The choice of a facility location and the design of the facility, including the choice of the quantity of each input to use, are intimately related. Consequently, one would expect facility location and facility design problems to be addressed as simultaneous problems in the theory of the firm. However, the traditional theory of the firm does not include spatial elements. Furthermore, the traditional theory of location, following Alfred Weber, does not include the choice of input mix. It is as if the developers of these traditional theories felt that a kind of separability was inherent in productionlocation problems. There are analytical advantages to the use of this separation, but it carries with it the possibility of suboptimization. A number of authors have taken the point of view that production and location problems should be treated simultaneously. These efforts include the classic paper by Leon Moses and more recent papers by Hurter and Richard Wendell, David Emerson, A. J. Goldman, M. Bradfield, Noboru Sakashita, Robert Woodward, and Amir Khalili, Vijay Mathur, and Diran Bodenhorn. In one way or another, each of these authors contributes something to the question of the conditions under which the location decision and input-mix decisions can be treated separately. Our purpose here is to address this question directly, to draw together the contribution of these various authors, and to extend them. I. Assumptions and Problem Formulation

Analyses of strike behavior rarely take account of prior learning and experience of bargainers. We show that experienced bargainers have fewer strikes than others and that differences in strike activity across U.S. manufacturing industries vary inversely with the estimated cost of striking. The cost of striking is measured as an inverse function of the ease of substituting pre- and poststrike production for strike-inhibited output. The occurrence of strikes, among rational and experienced bargainers, is attributed to the cost of designing contingent contracts applicable to unlikely circumstances, relative to the expected cost of strikes in such circumstances, absent contingent contracts.

Economies of scale and domestic divergences offer an important scope for gains from industrial integration among developing countries. Underutilized industrial capacity, together with distorting policies and imperfections in factor markets, provides a rationale for countries to swap opportunities for industrial expansion. Through integration, Ghana and the Ivory Coast stand to achieve welfare gains of 33 and 22 percent of gross output in world prices. About two-fifths of these gains have their source in Viner's trade-creation effects, one-fifth in Corden's cost-reduction effects, and two-fifths in the newly suggested production effects.

This paper challenges the empirical basis for the current belief that competition forces banks to make immediate implicit-interest payments on demand deposits equal to the marginal earnings on those deposits and that this implicit return has a strong effect on the demand for money. Klein's method of defining the implicit return as a function of the money supply and of the return on an alternative asset and then adding that implicit return to a money-demand equation is likely to produce his results whether or not the world behaves as he hypothesizes.

Although estimates of the fertility-labor supply relationship abound, a full appreciation of the interpretation of such estimates has been lacking, regardless of the empirical strategy employed. This paper attempts to elucidate, within the context of a life-cycle decision-making process, the information contained in the estimated association between fertility and labor supply as calculated from "single" and "simultaneous-equations" estimation techniques. We also present a statistical methodology based upon the occurrence of twins in the first pregnancy and provide estimates, using that methodology, of the extent to which women's life-cycle labor supply decisions respond to exogenous (and, in this case, unanticipated) extra children.

The efficiency of public and private firms is usually compared in industries which have heavy regulation and limited competition. In this paper we present a case study in which the effects of property rights can be isolated from the effects of regulation on noncompetitive markets. We compare the postwar productivity performance of the Canadian National and Canadian Pacific Railroads. Contrary to the predictions of the property rights literature, we find no evidence of inferior performance by the government-owned railroad. We conclude that any tendency toward inefficiency resulting from public ownership has been overcome by the benefits of competition.

Analyses of strike behavior rarely take account of prior learning and experience of bargainers. We show that experienced bargainers have fewer strikes than others and that differences in strike activity across U.S. manufacturing industries vary inversely with the estimated cost of striking. The cost of striking is measured as an inverse function of the ease of substituting pre- and poststrike production for strike-inhibited output. The occurrence of strikes, among rational and experienced bargainers, is attributed to the cost of designing contingent contracts applicable to unlikely circumstances, relative to the expected cost of strikes in such circumstances, absent contingent contracts.

Economies of scale and domestic divergences offer an important scope for gains from industrial integration among developing countries. Underutilized industrial capacity, together with distorting policies and imperfections in factor markets, provides a rationale for countries to swap opportunities for industrial expansion. Through integration, Ghana and the Ivory Coast stand to achieve welfare gains of 33 and 22 percent of gross output in world prices. About two-fifths of these gains have their source in Viner's trade-creation effects, one-fifth in Corden's cost-reduction effects, and two-fifths in the newly suggested production effects.

The efficiency of public and private firms is usually compared in industries which have heavy regulation and limited competition. In this paper we present a case study in which the effects of property rights can be isolated from the effects of regulation on noncompetitive markets. We compare the postwar productivity performance of the Canadian National and Canadian Pacific Railroads. Contrary to the predictions of the property rights literature, we find no evidence of inferior performance by the government-owned railroad. We conclude that any tendency toward inefficiency resulting from public ownership has been overcome by the benefits of competition.