I construct an equilibrium search model where some employers have a distaste for hiring minority workers and show that this bias results in economic discrimination against minority workers. Although only unprejudiced firms hire minority workers, minority workers receive lower wages than workers not facing discrimination whenever any employers in the market have a distaste for minority workers. One implication of the model is that gender or racial wage differentials understate the utility loss from discrimination. In addition, the wages of minority workers increase when their proportion increases in the labor market.

In this paper I examine the effect of the current social security system on the structure of compensation that a wealth-maximizing worker selects. I show that the current method of benefit determination encourages an upward-sloping wage profile and that the social security system alters the mix of wage and pension payments. In addition, the intragenerational transfers of the social security system alter the level of investment in human capital. As a result, the social security system reduces the disparity of income within the economy.

Provisions for Agricultural Credit prior to 1913. — I. Federal rural-credit legislation since 1913, 95. — State rural-credit legislation since 1913, 103. — II. Effect of the new institutions. — Mortgage credit, 108. — Short-term credit, 111. — Terms of loans and interest rates, 115. — III. Adequacy of mortgage credit facilities, 117. — Provisions for "low-grade" loans, 120. — Appraisal methods, 122. — Mortgage credit facilities in the South, 123. — IV. Short-term credit facilities are inadequate, 124. — Bank failures, 124. — Suggestions for improvement of the country banking situation, 127. — V. Intermediate credit. Production credit in the South, 129. — VI. Conclusion, 130.

Reviews the book "The Alton Water Company Deffered Tax Case."

Reviews the book "Accounting Fundamentals," 3rd ed., by George A. MacFarland, Robert D. Ayars and Williard E. Stone.

The existence of counteroffers can lead to a variety of important labor‐market features. This article develops a model of the selective use of counteroffers in which a firm decides whether to extend counteroffers after a worker informs the firm of an alternative offer. We outline factors that can influence the employer’s net value of making a counteroffer and, thus, affect the likelihood of a counteroffer. We provide a new empirical analysis that examines whether proxies for these factors do, in fact, influence the likelihood that a firm would consider a counteroffer to an employee with a competing offer.

This article compares various measures of on-the-job training, from a new source that matches establishments and workers, allowing the authors to compare the responses of employers and employees to identical training questions. Establishments report 25 percent more hours of training than do workers, although workers and establishments report similar incidence rates of training. Both establishment and worker measures agree that there is much more informal training than formal training. Further, informal training is measured about as accurately as formal training. Finally, the authors show that measurement error reduces substantially the observed effect of training, in particular the effect of training on productivity growth. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.

Conventional analysis predicts that workers pay part of their on-the-job training costs by accepting a lower starting wage and subsequently realize a return to this investment in the form of greater wage growth. Missing from the conventional treatment of on-the-job training is a discussion of the process by which heterogeneous workers are matched to jobs requiring varying amounts of training. This matching process constitutes a key feature of the on-the-job training model presented in this article and tested with a unique data set containing extensive information concerning on-the-job training, employer search, wages, and wage and productivity growth.

An employer must choose a procedure for screening job applicants, a rate of hire, a training program for new employees, a criterion for the retention of new employees after observing their on-the-job performance, a compensation package, and a rate of capital investment so as to minimize production costs across time. This paper examines the effects of employer size on these hiring and training decisions when larger employers have greater monitoring costs. A unique data set is employed to estimate the empirical relation among employer size and employer search, training, capital investment, and wages.

We use unique data from the Medicaid program of the Commonwealth of Kentucky to examine the duration of Medicaid spells. The data set consists of a one-in-ten sample of all Medicaid recipients in Kentucky on July 1, 1986, and a similar sample of all new spells between July 1, 1986, and June 30, 1987. Because the beginning date of Medicaid recipiency is known for all spells, this mixed "stock" and "flow" sample allows us to identify the duration of Medicaid spells for up to twenty years. This is in contrast to other studies using short panels of new spells. We find significant differences in hazard functions across program eligibility categories, suggesting that the cost of expanding Medicaid or the savings from contracting it would vary depending on the eligibility group affected by the change in policy. © 1998 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technolog