In this paper we seek to document errors that could affect studies of earnings management. The book income adjustment (BIA) of the alternative minimum tax (AMT) created apparently strong incentives to manage book income downward in 1987. Five earlier papers using different methodologies and samples all conclude that earnings were reduced in response to the BIA. This consensus of findings offers an opportunity to investigate our speculation that methodological biases are more likely when there appear to be clear incentives for earnings management. A reexamination of these studies uncovers potential biases related to a variety of factors, including choices of scaling variables, selection of affected and control samples, and measurement error in estimated discretionary accruals. A reexamination of the argument underlying these studies also suggests that the incentives to manage earnings are less powerful than initially predicted, and are partially mitigated by tax and non-tax factors. As a result, we believe that the extent of earnings management that occurred in 1987 in response to the BIA remains an unresolved issue

In this paper we seek to document errors that could affect studies of earnings management. The book income adjustment (BIA) of the alternative minimum tax (AMT) created apparently strong incentives to manage book income downward in 1987. Five earlier papers using different methodologies and samples all conclude that earnings were reduced in response to the BIA. This consensus of findings offers an opportunity to investigate our speculation that methodological biases are more likely when there appear to be clear incentives for earnings management. A reexamination of these studies uncovers potential biases related to a variety of factors, including choices of scaling variables, selection of affected and control samples, and measurement error in estimated discretionary accruals. A reexamination of the argument underlying these studies also suggests that the incentives to manage earnings are less powerful than initially predicted, and are partially mitigated by tax and non‐tax factors. As a result, we believe that the extent of earnings management that occurred in 1987 in response to the BIA remains an unresolved issue

This paper examines the association between external monitoring and earnings management by property‐casualty insurers. We extend previous work by Petroni and Beasley (1996) by expanding the set of external monitors to include both auditors and actuaries. We investigate whether certain auditor‐actuary pairs are associated with less understatement of the loss reserve account by financially struggling insurers. Our data consist of loss adjustments reported by 465 property‐casualty insurers for reserves established in 1993. The results indicate that under‐reserving by weak insurers is essentially eliminated when the firm uses auditors and actuaries that are both from Big Six accounting firms. In contrast, non‐Big Six actuaries have less impact on under‐reserving by weak insurers. Our results suggest that the quality usually associated with Big Six auditors falls when the audit firm relies on third party actuaries to evaluate the loss reserve estimates of struggling insurance clients. We conjecture that Big Six actuaries insist on more conservative loss reserve levels because, compared to actuarial consulting firms, they are more attuned to the liability exposure of the auditor

Concern that earnings management erodes the quality of financial reporting has prompted the Securities and Exchange Commission to question the role of the external auditor. To help address that concern, this study examines the relation between earnings management and auditor litigation. While prior research on the relation between auditor litigation and total accruals has yielded inconclusive results, I find that the risk of auditor litigation is positively associated with a sharper measure of earnings management—abnormal accruals. Using a larger and more recent sample, this study provides evidence that the probability of auditor litigation increases as clients report more positive (income-increasing) abnormal accruals. This result holds in: (1) univariate analyses, (2) logit analyses that also control for auditor size, client importance to the auditor, length of the auditor-client relationship, client industry, client financial condition, client size, and client growth, and in (3) the subsample of lawsuits alleging wrongdoing in the more recent time period (1984–1998

This paper reviews agency theory and its application to accounting issues. I discuss the formulation of models of incentive problems caused by moral hazard and adverse selection problems. I review theoretical research on the role of performance measures in compensation contracts, and I compare how information is aggregated for compensation purposes versus valuation purposes. I also review the literature on communication, including models where the revelation principle does not apply so that nontruthful reporting and earnings management can take place. The paper also discusses capital allocation within firms, including transfer pricing and cost allocation problems

I present evidence consistent with managers using derivatives and discretionary accruals as partial substitutes for smoothing earnings. Using 1994–1996 data for a sample of Fortune 500 firms, I estimate a set of simultaneous equations that captures managers' incentives to maintain a desired level of earnings volatility through hedging and accrual management. These incentives include increasing managerial compensation and wealth, reducing corporate income taxes and debt financing costs, avoiding underinvestment and earnings surprises, and mitigating volatility caused by low diversification. After controlling for such incentives, I find a significant negative association between derivatives' notional amounts and proxies for the magnitude of discretionary accruals

We model a two‐period pure exchange economy where a risk averse manager, who has private information regarding future earnings, is required to issue an earnings report to investors at the end of each period. While the manager is prohibited from directly disclosing her private information, she is allowed to bias reported earnings in the first period, subject to GAAP rules that require that a specified proportion of the bias be reversed subsequently. We show there is a minimum threshold of reversal, such that, when the proportion of required reversal is above this threshold, the manager smooths income and communicates her private information through reported earnings. Consequently, the market attaches greater weight to reported earnings than under a regime that allows no discretion. When the required reversal is below the minimum threshold, the manager increases reported earnings without limit and the equilibrium degenerates. When the manager is not endowed with any private information, the market unravels the “true” earnings and price is unaffected by earnings management. Our results underscore the importance of both allowing and restricting reporting discretion through formal mechanisms