B. H. Beckhart, Carl F. Behrens, George N. Emory, Shirley K. Hart, James J. O'Leary, A. M. Weimer, Liquidity: A Growing Attribute of Mortgage Loan Portfolios: Discussion, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Dec., 1950), pp. 324-336

Recent technological advances make it possible to create automated virtual interviewers, called embodied conversational agents (ECAs). We study how an ECA compares to a human interviewer in three experiments. In experiment 1, we show that two theoretically motivated factors—making the ECA facially and vocally similar to the interviewee—result in the ECA performing similarly to or better than human interviewers for six antecedents of disclosure quality. In two additional experiments, we show that employees are, on average, 21 to 32 percent more likely to disclose violating internal controls to an ECA than to a human, even if the human interviewer has significant interviewing experience. These findings contribute to the ECA design literature by showing that similarity-enhancing features of ECAs increase the antecedents of disclosure. The findings also contribute to the accounting literature by demonstrating that ECA technology can increase the scope of interviewing in accounting without reducing interview quality.

This paper investigates the validity and usefulness of “hybrid” valuation models. We recast the model in Ohlson and Johannesson (2016) as a hybrid of the Dividend Discount Model and an earnings-based price multiple model, and develop a new hybrid model that generalizes the Residual Income Valuation Model. After validating the theoretical properties of these models' unique parameters, we assess the usefulness of the hybrid models in two applications. In application one, we find that intrinsic values from the hybrid models are more accurate than those from common discounted models or price multiple models. These improvements are attributable to the hybrid models' ability to incorporate stock price and more realistic assumptions about growth. In application two, we find that the implied cost of equity from the hybrid models better captures systematic risks and key idiosyncratic risks, and captures expected returns. These results demonstrate the validity and usefulness of hybrid valuation models. JEL Classifications: G12; G14; G17; G31; M41. Data Availability: The data used are publicly available from the sources cited in the text.

In this paper we provide new estimates of the impact of unions on nonunion wage setting. We allow the presence of unions to affect nonunion wages both through the typically discussed channel of nonunion firms emulating union wages in order to fend off the threat of unionisation and through a bargaining channel in which nonunion workers use the presence of union jobs as part of their outside option. We specify these channels in a search and bargaining model that includes union formation and, in our most complete model, the possibility of nonunion firm responses to the threat of unionisation. Our results indicate an important role played by union wage spillovers in lowering wages over the 1980-2010 period. We find de-unionisation can account for 38% of the decline in the mean hourly wage between 1980 and 2010, with two-thirds of that effect being due to spillovers. Both the traditional threat and bargaining channels are operational, with the bargaining channel being more important.

Technology has facilitated new, nontraditional work arrangements, including the ride-sharing company Uber. Uber drivers provide rides anytime they choose. Using data on hourly earnings and driving, we document driver utilization of this real-time flexibility. We propose that the value of flexibility can be measured as deriving from time variation in the drivers' reservation wage. Measuring time variation in drivers' reservation wages allows us to estimate the surplus and labor supply implications of Uber relative to alternative, less-flexible work arrangements. Despite other drawbacks to the Uber arrangement, we estimate that Uber drivers earn more than twice the surplus they would in less-flexible arrangements.

Major League Baseball umpires express their racial/ethnic prefer ences when they evaluate pitchers. Strikes are called less often if the umpire and pitcher do not match race/ethnicity, but mainly where there is little scrutiny of umpires. Pitchers understand the incentives and throw pitches that allow umpires less subjective judgment (e.g., fastballs over home plate) when they anticipate bias. These direct and indirect effects bias performance measures of minorities downward. The results suggest how discrimination alters discriminated groups' behavior generally. They imply that biases in measured productivity must be accounted for in generating measures of wage discrimination.

Inputs and Impacts in Charter Schools: KIPP Lynn by Joshua D. Angrist, Susan M. Dynarski, Thomas J. Kane, Parag A. Pathak and Christopher R. Walters. Published in volume 100, issue 2, pages 239-43 of American Economic Review, May 2010