Comments on the article "Advertising Effectiveness and Accounting Policy," by A. Rashad Abdel-Khalik, published in the October 1975 issue of "The Accounting Review." Discussion on the topic of whether advertising costs should be capitalized or expensed when incurred; Effect of the isolation of expenditures by media; View that different models are necessary for different industries if advertising costs are to be matched properly to the resulting revenues; Use of awareness models in predicting advertising exposure; Importance of the use of regression equations for industry classes to the problem of determining the amount of advertising cost to capitalize.

This paper presents two models of investment in health which explicitly recognize the random nature of illness and death. The first model examines life-cycle behavior of investment and health capital when the motive for investing in health is to decrease the probability of illness. In the second model the individual invests in health through his choice of occupation. This determines the extent of his exposure to a pollutant, such as asbestos, which increases the probability of death. The model examines how exposure to pollution should vary with age and predicts how workers should respond to information about occupational dangers.

A discrete version of the author's incentive-compatible Auction Mechanism for public goods is applied to the problem of social choice (voting) among distinct mutually exclusive alternatives. This Auction Election is a bidding mechanism characterized by (1) unanimity, (2) provision for the voluntary compensation of voters harmed by a winning proposition, and (3) incentives for "reasonable" bidding by excluding members of a collective from maximal increase in benefit if they fail to agree on the proposition with largest surplus. Four of five experiments with six voters, bidding privacy, monetary rewards, and cyclical majority rule structure choose the best of three propositions.

Theory and hypotheses, 600.—Subjects and experimental design, 601.—Experimental results, 605.—Concluding remarks, 610.—Appendix 1: Instructions for market experiment 1, 610.—Appendix 2: Instructions, 615.—Appendix 3: Subject index and limit prices, 618.—Appendix 4: Contracts in experiment 1, and bids, offers, and contracts for experiment 2, 619.