The average annual inflation-adjusted amount paid out through dividends and repurchases by public industrial firms is more than three times larger from 2000 to 2019 than from 1971 to 1999. We find that an increase in aggregate corporate income accounts for 37% of the increase in aggregate annual payouts, and an increase in the payout rate accounts for 63%. Firms have higher payout rates in the 2000s not only because they are older, larger, and have more free cash flow, but also because they pay out more of their free cash flow. Though firms spend less on capital expenditures in the 2000s than before, capital expenditures decrease similarly for firms with payouts and for firms without.

Liquidity production is a central function of banks. High leverage is optimal for banks in a model that has just enough frictions for banks to have a meaningful role in liquid-claim production. The model has a market premium for (socially valuable) safe/liquid debt, but no taxes or other traditional motives to lever up. Because only safe debt commands a liquidity premium, banks with risky assets use risk management to maximize their capacity to include such debt in the capital structure. The model can explain why banks have higher leverage than most operating firms, why risk management is central to banks׳ operating policies, why bank leverage increased over the last 150 years or so, and why leverage limits for regulated banks impede their ability to compete with unregulated shadow banks.

Though overall bank performance from July 2007 to December 2008 was the worst since the Great Depression, there is significant variation in the cross-section of stock returns of large banks across the world during that period. We use this variation to evaluate the importance of factors that have been put forth as having contributed to the poor performance of banks during the credit crisis. The evidence is supportive of theories that emphasize the fragility of banks financed with short-term capital market funding. The better-performing banks had less leverage and lower returns immediately before the crisis. Differences in banking regulations across countries are generally uncorrelated with the performance of banks during the crisis, except that large banks from countries with more restrictions on bank activities performed better and decreased loans less. Our evidence poses a substantial challenge to those who argue that poor bank governance was a major cause of the crisis because we find that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards performed significantly worse during the crisis than other banks, were not less risky before the crisis, and reduced loans more during the crisis.

We investigate whether bank performance during the recent credit crisis is related to chief executive officer (CEO) incentives before the crisis. We find some evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of shareholders performed worse and no evidence that they performed better. Banks with higher option compensation and a larger fraction of compensation in cash bonuses for their CEOs did not perform worse during the crisis. Bank CEOs did not reduce their holdings of shares in anticipation of the crisis or during the crisis. Consequently, they suffered extremely large wealth losses in the wake of the crisis.

From 1988 to 2003, the average change in managerial ownership is significantly negative every year for American firms. We find that managers are more likely to significantly decrease their ownership when their firms are performing well and more likely to increase their ownership when their firms become financially constrained. When controlling for past stock returns, we find that large increases in managerial ownership increase Tobin's q. This result is driven by increases in shares held by officers, while increases in shares held by directors appear unrelated to changes in firm value. There is no evidence that large decreases in ownership have an adverse impact on firm value. We rely on the dynamics of the managerial ownership/firm value relation to mitigate concerns in the literature about the endogeneity of managerial ownership.

Differences in culture, proxied by differences in religion and language, cannot be ignored when examining why investor protection differs across countries. We show that a country's principal religion predicts the cross-sectional variation in creditor rights better than a country's natural openness to international trade, its language, its income per capita, or the origin of its legal system. Catholic countries protect the rights of creditors less well than Protestant countries. A country's natural openness to international trade mitigates the influence of religion on creditor rights. Culture proxies are also helpful in understanding how investor rights are enforced across countries.

This paper investigates the impact on bank stock prices of emerging market currency crises and bailouts. The stock market distinguishes between banks with exposure to a crisis country and other banks. In general, banks with exposures to a crisis country are affected adversely by currency events and positively by bailouts. Other banks are mostly unaffected by events in countries experiencing a crisis. The paper uses the impact of the LTCM crisis on bank stock prices to put the emerging market events in perspective. The LTCM crisis had no significant contagion effects in the banking sector either, but banks that participated in the LTCM rescue experienced negative stock returns when the rescue was announced.

Publicly traded firms contribute less to total nonfarm employment and GDP now than in the 1970s. Major reasons for this development are the decline of manufacturing, the shift towards more production abroad in manufacturing, and the growth of the service economy as firms providing services are less likely to be listed on exchanges. A firm's stock market capitalization is much less instructive about its employment now than earlier. Market capitalizations have not become systematically less informative about firms’ contribution to GDP. Listed stock market superstars account for less employment than they did in the 1970s.

Using quarterly data on initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) for 37 countries from 1995 to 2014, we show that changes in equity issuance are positively related to lagged changes in aggregate local stock market liquidity. This relation is as economically significant as the well-known relation between equity issuance and lagged stock returns. It survives the inclusion of proxies for market timing, capital market conditions, growth prospects, asymmetric information, and investor sentiment. Changes in liquidity are less relevant for issuance by firms with greater financial pressures and by firms in less financially developed countries.

During the recent financial crisis, corporate borrowing and capital expenditures fall sharply. Most existing research links the two phenomena by arguing that a shock to bank lending (or, more generally, to the corporate credit supply) caused a reduction in capital expenditures. The economic significance of this causal link is tenuous, as we find that (1) bank-dependent firms do not decrease capital expenditures more than matching firms in the first year of the crisis or in the two quarters after Lehman Brother's bankruptcy; (2) firms that are unlevered before the crisis decrease capital expenditures during the crisis as much as matching firms and, proportionately, more than highly levered firms; (3) the decrease in net debt issuance for bank-dependent firms is not greater than for matching firms; (4) the average cumulative decrease in net equity issuance is more than twice the average decrease in net debt issuance from the start of the crisis through March 2009; and (5) bank-dependent firms hoard cash during the crisis compared with unlevered firms.