Can fintech close the gender gap in access to financial services? Using novel survey data for 28 countries, this paper finds a large and ubiquitous ‘fintech gender gap’: while 29% of men use fintech products, only 21% of women do. This difference exceeds the gender gap in bank account ownership at traditional financial institutions. While country characteristics and individual-level controls explain about a third of the fintech gender gap, the residual gap declines by 60% when accounting for gender differences in the willingness to use new financial technology, the suitability of fintech products, and the willingness to use fintech entrants if they offer cheaper products. The paper concludes by discussing drivers of differences in attitudes and implications for policy to foster financial inclusion with new technology.

Firms with low Tobin's Q and high cash flow have significantly more positive dividend initiation announcement returns than do other firms. I interpret this result as consistent with the hypothesis that reductions in the agency costs of overinvestment at firms with poor investment opportunities and ample cash flow are reflected in higher dividend initiation announcement returns. Further tests, such as examining the impact of governance metrics on initiation announcement returns following the dividend tax cut of 2003 and examining the long-run cash-retention policies of dividend-initiating firms, are consistent with this interpretation. There is also some evidence that is consistent with the cash flow signaling hypothesis, as dividend-initiating firms with low Tobin's Q and low pre-initiation cash flow experience substantial revisions in analysts' earnings forecasts and significantly positive initiation announcement returns.

This paper examines the predictions of the performance based arbitrage hypothesis for the merger arbitrage market. Performance based arbitrage [Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. The limits of arbitrage. Journal of Finance, 52 (1), 35–55] is the notion that funds under management are withdrawn from arbitrageurs following trading losses, resulting in inefficient prices for securities subject to arbitrage trades. I examine general comovement in merger arbitrage spreads and the response of spreads to large arbitrage losses and substantial changes in deal flow. I find little evidence that merger arbitrage spreads exhibit systematic comovement or are substantially affected by important liquidity events in this market.

Previous work by Aggarwal and Samwick [Aggarwal, R., Samwick, A., 1999. The other side of the tradeoff: the impact of risk on executive compensation. Journal of Political Economy 107 pp. 65–105] has documented the importance of controlling for the variance of firm stock returns when estimating pay–performance sensitivities. They find that pay–performance sensitivities are an order of magnitude greater for small vs. large variance firms. Using a comparable sample of CEOs, I provide evidence that when properly controlling for firm size, the negative effect of variance in stock returns on estimated pay–performance sensitivities is greatly diminished. In particular, when using dollar returns as the measure of firm performance, it is imperative to properly control for firm size.

This paper examines the relationship between the likelihood a firm is acquired and the governance and financial characteristics of the firm. Given many of the developments in the corporate control market in the late 1980s, I suspect that the process governing takeover likelihood may have changed in the 1990s. I examine a sample of 342 NYSE/AMEX firms that were acquired during the 1990–1997 period and compare them to a matched sample of nonacquired firms. I find that firms that were acquired over this period can be characterized as having lower managerial ownership and higher ownership by outsiders, particularly higher ownership by nonmanagement blockholders with board representation. The fact that managerial ownership is negatively related to takeover likelihood is consistent with studies using data from 1970s and 1980s. This suggests that managerial ownership helps managers maintain control, or alternatively that ownership proxies for how much managers care about control.

Predictability of future returns using ex ante information (e.g., analyst forecasts) violates market efficiency. We show that predictability can be due to non-random data deletion, especially in skewed distributions of long-horizon security returns. Passive deletion arises because some firms do not survive the post-event long horizon. Active deletion arises when extreme observations are truncated by the researcher. Simulations demonstrate that data deletion induces a negative relation between future returns and ex ante information variables. Analysis of actual data suggests a 30–50% bias in the estimated relations. We recommend specific robustness checks when testing return predictability using ex ante information.

Assessing the predictive ability of behavioral finance theories using out-of-sample data is important. Otherwise, the potentially boundless set of psychological biases underlying the behavioral explanations for security price behavior can lead to overfitting of theories to data. We test pricing effects attributed to two psychological biases, representativeness and conservatism, which underlie many behavioral finance theories. Using trends and consistency of accounting performance, we look for the pricing consequences of representativeness and conservatism. We find mixed evidence consistent with behavioral finance. Specifically, the theories based on representativeness are not supported, but we find some evidence of the pricing implications of conservatism.

Auditing, Audit quality, Audit performance, Time pressure

Cost allocation, Noncontrollable cost allocation, Collusion, Performance evaluation

Depreciation, Inflation, Price levels, Assets' useful lives