The COVID-19 pandemic has threatened lives and livelihoods, imperiled families and communities, and disrupted developmental milestones globally. Among the critical developmental disruptions experienced is the transition to college, which is common and foundational for personal and social exploration. During college shutdowns (spring 2020), we recruited 633 first-year U.S. students (mean age = 18.83 years, 71.3% cisgender women) to provide narratives about the impacts of the pandemic. We tested the ways narrative features were associated with concurrent and longitudinal COVID stressors, psychosocial adjustment, and identity development. Narrative growth expressed in spring 2020 was positively associated with psychosocial adjustment and global identity development and was negatively associated with mental health concerns. Associations were supported concurrently and at 1-year follow-up. Growth partly explained associations between COVID stressors and students’ adjustment. Our findings reinforce the importance of growth for resilience and underscore the importance of connective reasoning as people navigate a chronic stress.

As a synthesis of organization theory and historiography, the field of organizational history is mature enough to contribute to wider theoretical and historiographical debates and is sufficiently developed for a theoretical consideration of its subject matter. In this introduction to the Special Topic Forum on History and Organization Studies, we take up the question, “What is organizational history?” and consider three distinct arguments that we believe frame the next phase of development for historical work within organization studies. First, we argue that following the “historic turn,” organizational history has developed as a subfield of organization studies that takes seriously the matter of history, promoting historical research as a way to enrich the broad endeavor of organization. Second, if “history matters,” then organization theory needs a theoretical account of the past that goes beyond the mere use of history as a context to test or as an example to illustrate theory. Third, the focus on “history that matters” in the present leads to two important considerations: how organizations can use “rhetorical history” as a strategic resource and the need to engage with historiographically significant subjects that connect organization theory to larger humanistic concerns, such as slavery and racism.

This paper investigates the dynamics of cross-listing and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Using a sample of 10,815 firm-year observations from 54 countries over the period 2002–2011, we find that cross-listed firms have better CSR performance than non–cross-listed domestic firms. This result is robust to endogeneity and different types of cross-listing. We also find that CSR increases (decreases) significantly after cross-listing in (delisting from) U.S. markets. The positive impact of cross-listing on CSR performance is stronger for firms from countries with weaker institutions, lower country-level sustainability, and higher liability of foreignness, and for firms operating in industries with high litigation risk. Finally, we find that cross-listed firms with better CSR performance exhibit higher valuations.

ABSTRACT Using a field experiment in a 401(k) plan, we measure the effect of disseminating information about peer behavior on savings. Low‐saving employees received simplified plan enrollment or contribution increase forms. A randomized subset of forms stated the fraction of age‐matched coworkers participating in the plan or age‐matched participants contributing at least 6% of pay to the plan. We document an oppositional reaction: the presence of peer information decreased the savings of nonparticipants who were ineligible for 401(k) automatic enrollment, and higher observed peer savings rates also decreased savings. Discouragement from upward social comparisons seems to drive this reaction.

Stressor and exchange relationship paradigms have developed in isolation from each other to explain the negative effects of perceived organizational politics. We outline how these different paradigms share a common basis—a focus on psychological need satisfaction—and develop a needs-based paradigm to account for the negative effects of perceived organizational politics. Moreover, we argue that psychological need satisfaction acts as an unmeasured third variable, which, once accounted for, should limit the utility of stressor and exchange relationship paradigms. Across four samples using a combination of multiple sources, operationalizations of constructs, and measurement occasions, we found full support for the needs-based paradigm as a mediator of the effects of politics on contextual performance, creativity, and proactive behavior, whereas strain and exchange relationship constructs by and large had no effect on outcomes once psychological need satisfaction was accounted for. Theoretical implications and future research directions are discussed.

Defaults often have a large influence on consumer decisions. We identify an overlooked but practical alternative to defaults: requiring individuals to make an explicit choice for themselves. We study such "active decisions" in the context of 401(k) saving. We find that compelling new hires to make active decisions about 401(k) enrollment raises the initial fraction that enroll by 28 percentage points relative to a standard opt-in enrollment procedure, producing a savings distribution three months after hire that would take 30 months to achieve under standard enrollment. We also present a model of 401(k) enrollment and derive conditions under which the optimal enrollment regime is automatic enrollment (i.e., default enrollment), standard enrollment (i.e., default non-enrollment), or active decisions (i.e., no default and compulsory choice). Active decisions are optimal when consumers have a strong propensity to procrastinate and savings preferences are highly heterogeneous. Financial illiteracy, however, favors default enrollment over active decision enrollment.

Most bank merger studies do not control for hidden bailouts, which may lead to biased results. In this study we employ a unique data set of approximately 1000 mergers to analyze the determinants of bank mergers. We use undisclosed information on banks’ regulatory intervention history to distinguish between distressed and non-distressed mergers. Among merging banks, we find that improving financial profiles lower the likelihood of distressed mergers more than the likelihood of non-distressed mergers. The likelihood to acquire a bank is also reduced but less than the probability to be acquired. Both distressed and non-distressed mergers have worse CAMEL profiles than non-merging banks. Hence, non-distressed mergers may be motivated by the desire to forestall serious future financial distress and prevent regulatory intervention.

Abstract A long‐standing debate has focused on the extent to which different levels of analysis shape firm performance. The strategic group level has been largely excluded from this inquiry, despite evidence that group membership matters. In this study, we use hierarchical linear modeling to simultaneously estimate firm‐, strategic group‐, and industry‐level influences on short‐term and long‐term measures of performance. We assess the three levels' explanatory power using a sample of 1,165 firms in 12 industries with data from a 7‐year period. To enhance comparability to previous research, we also estimate the effects using the variance components and ANOVA methods relied on in past studies. To assess the robustness of strategic group effects, we examine both deductively and inductively defined groups. We found that all three levels are significantly associated with performance. The firm effect is the strongest, while the strategic group effect rivals and for some measures outweighs the industry effect. We also found that the levels have varying effects in relation to different performance measures, suggesting more complex relationships than depicted in previous studies. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The article presents a list of books, which readers are reading. They include “Management by Policy: How Companies Focus Their Total Quality Efforts to Achieve Competitive Advantage,” “The Logic of Organizations,” and “The Vulnerable Fortress: Bureaucratic Organization and Management in the Information Age.”

We find that equity loan fees, which have been largely ignored by the anomalies literature, are the best predictor of cross-sectional returns. When compared with 102 other anomalies and other short-selling measures, the loan fee anomaly has the highest monthly long-short return (4.01%), the highest monthly Sharpe Ratio (0.66), and, unlike other anomalies, exhibits strong persistence throughout the sample. Although prior work has shown that existing anomalies reside in high loan fee stocks, we find that 42% of loan fee outperformance is due to unique information not contained in other anomalies. Future papers that examine cross-sectional predictors of returns should include the single most effective predictor: loan fees. This paper was accepted by Victoria Ivashina, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.00152 .