This study examines how limits of arbitrage can affect the pricing of idiosyncratic volatility. Using both unique trading constraints in the Chinese stock market and other commonly-used limits-of-arbitrage measures, we construct a comprehensive limits-of-arbitrage index. Based on this index, we find that the negative idiosyncratic volatility return premium is much stronger and more persistent in stocks with high limits of arbitrage. Furthermore, the existing explanations about the idiosyncratic volatility return premium cannot fully explain what we find about the role of limits of arbitrage in the pricing of idiosyncratic volatility in the Chinese stock market. Our study suggests that the trading constraints introduced in the name of protecting individual investors can actually hurt them, since these additional limits of arbitrage will increase the inefficiency of the security market

We provide evidence that open-end organizational structures undermine incentives for asset managers to attack long-term mispricing. We compare open-end funds with closed-end funds. Closed-end funds purchase more underpriced stocks than do open-end funds, especially if the stocks involve high arbitrage risk. We then show that hedge funds with highshare restrictions having a lower degree of open-endedness also trade against long-term mispricing to a larger extentthan do other hedge funds. Our analysis suggests that open-end organizational structures are not conducive to long-term risky arbitrage. Received November 4, 2015; editorial decision March 10, 2017 by Editor Andrew Karolyi

We provide evidence that open-end organizational structures undermine incentives for asset managers to attack long-term mispricing. We compare open-end funds with closed-end funds. Closed-end funds purchase more underpriced stocks than do open-end funds, especially if the stocks involve high arbitrage risk. We then show that hedge funds with high share restrictions having a lower degree of open-endedness also trade against longterm mispricing to a larger extent than do other hedge funds. Our analysis suggests that open-end organizational structures are not conducive to long-term risky arbitrage

Using various empirical measures, we find that, in China, firms with high profitability generate substantially higher future stock returns than those with low profitability. This positive effect of profitability on expected returns is robust to controlling for other firm characteristics and risks. We show that the profitability premium is stronger among firms with low investment friction, which is consistent with the implications of investment-based q-theory asset pricing models. However, the premium is not stronger among firms with high limits to arbitrage, contradicting behavioral mispricing explanations

This study examines the role of investor sentiment in the pricing dynamics between the spot and futures markets. The empirical evidence suggests that investor sentiment has a positive impact on price volatility and the bid–ask spread on both the spot and futures markets, which induces higher arbitrage risk and trading costs during high sentiment periods. Consequently, during high sentiment periods, informed traders become less willing to leverage their information advantages on the futures market, which diminishes the futures markets’ leading informational role and contributions to price discovery. Our findings provide support for the theory of limits to arbitrage

Using a measure of political risk, relative to the United States, that captures unexpected political conditions, we show that political risk is priced in the cross section of currency momentum and contains information beyond other risk factors. Our results are robust after controlling for transaction costs, reversals, and alternative limits to arbitrage. The global political environment affects the profitability of the momentum strategy in the foreign exchange market; investors following such strategies are compensated for the exposure to the global political risk of those currencies they hold, that is, the past winners, and exploit the lower returns of loser portfolios. The risk compensation is mainly justified by the different exposures of foreign currencies in the momentum portfolio to U.S. political shocks, which is the main component of global political risk