[Unemployment statistics are not published by the Soviet government which claims unemployment was "liquidated" in the early 1930s. An unemployment rate for the Soviet urban population during the late 1970s is calculated from a survey of 2793 former Soviet citizens. Unemployment incidence, multiple spells, and unemployment duration by demographic characteristics are compared with U.S. patterns. Similar unemployment rates for Soviet men and women and a positive relation between education and unemployment are found.]

The theory of storage says that the marginal convenience yield on inventory falls at a decreasing rate as inventory increases. The authors test this hypothesis by examining the relative variation of spot and futures prices for metals. As the hypothesis implies, futures prices are less variable than spot prices when inventory is low, but spot and futures prices have similar variability when inventory is high. The theory of storage also explains inversions of “normal” futures-spot price relations around business-cycle peaks. Positive demand shocks around peaks reduce metal inventories and, as the theory predicts, generate large convenience yields and price inversions.

The theory of storage says that the marginal convenience yield on inventory falls at a decreasing rate as inventory increases. The authors test this hypothesis by examining the relative variation of spot and futures prices for metals. As the hypothesis implies, futures prices are less variable than spot prices when inventory is low, but spot and futures prices have similar variability when inventory is high. The theory of storage also explains inversions of “normal” futures‐spot price relations around business‐cycle peaks. Positive demand shocks around peaks reduce metal inventories and, as the theory predicts, generate large convenience yields and price inversions.

The relevance of imperfect competition for models of aggregate economic fluctuations has received increased attention from researchers in both macroeconomics and industrial organization.Measuring properly the size of industry markups of price over marginal cost is important both for assessing the role of market structure and for determining the extent to which excess capacity is a significant feature accompanying imperfect competition in American industry.Using a panel data set on four-digit Census manufacturing industries, this paper expand8 recent work by Robert Hall on the importance of market structure for understanding cyclical fluctuations.We outline a methodology for estimating industry markups of price over cost and the influence of market structure on cyclical movements in total factor productivity.While we find evidence to support the proposition that price exceeds marginal cost In U.S. manufacturing, our results offer only limited support for the notion that markups are importantly related to differences in Industry concentration, though the effect of unionization is important.Concentration effects are important only in industries producing durable goods or differentiated con8umer goods.In addition, much of the estimated markup of price over marginal cost is accounted for by fixed costs related to overhead labor, advertising, and central office expenses; we do not find compelling evidence of substantial evidence of excess capacity in most industries.

Optimal regulatory policy is derived in a setting where the firm has better knowledge of demand than the regulator. When marginal production costs increase with output, the regulator can induce the firm to use its private information entirely in the social interest. When marginal costs decline with output, however, the regulator is unable to derive any benefit from the firm's superior knowledge, and a single price is established that is invariant to demand.

It is the federal government's role to promote in research and development (RD and (2) contracting with private firms and nonprofit organizations (such as universities) to perform RD the winning firm recovered its development costs in the form of profits on the sale of the airplanes, and the losing firms did not recoup their R&D investment (Mansfield, 1971, p. 122).

A slowly mean-reverting component of stock prices tends to induce negative autocorrelation in returns. The autocorrelation is weak for the daily and weekly holding periods common in market efficiency tests but stronger for long-horizon returns. In tests for the 1926-85 period, large negative autocorrelations for return horizons beyond a year suggest that predictable price variation due to mean reversion accounts for large fractions of 3 to 5-year return variances. Predictable variation is estimated to be about 40 percent of 3 to 5-year return variances for portfolios of small firms. The percentage falls to around 25 percent for portfolios of large firms.

[This paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions. Like market institutions, legislative institutions reflect two key components: the goals or preferences of individuals (here, representatives seeking reelection) and the relevant transactions costs. We present three conclusions. First, we show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators. Second, we explain why, given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures, specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange. Third, our approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue.]