In credit card markets banks provide both payment and credit services. Two regulations were recently enacted in the Turkish credit card market: one on payment services in 2005 and the other on credit services in 2006. By employing the well-known Panzar and Rosse, 1982, Panzar and Rosse, 1987 method and a unique quarterly data set for 21 Turkish banks between 2002 and 2008, we investigate the extent of banks’ market power in the Turkish credit card market before and after the regulations. Unlike most of the existing literature, which considers competition and regulation for either credit or payment services and ignores the externalities between them, we consider the entire market by taking both services into account. Fixed effects estimations reveal that banks enjoyed collusive oligopoly power before the regulations. Although the first regulation did not have much impact, the second led to rises in both banks’ total revenues and competition in the entire market.

This study examines the impact of foreign controlling shareholder trust on firm market risk using two measures of total and idiosyncratic risk. An extensive global sample of 12,496 firm-year observations from 43 countries is employed. The results show that firms controlled by foreign trusting shareholders display lower levels of risk in both market measures. Trust appears more important for firms based in countries with a less favourable institutional environment, whereby it varies with the investment horizon of foreign controlling shareholders. The results are robust after controlling for cultural measures, endogeneity, selection bias and alternate model specifications.