We analyze the potential competitive effects of the proposed Basel II capital regulations on US bank credit card lending. We find that bank issuers operating under Basel II will face higher regulatory capital minimums than Basel I banks, with differences due to the way the two regulations treat reserves and gain-on-sale of securitized assets. During periods of normal economic conditions, this is not likely to have a competitive effect; however, during periods of substantial stress in credit card portfolios, Basel II banks could face a significant competitive disadvantage relative to Basel I banks and nonbank issuers.

Over the past decade, the distances between small businesses and their bank lenders have increased substantially, as increasing numbers of bank lenders have implemented credit-scoring models to evaluate the creditworthiness of small businesses. These developments are antithetical to the traditional small business lending process, which emphasizes local proximity, bank–borrower relationships, and qualitative information. We theoretically model and empirically test whether and how these changes have affected the probability that small business loans default, using 1984–2001 data from the SBA's flagship lending program. On average, both distance and credit scoring are associated with higher default probabilities—the former suggests that distance interferes with information collection, while the latter suggests that production efficiencies encourage credit-scoring lenders to expand output by making riskier loans at the margin. The default-increasing effects of distance are substantially dampened at credit scoring banks, however, suggesting that hard-information lending approaches may outperform soft-information, relationship-based lending approaches in long-distance situations.

This study finds that banks receive more favorable Moody's financial strength ratings in countries with better compliance with Basel Core Principles related to information provision. The results are robust to controlling for broad indexes of institutional quality, macroeconomic variables, sovereign ratings, and reverse causality. Compliance with other Core Principles does not affect ratings robustly. Measuring bank soundness through Z-scores yields broadly similar results for advanced and emerging markets. Countries aiming to upgrade banking regulation and supervision should consider giving priority to information provision over other elements of the core principles.

This paper identifies factors that influence decisions about a country's financial safety net, using a comprehensive data set covering 180 countries during the 1960–2003 period. Our analysis focuses on how private interest-group pressures, outside influences, and political-institutional factors affect deposit-insurance adoption and design. Controlling for macroeconomic shocks, quality of bank regulations, and institutional development, we find that both private and public interests, as well as outside pressure to emulate developed-country regulatory schemes, can explain the timing of adoption decisions and the rigor of loss-control arrangements. Controlling for other factors, political systems that facilitate intersectoral power sharing dispose a country toward design features that accommodate risk-shifting by banks

Banking crises are usually followed by low credit and GDP growth. Is this because crises tend to take place during economic downturns, or do banking sector problems have independent negative real effects? If banking crises exogenously hinder real activity, then sectors more dependent on external finance should perform relatively worse during banking crises. The evidence in this paper supports this view. The differential effects across sectors are stronger in developing countries, in countries with less access to foreign finance, and where banking crises were more severe. Robustness checks include controlling for recessions, currency crises, and alternative proxies for bank dependence

We examine the implications of optimal credit risk transfer (CRT) for bank-loan monitoring, and the incentives for banks to engage in optimal CRT. In our model, properly designed CRT instruments allow banks to insure themselves against loan losses precisely in those states that signal monitoring. We find that optimal CRT enhances loan monitoring and expands financial intermediation, in contrast to the findings of the previous literature. Optimal CRT instruments are based on loan portfolios rather than individual loans and have credit-enhancement guarantees, pretty much as banks do in practice. But the extent of credit enhancement needs to be precisely delimited. Above that exact level, monitoring incentives are undermined (loan quality deteriorates) and wealth is transferred from the bank's financiers to the bank. Properly designed risk-based capital requirements are shown to prevent such a wealth transfer and to provide banks with the incentive to engage in optimal CRT.

We analyze the optimal contract to finance the series of investments of a growing firm. The analysis is based on the need to repeatedly raise funds when informed insiders can expropriate outside investors. The optimal contract can be implemented by a sequence of one-period debt contracts and equity ownership by outsiders. Debt is optimal, as it reduces the expected cost of auditing, while partial equity ownership by insiders is optimal, as it mitigates the need for auditing in the presence of valuable growth opportunities. The model yields time-series implications regarding capital structure, investment and its fraction financed externally, and profitability.

In this paper we study the optimal design of credit derivative contracts when banks have private information about their ability in the loan market and are subject to capital requirements. First, we prove that when banks are subject to a maximum loss capital requirement the optimal signaling contract is a binary credit default basket. Second, we show that if credit derivative markets are opaque then banks cannot commit to terminal-date risk exposure, and therefore the optimal signaling contract is more costly. The above results allow us to discuss the potential implications of different capital adequacy rules for the credit derivative markets

This paper argues that banks must be sufficiently levered to have first-best incentives to make new risky loans. This result, which is at odds with the notion that leverage invariably leads to excessive risk taking, derives from two key premises that focus squarely on the role of banks as informed lenders. First, banks finance projects that they do not own, which implies that they cannot extract all the profits. Second, banks conduct a credit risk analysis before making new loans. Our model may help understand why banks take on additional unsecured debt, such as unsecured deposits and subordinated loans, over and above their existing deposit base. It may also help understand why banks and finance companies have similar leverage ratios, even though the latter are not deposit takers and hence not subject to the same regulatory capital requirements as banks

We examine the impact of geographical proximity on the acquisition decisions of US public firms over the period 1990–2003. Transactions where the acquirer and target firms are located within 100 km of each other are classified as local transactions. We find that acquirer returns in local transactions are more than twice that in non-local transactions. The higher return to local acquirer is not explained by related, either horizontal or vertical, industry transactions, and appears to be related to information advantages arising from geographical proximity. These information advantages facilitate acquisition of targets that, on average, create higher overall return. The higher return to local acquirers is preserved by the use of target termination fee contracts.