Agents often inflate measured performance by distorting operating decisions (e.g., real earnings management) and/or reporting decisions (e.g., accruals management). Across four studies, we find that public judgments of distortion’s acceptability largely reflect assessments of how harmful and norm-violating the distortion is. Judgments of operating distortion primarily reflect assessments of harm, whereas judgments of reporting distortion primarily reflect assessments of norm violation. These results are consistent with the Theory of Dyadic Morality (Gray, Waytz, and Young 2012; Schein and Gray 2018). We also find that those who perceive an accounting system as more unfairly withholding an agent’s bonus assess distortion (especially reporting distortion) to be less norm-violating. Those who perceive the performance measure as less appropriate for capturing the value of performance to stakeholders assess distortion (especially operating distortion) to be more harmful. Assessments of distortions’ harm and norm violation explain a substantial portion of the variation in acceptability judgments.

In this study, we examine whether sell-side security analysts gain access to value-relevant information through political connections. We measure analysts' political connections based on political contributions at the brokerage-house level. We argue that if brokerages are able to obtain private information through their political connections, then analysts at politically connected brokerages should issue more profitable stock recommendations, and this increased profitability should be more pronounced for politically sensitive stocks. Our evidence is consistent with these predictions. Analyses of recommendations issued surrounding the Affordable Care Act further support our main inferences. Moreover, our findings hold after we employ numerous tests to address correlated omitted variables and endogeneity. Collectively, these results suggest that brokerages obtain value-relevant, nonpublic information from their political connections.

We investigate the relation between corporate tax payments and corporate social responsibility. Because existing theory and empirical studies find inconsistent evidence on the relation between these constructs, we investigate whether the two activities act as complements or substitutes. We estimate the relation between measures of corporate social responsibility and (1) the amount of corporate taxes paid, and (2) the amount invested in tax lobbying activities using both ordinary least squares and a system of simultaneous equations. We find consistent evidence that corporate social responsibility is negatively related to five-year cash effective tax rates and positively related to tax lobbying expenditures. Our evidence suggests that, on average, corporate social responsibility and tax payments act as substitutes. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

Firms frequently attempt to increase profits by replacing some existing workers with new lower-wage workers. However, this strategy may be ineffective in an incomplete-contract environment because the new workers may provide lower effort in response to their lower wages, and hiring new lower-wage workers may damage the remaining original workers' reciprocal relationship with the firm. We conduct an experiment to examine this issue and find that when new lower-wage workers become available, firms hire them to replace original higher-wage workers and pay the new workers lower wages. However, these lower wages do not improve firm profit because the decision to hire new lower-wage workers causes both the new and remaining workers to provide lower effort. Moreover, hiring lower-wage workers reduces new workers' payoffs and, thus, decreases social welfare. These unintended consequences suggest that firms should consider both the wage savings and the potential costs when deciding whether to replace some workers with new lower-wage workers. We discuss the implications of our findings for contract design, hiring practices, and managerial accountants.

We examine whether three tax system characteristics—required book-tax conformity, worldwide versus territorial approach, and perceived strength of enforcement—impact corporate tax avoidance across countries after controlling for firm-specific factors previously shown to be associated with tax avoidance (i.e., performance, size, operating costs, leverage, growth, the presence of multinational operations, and industry) and for other cross-country factors (i.e., statutory corporate tax rates, earnings volatility, and institutional factors). We find that, on average, firms avoid taxes less when required book-tax conformity is higher, a worldwide approach is used, and tax enforcement is perceived to be stronger. However, the relations between tax avoidance and all three tax systems characteristics are contextual and depend on the extent to which management compensation comes from variable pay, including bonuses, stock awards, and stock options. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the text.

Following Sloan (1996), numerous studies document that the accrual component of earnings is less persistent than the cash flow component of earnings. Disagreement exists, however, as to the explanation for this result. One stream of literature follows Sloan's lead in arguing that this result is attributable to accounting distortions (Xie 2001; Dechow and Dichev 2002; Richardson et al. 2005). A second stream of literature argues that this result is attributable to a more general growth effect and that growth-related factors such as diminishing returns to new investment explain the lower persistence of accruals (e.g., Fairfield et al. 2003a; Cooper et al. 2005). We provide new evidence indicating that temporary accounting distortions are a significant contributing factor to the lower persistence of the accrual component of earnings. Our evidence indicates that the lower persistence of accruals extends to accruals that are unrelated to sales growth and that extreme accruals are systematically associated with alleged cases of earnings manipulation.

The article focuses on the proceedings of the twelfth annual convention of the American Association of University Instructors in Accounting, held at Washington D.C., between December 28 and 29, 1927. After some introductory remarks by the organizers, papers were read by W. W. Nissley of the American Institute of Accountants, John R. Wildman of the company Haskins and Sells, David Himmelblau of Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, William A. Paton of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, and J. L. Dohr of Greene and Hurd and of Columbia University, New York, New York. The second program meeting was given over to a discussion of various features of the federal income tax law. Johns Hopkins University's, Baltimore, Maryland, professor presided at the session and opened it with a brief statement introducing the speakers of the afternoon, all of whom were representatives of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The third program session consisted of a joint meeting with the American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business. The general topic for discussion was "The Place of Accounting in Commerce Curriculum."

We provide evidence that democracy has a positive effect on GDP per capita. Our dynamic panel strategy controls for country fixed effects and the rich dynamics of GDP, which otherwise confound the effect of democracy. To reduce measurement error, we introduce a new indicator of democracy that consolidates previous measures. Our baseline results show that democratizations increase GDP per capita by about 20 percent in the long run. We find similar effects using a propensity score reweighting strategy as well as an instrumental-variables strategy using regional waves of democratization. The effects are similar across different levels of development and appear to be driven by greater investments in capital, schooling, and health.

We measure the capitalization of housing market externalities into residential housing values by studying the unanticipated elimination of stringent rent controls in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1995. Pooling data on the universe of assessed values and transacted prices of Cambridge residential properties between 1988 and 2005, we find that rent decontrol generated substantial, robust price appreciation at decontrolled units and nearby never-controlled units, accounting for a quarter of the $7.8 billion in Cambridge residential property appreciation during this period. The majority of this contribution stems from induced appreciation of never-controlled properties. Residential investment explains only a small fraction of the total.

Using a dataset constructed through textual analysis and manual data collection, we show that, prior to ASC 606, firms with principal-versus-agent (PA) exposure face heightened GAAP compliance risk, reflected in a greater likelihood of receiving revenue-related SEC comment letters and higher audit fees. Following the adoption of ASC 606, these differences decline, consistent with the standard’s stated goal of simplifying PA assessments and reducing implementation challenges. Overall, our findings provide the first large-sample evidence on PA considerations and show that ASC 606 mitigates compliance risk, although further analyses suggest additional disclosure may be needed to mitigate information challenges associated with PA assessments. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.