[We examine the potential for selection bias in voluntarily reported hedge fund performance data. We construct a set of hedge fund returns that have never been reported to a commercial hedge fund database. These returns allow a direct comparison of performance between funds that choose to report to commercial databases and funds that do not. We find that funds that report their performance to commercial databases significantly outperform nonreporting funds. Our results suggest that the voluntarily reported performance in commercial databases suffers from a selection bias that may exaggerate the average skill of the universe of hedge fund managers.]

When starting their campaigns, activist investors face the decision of when to begin communication with the management of the target firm. We document how the choice to start communication early with management, before the 13D disclosure, fits within the campaign's overall strategy. Nearly a quarter of the activist campaigns in our sample begin with what we call open activism. More credible activists with lower costs of activism are more likely to engage with management early and this early engagement is related to their desire to see specific changes made at the target firm. Eventual actions taken by activists, such as a subsequent merger or proxy contest, as well as the long-run performance of the target, are also related to this initial communication decision. Together, our findings suggest that open activism is an important part of the activist's underlying strategy and that market participants understand this link.

We examine the potential for selection bias in voluntarily reported hedge fund performance data. We construct a set of hedge fund returns that have never been reported to a commercial hedge fund database. These returns allow a direct comparison of performance between funds that choose to report to commercial databases and funds that do not. We find that funds that report their performance to commercial databases significantly outperform nonreporting funds. Our results suggest that the voluntarily reported performance in commercial databases suffers from a selection bias that may exaggerate the average skill of the universe of hedge fund managers.

We study hedge funds that imposed discretionary liquidity restrictions (DLRs) on investor shares during the financial crisis. DLRs prolong fund life, but impose liquidity costs on investors, creating a potential conflict of interest. Ostensibly, funds establish DLRs to limit performance-driven withdrawals that could force fire sales of illiquid assets. However, after they restrict investor liquidity, DLR funds do not reduce illiquid stock sales and underperform a control sample of non-DLR funds. Consequently, DLRs appear to negatively impact fund family reputation. After the crisis, funds from DLR families faced difficulties raising capital and were more likely to cut their fees.

We exploit the expiring nature of hedge fund lockups to create a new measure of funding liquidity risk that varies within funds. We find that hedge funds with lower funding risk generate higher returns, and this effect is driven by their increased exposure to equity-mispricing anomalies. Our results are robust to a variety of sampling criteria, variable definitions, and control variables. Further, we address endogeneity concerns in various ways, including a placebo approach and regression discontinuity design. Collectively, our results support a causal link between funding risk and the ability of managers to engage in risky arbitrage.