market familiarity.

Measuring the impact of political risk on investment projects is one of the most vexing issues in international business. One popular approach is to assume that the sovereign yield spread captures political risk and to augment the project discount rate by this spread. We show that this approach is flawed. While the sovereign spread is influenced by political risk, it also reflects other risks that are likely included in the valuation analysis — leading to the double counting of risks. We propose to use “political risk spreads” to undo the double counting in the evaluation of international investment projects.