Explaining the Short Careers of High-Achieving Teachers in Schools with Low-Performing Students by Donald Boyd, Hamilton Lankford, Susanna Loeb and James Wyckoff. Published in volume 95, issue 2, pages 166-171 of American Economic Review, May 2005

ABSTRACT: Optimal agency contracts pay the lowest wage necessary to induce profit-maximizing effort. Employees could view such contracts as violating reciprocity because, relative to more reciprocal contracts, they offer a lower wage in exchange for higher effort. Consequently, the profit-maximizing effectiveness of optimal contracts could be impaired if employees reject them or reduce their effort. We use experimental labor markets to examine (1) how employees respond to an optimal versus a suboptimal reciprocity-based contract when each contract is the only contract available, (2) how employees respond to these contracts when firms choose which one to offer, (3) whether the firms' contract offers depend on employees' reactions to those offers, and (4) how employees and firms react to a hybrid contract that incorporates features of both contracts. We find that the optimal contract is less effective than agency analysis predicts, the reciprocity-based contract can be equally effective, and the hybrid contract dominates a market in which all three contracts are available. Implications of these results are discussed.

This study examines whether personally performing other audit tasks can bias supervising seniors' going-concern judgments. During an audit, the senior performs some audit tasks him/herself and delegates other tasks to staff members. When personally performing an audit task, the senior would focus on the evidence related to that task. We predict that such evidence will have greater influence on the senior's subsequent going-concern judgment. The results of our experiment are consistent with our predictions. When provided with an identical set of information, seniors who performed another audit task for which the underlying facts of the case reflected positively (negatively) on the company's viability, subsequently made going-concern judgments that were relatively more positive (negative). Our results also demonstrate that the well-documented tendency of auditors to attend more to negative information does not always dominate auditors' information processing. Subjects who performed the task for which the underlying facts reflected positively on the company's viability directed their attention to such positive information and, consequently, both their memory and judgments were more positive than those of subjects in the other conditions. Recent findings indicating that biases in seniors' going-concern judgments may not be fully offset in the review process are discussed along with other potential implications of our results.

This paper reexamines whether higher cigarette taxes will substantially reduce youth smoking. We study the impact of taxes during exactly the period in adolescence in which most smokers start their habits. We find weak or nonexistent tax effects in models of the onset of smoking between eighth and twelfth grades, models of the onset of heavy smoking between eighth and twelfth grades, and discrete‐time hazard models that include state fixed effects. We also provide a new perspective on the relationship between smoking and schooling: students who eventually drop out of school are already more likely to smoke in the eighth grade.

This study examines the role of auditor industry expertise in the pricing of Big 5 audits in Australia. We test if the audit market prices an auditor's firm-wide industry expertise, or alternatively if the audit market only prices office-level expertise in those specific cities where the auditor is the industry leader. We document that there is an average premium of 24 percent associated with industry expertise when the auditor is both the city-specific industry leader and one of the top two firms nationally in the industry. However, the top two firms nationally do not earn a premium in cities where they are not city leaders. We further document that national leadership rankings are, in fact, driven by the specific offices where accounting firms are city leaders. Thus, the overall evidence supports that the market perception and pricing of industry expertise in Australia is primarily based on office-level industry leadership in city-specific audit markets.