We exploit an exogenous change in basis risk in the oil and gas industry to analyze the channels through which hedging affects firm value. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we find that firms affected by a basis risk shock reduce investment, have lower valuations, sell assets, and reduce debt. Our findings are driven by firms with ex ante high leverage. Overall, our results provide evidence that reducing the probability of financial distress and underinvestment risk are first-order channels through which hedging affects firm value.

We examine the effect of personal taxes on CEOs’ decisions to sell their equity, controlling for diversification, managerial overconfidence, and other determinants. While CEOs frequently sell large amounts of their unrestricted firm equity, the tax burden associated with the sale significantly deters them from selling equity even after controlling for other determinants like diversification. We also find that both taxable institutional investors and CEOs respond to taxes in their selling of equity, although CEOs appear to be less tax-sensitive. Our findings underscore the importance of taxes in corporate and managerial decisions and they have implications for executive compensation policies.

We assess the role that monetary policy plays in the decision to default using a General Equilibrium model with collateralized loans, trade in fiat money and production. The monetary authority extends long-term credit against risky collateral along with its traditional monetary operations. The value of collateral depends on traditional monetary policy and agents can optimally choose to default depending on the relative value of the collateral to the face value of the loan. Default results in foreclosure, higher borrowing costs, inefficient investment and a decrease in total output. We show that pre-crisis contractionary monetary policy interacts with Fisherian debt-deflation dynamics and can increase the probability that a crisis occurs.

Much of the male-female wage differential exists because men and women are assigned to different jobs. Within narrow job categories, there is no male-female differential. Only a tortured taste theory of discrimination can reconcile these facts. We argue that differential movement along job ladders entails comparative advantage, so the ability standard for promotion is higher for women. This implies that more able women will be passed over in favor of less able men. Women, assumed to have the same ability distribution as men, earn less. The differential reflects females' lower promotion probability, not within-job discrimination.

Affirmative action remains controversial. The controversy extends from the original antidiscrimination legislation and its interpretation to estimates of affirmative action's effect on the labor market. This paper provides a progress report on our recent efforts at detecting the effects of affirmative action on minority wages and employment. Although we find a substantial increase in wages for black men and black women over our sample period, the timing of these wage changes is surprising. Most of the wage gains came prior to 1974, before the establishment of an effective monitoring structure for affirmative action. Indeed, when the powers of the EEOC and OFCC are greatest, the wage effects for young blacks are somewhat perverse. Using EEO-1 reports we find a major shift in black employment toward firms most vulnerable to the monitoring and potential sanctions of the affirmative action programs. As with wages, the shift in minority employment came prior to the expansion of the powers and budgets of the EEOC and OFCC. We are surprised by the timing of these changes and are concerned about the quality of the EEO-1 reports.

This paper examines whether investors care more about trading their exact quantity demands at some times than at others. Using a new data set of foreign exchange transactions, I find that customers trade more precise quantities at quarter-end, as evidenced by less trade-size clustering. Customers trade more odd lots and fewer round lots, while the number of trades and total volume are not significantly changed. I also find that the price impact of order flow is greater when customers care more about trading precise quantities. This work sheds new light on trade-size clustering and offers a potential explanation for time-series and cross-sectional variation in common liquidity measures.

We investigate the problem of a firm wishing to finance a project by issuing securities under asymmetric information. We find that, when outside investors can produce (noisy) information on the firm's quality, the degree of information asymmetry resulting in equilibrium is endogenous and depends on the information sensitivity of the security issued. Thus, in contrast to the prediction of the pecking order theory (see, e.g. Myers and Majluf, J. Financial Econom. 13 (1984) 187) a security with low sensitivity to private information, such as debt, does not always dominate one with high information sensitivity, such as equity. A firm's preference for equity rather than debt depends on the costs of information production, the precision of the information-production technology, and the extent of the information asymmetry. We also study the optimal security design problem and find that, depending on the cost and precision of the information-production technology, risky debt or a composite security with a convex payoff emerges as optimal securities.

Two explanations are commonly offered for the large number of recent IPOs by Internet firms. The first argues that Internet firms are trying to grab market share in an industry with large economies of scale. The second argues that Internet firms are rushing to go public when Internet stock prices are irrationally high. In this paper we examine the actions of those closest to Internet firms – firm managers, underwriters, and venture capitalists – to determine their motives for going public. Numerous strategic alliances and mergers and acquisitions provide strong evidence of a rush to grab market share. Other factors provide only weak evidence that Internet IPOs are attempts to sell overpriced stock.