We measure how cuts to public procurement propagate through the banking system in a financial crisis. During the European sovereign debt crisis, the Portuguese government cut procurement spending by 4.3 percent of GDP. We find that this cut saddled banks with nonperforming loans from government contractors, which led to a persistent reduction in credit supply to other firms. We estimate a bank-level elasticity of credit supply with respect to procurement demand of 2.5. In a general equilibrium model, our findings point to large effects of fiscal policy on credit supply and output in a crisis.

The pace of job reallocation has declined in the United States in recent decades. We draw insight from canonical models of business dynamics in which reallocation can decline due to (i ) lower dis persion of idiosyncratic shocks faced by businesses, or (ii ) weaker marginal responsiveness of businesses to shocks. We show that shock dispersion has actually risen, while the responsiveness of business-level employment to productivity has weakened. Moreover, declining responsiveness can account for a significant fraction of the decline in the pace of job reallocation, and we find suggestive evidence this has been a drag on aggregate productivity.

A large literature documents declining measures of business dynamism including high-growth young firm activity and job reallocation. A distinct literature describes a slowdown in the pace of aggregate labor productivity growth. We relate these patterns by studying changes in productivity growth from the late 1990s to the mid 2000s using firm-level data. We find that diminished allocative efficiency gains can account for the productivity slowdown in a manner that interacts with the within-firm productivity growth distribution. The evidence suggests that the decline in dynamism is reason for concern and sheds light on debates about the causes of slowing productivity growth.

A growing body of evidence indicates that the U.S. economy has become less dynamic in recent years. This trend is evident in declining rates of gross job and worker flows as well as declining rates of entrepreneurship and young firm activity, and the trend is pervasive across industries, regions, and firm size classes. We describe the evidence on these changes in the U.S. economy by reviewing existing research. We then describe new empirical facts about the relationship between establishment-level productivity and employment growth, framing our results in terms of canonical models of firm dynamics and suggesting empirically testable potential explanations.

The distribution of city populations has attracted much attention, in part because it constrains models of local growth. However, there is no consensus on the distribution below the very upper tail, because available data need to rely on “legal” rather than “economic” definitions for medium and small cities. To remedy this difficulty, we construct cities “from the bottom up” by clustering populated areas obtained from high-resolution data. We find that Zipf 's law for population holds for cities as small as 5,000 inhabitants in Great Britain and 12,000 inhabitants in the US. We also find a Zipf 's law for areas. JEL: R11, R12, R23

Using a large sample of institutional investors’ investments in private equity funds raised between 1991 and 2011, we estimate the extent to which investors’ skill affects their returns. Bootstrap analyses show that the variance of actual performance is higher than would be expected by chance, suggesting that some investors consistently outperform. Extending the Bayesian approach of Korteweg and Sorensen, we estimate that a one‐standard‐deviation increase in skill leads to an increase in annual returns of between one and two percentage points. These results are stronger in the earlier part of the sample period and for venture funds.

Financial misconduct (FM) rates differ widely between major U.S. cities, up to a factor of 3. Although spatial differences in enforcement and firm characteristics do not account for these patterns, city‐level norms appear to be very important. For example, FM rates are strongly related to other unethical behavior, involving politicians, doctors, and (potentially unfaithful) spouses, in the city.

We study the performance of equity mutual funds run by asset management divisions of commercial banking groups using a worldwide sample. We show that bank‐affiliated funds underperform unaffiliated funds by 92 basis points per year. Consistent with conflicts of interest, the underperformance is more pronounced among those affiliated funds that overweight the stock of the bank's lending clients to a great extent. Divestitures of asset management divisions by banking groups support a causal interpretation of the results. Our findings suggest that affiliated fund managers support their lending divisions’ operations to reduce career concerns at the expense of fund investors.

This paper documents that the path of credit spreads since a firm's last loan influences the level at which it can currently borrow. If spreads have moved in the firm's favor (i.e., declined), it is charged a higher interest rate than is justified by current fundamentals, whereas if spreads have moved to the firm's detriment, it is charged a lower rate. We evaluate several possible explanations for this finding, and conclude that anchoring to past deal terms is most plausible.