We show that callable bonds have both higher yields and lower market prices than matched non-callable bonds of the same issuer-time, reflecting the value of call features to issuers and investors. This “value of callability” as well as the inclusion and the exercise of call rights are jointly determined by issuer credit quality. Critically, our agency-based theoretical and empirical analyses show that callability reduces debt overhang in corporate mergers. Our results help explain the value and increasing prevalence of callable bonds in credit markets.

We build a general equilibrium model to examine the implications of prospect theory for the disposition effect, asset prices, and trading volume. Diminishing sensitivity predicts a disposition effect, price momentum, a reduced return volatility, and a positive return-volume correlation. Loss aversion generally predicts the opposite. In calibrated economies, there is a nontrivial range of preference parameters for prospect theory to simultaneously explain the disposition effect, the momentum effect, and the equity premium puzzle. Our model is helpful for understanding a wide range of financial phenomena and it also suggests new testable predictions.

This paper examines the link between ownership concentration and corporate bond volatility. We show that more concentrated mutual fund ownership is associated with higher volatility of corporate bonds. This relation is stronger among more illiquid bonds, during periods of heightened bond market illiquidity, and among bonds held by corporate bond funds that invest in more illiquid bonds and experience higher or more correlated liquidity shocks. Using a sample of mutual fund mergers, we further show that increases in bond volatility are unlikely to be driven entirely by the endogenous ownership structure of corporate bonds. Our findings suggest that the concentrated ownership by corporate bond mutual funds provides another channel, apart from illiquidity, to help explain the excess volatility in corporate bonds.

We study the observability of investors’ information-acquisition activities in financial markets. Improving observability leads to two strategic effects on information acquisition: (1) the pricing effect, which arises from interactions between investors and the market maker and can encourage or discourage information acquisition, and (2) the competition effect, which concerns interactions among investors and always encourages information acquisition. We apply our theory to study voluntary and mandatory disclosures of corporate site visits. When the competition effect dominates, investors voluntarily disclose their visits. When the pricing effect dominates, mandatory disclosure is effective. Our analysis sheds novel light on Regulation Fair Disclosure.

This paper presents a dynamic equilibrium model of bond markets in which two groups of agents hold heterogeneous expectations about future economic conditions. The heterogeneous expectations cause agents to take on speculative positions against each other and therefore generate endogenous relative wealth fluctuation. The relative wealth fluctuation amplifies asset price volatility and contributes to the time variation in bond premia. Our model shows that a modest amount of heterogeneous expectations can help explain several puzzling phenomena, including the “excessive volatility” of bond yields, the failure of the expectations hypothesis, and the ability of a tent-shaped linear combination of forward rates to predict bond returns.

We use the adoption of General Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 34 (GASB 34) to examine whether disclosing information in states' financial reports influences their investment decisions. GASB 34 requires governments to report on general infrastructure assets and permits either the standard depreciation approach or the modified approach. The modified approach requires additional disclosures, a step which we argue promotes greater transparency about a government's infrastructure and can potentially facilitate infrastructure investment decisions. We find a robust positive association between the modified approach and investment in infrastructure maintenance. Additional evidence demonstrates a more pronounced effect when external monitoring is likely higher and government officials are likely better informed as a result of the increased disclosure. We further find that states using the modified approach are less likely to cut or divert funds intended for infrastructure maintenance. Our study suggests that disclosing information in governments' financial reports can have real effects, such as mitigating underinvestment in infrastructure maintenance, which governments often defer to future periods in violation of the interperiod equity principle and to the detriment of society.

In this paper, we examine the effect of labor unions on bank performance during the recent financial crisis. Empirical evidence from the 314 largest global banks indicates that the stock returns and profitability of unionized banks are higher, and the default probabilities are lower than non-unionized banks. Moreover, unionized banks have lower tail risk in their stock returns, more tangible equity, more liquid assets, and better quality lending before the crisis than non-unionized banks. These finding show that unionized banks operate more conservatively and engage in less risk-taking. Our results imply that union preferences can shape the risk culture of banks.

This paper formalizes a classic idea that in second-best environments trade can induce welfare losses: incremental income losses from distortions can outweigh trade gains. In a Melitz model with distortionary taxes, we derive sufficient statistics for welfare gains/losses and show departures from the efficient case (Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare 2012) can be captured by the gap between an input and output share and domestic extensive margin elasticities. The loss reflects an endogenous selection of more subsidized firms into exporting. Using Chinese manufacturing data in 2005 and model-inferred firm-level distortions, we demonstrate that a sizable negative fiscal externality can potentially offset conventional gains.