We investigate the portfolio frontier and risk premia in equilibrium when institutional investors aim to minimize the tracking error variance and to attain a certain ESG score (ESG mandate). Provided that a negative ESG premium is priced by the market, we show that an ESG mandate can reduce the mean–variance inefficiency of the portfolio frontier when the asset manager targets a limited over-performance return with respect to the benchmark. In equilibrium, with mean–variance investors and asset managers endowed with an ESG mandate, a negative ESG premium arises if the mandate is binding for asset managers. The negative ESG premium is due to the ESG constraint (institutional investors over-invest in virtuous ESG stocks). We find empirical evidence of such a negative premium in the US market

This study examines the determinants and consequences of broker in-house ESG research. Using manually collected brokerage ESG research data, we find that the provision of in-house ESG research is positively related to both demand-side factors (client demand, internal demand, and local ESG awareness) and supply-side factors (broker size and coverage of sustainable industries). Regarding the consequences of such research, we find that in-house ESG research is associated with improved earnings forecast accuracy in industries where ESG is more salient. Further, the market reaction to earnings forecast revisions is stronger when equity analysts have access to in-house ESG research. Finally, we observe a consistent pattern suggesting that ESG analysts support equity analysts beyond forecast accuracy, as equity analysts with access to in-house ESG research issue more accurate target prices, more informative recommendation upgrades for ESG-heavy industries, and discuss ESG issues more extensively in their analyst reports. Data Availability Statement: The data used in this study are obtained from publicly available sources identified in the paper, as well as job posting data licensed from Lightcast. Sample construction procedures are described in the paper. Researchers interested in the job posting data should contact Lightcast directly, as access is subject to licensing restrictions

This article studies how ESG and conventional mutual funds trade stocks during the COVID-19 crash. Both fund types trade individual stocks similarly: Net purchases of ESG stocks are less sensitive than other stocks to fund flows pre-crash, but sensitivities increase for all stocks during the crash. In contrast, ESG funds’ aggregate net purchases are less sensitive than those of conventional funds during the crash. This difference is due to ESG funds’ portfolio tilt toward the less flow-sensitive ESG stocks. There is no evidence of an ESG clientele effect in trading decisions, as both fund types trade individual stocks similarly

Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) funds have heterogeneous incentives to engage with portfolio firms. If funds view ESG as a value driver, then these incentives will affect funds’ behavior and thus their impact on firms. We compare ESG funds with similar levels of ESG investments but different incentives to engage. Funds with higher incentives to engage, that is, committed ESG funds, conduct more ESG-related information acquisition, pursue longer term investment strategies, engage more intensely on ESG issues, and have greater real impacts. Moreover, committed ESG funds have outperformed other ESG funds within subportfolios with higher and more effective ESG engagement

We examine whether and how common ownership affects Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) ratings—an important research question given the increasing use of these ratings in investment decisions and corporate evaluations. We find that companies with major shareholders in common with the rating agency (“sister firms”) tend to receive higher ESG ratings. When a company becomes a sister firm through a change in the rating agency's ownership structure, its rating from that agency is subsequently upgraded, whereas its ESG ratings from other agencies remain unchanged. Sister firms exhibit greater rating disagreements across agencies than other firms. The higher ESG ratings for sister firms are partly attributable to the transfer of immaterial positive ESG information through common owners. The common ownership effect is more pronounced when the owner can exert a greater influence on the rating agency. Moreover, sister firms with initially elevated ratings demonstrate poorer future ESG performance. Overall, our findings suggest that owners can affect ESG ratings of their portfolio companies in a way consistent with their influence and interest

I examine how mandatory ESG disclosure regulations transmit to unregulated firms through ESG rating agencies’ peer benchmarking. Using the United Kingdom’s 2017 gender pay gap (GPG) disclosure mandate with its expected positive rating consequences for regulated U.K. firms, I show that unregulated firms with similar Refinitiv ESG ratings are significantly more likely to voluntarily disclose GPG information after the mandate. The effect is more pronounced when peers are defined by ESG rating similarity rather than market capitalization and is not driven by industry affiliation alone. Consistent with ESG ratings creating competitive pressures, spillovers are strongest when U.K. peers were initially lower ranked and when unregulated firms can report relatively better GPG performance. Further analyses show that these spillovers extend to other social disclosures and generalize to the European Union’s Non-Financial Reporting Directive. Overall, the paper highlights how ESG rating structures extend the reach of disclosure regulations beyond their formal scope. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text

This paper develops and tests an equilibrium model of active fund management with ESG considerations. Heterogeneous sustainability preferences lead fund managers to intensify information acquisition on assets across the ESG spectrum, broadening the scope of active management. This information channel enhances price informativeness, lowers discount rates, and increases portfolio deviation from benchmarks. The model predicts a negative and concave ESG-expected return relation, stronger for green assets and weaker for brown assets. Using data on U.S. mutual funds and stocks from 2007–2021, we find supporting evidence based on price informativeness and the implied cost of equity capital

We examine whether and, if so, how retail consumers change their shopping in response to firm‐specific negative environmental, social, and governance (ESG) news. Using an event study methodology, we do not find significant changes in consumer foot traffic in response to negative ESG news, on average. However, the average consumer reacts negatively when such news is covered by national or global media outlets, which elevates consumer awareness. In addition, we provide evidence of the heterogeneity in responses to negative ESG news across consumer groups. Consumers in more ESG‐conscious counties, as measured by county ESG preferences, income, education, and political ideology, reduce store visits in response to negative ESG news. In contrast, consumers in the least ESG‐conscious counties increase their visits in response to negative ESG news. These opposing reactions explain the insignificant average consumer response to negative ESG news. Furthermore, the ESG‐conscious consumers' negative reaction is, at most, modest, dissipating within six weeks. Overall, our findings suggest that firms face divergent responses to ESG activities from different consumer groups, underscoring the divisive nature of ESG issues

We present a model of competition between environmental, social, and governance (ESG) raters who acquire information about multiple unrelated categories and sell ratings. Raters specializing in different categories maximize the amount of information transmitted and surplus, and can be an equilibrium outcome. When investors place a high value on ESG performance across multiple categories, the unique equilibrium is for the raters to generalize—splitting their effort among the categories, resulting in less informative ratings. Greenwashing by firms can make generalization the only equilibrium. We also demonstrate that specialization maximizes ratings disagreement, and thus empirical measures of disagreement may be poor measures of surplus

We find that long‐term institutional investors tilt their portfolios toward firms with better Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) profiles, in the cross sections of both institutional investor portfolios and the ownership of firms. We test whether several theoretically motivated mechanisms can explain this relationship. Our results that long‐term investors exhibit patience with firms around poor earnings announcements, but quickly sell portfolio firms after negative ES incidents, support the view that long‐ and short‐term investors evaluate information differently. Our evidence shows that limits‐to‐arbitrage play a role, as we find that investors' ESG tilt weakens following regulatory shocks that shorten their horizon