[We examine intrafirm competition in the mutual-fund industry. We test the hypothesis that fund managers within mutual-fund families compete with each other in a tournament. Our empirical study of the US equity mutual-fund market shows that they adjust the risk they take depending on the relative position within their fund family. The direction of the adjustment depends on the competitive situation in that family. Risk adjustments are particularly pronounced among managers of funds with high expense ratios, which are managed by a single manager and which belong to large families.]

We document that speed of information dissemination within mutual fund families positively affects fund performance. This suggests that the resultant benefits of higher information precision far outweigh free-riding costs associated with fast internal dissemination. The performance effect is stronger when information travels across managers from different, rather than the same, styles. This is consistent with fast information diffusion aggregating complementary insights that sharpen information precision, but also with fewer free-riding opportunities among managers from different styles. Managers rationally exploit the resultant higher information precision by trading more, relying less on public information, and investing differently than unaffiliated peers.

In this paper we investigate empirically the relative advantages of floor and screen trading systems. We judge the systems by their ability in providing a high degree of market integration. The main result is that a closer integration of underlying and derivative markets occurs when both instruments are screen traded, but the difference is significant only for short return intervals. In active trading periods the superiority of screen systems is even more pronounced.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers:G15, G20.

We show that fund families allocate their most skilled managers to market segments in which manager skill is rewarded best. In efficient markets, even skilled managers cannot generate excess returns. In less efficient markets, skilled managers can exploit inefficiencies and generate higher performance than unskilled managers. Fund families seem to be aware of the relation between skill, efficiency, and performance, and allocate more skilled managers to inefficient markets. They pursue this strategy when hiring new fund managers and when reassigning managers to funds within the family. Overall, we conclude that fund families allocate fund managers in an efficient way.

Rationality would suggest that advice-seeking investors receive benefits from costly financial advice. However, evidence documenting these benefits for US investors has so far been lacking. This article is the first to document that US mutual fund investors indeed receive one of the many previously hypothesized benefits associated with financial advice. The documented benefit comes from valuable tax-management advice that helps investors avoid taxable fund distributions and becomes even more valuable when investors face distributions that can cause large and hard-to-predict tax liabilities. Additional evidence suggests that financial advice helps with other aspects of tax management such as tax-loss selling.

We develop a new family of estimators of the covariance matrix that relies solely on forward-looking information. It uses only current prices of plain-vanilla options. In an out-of-sample study, we show that a minimum variance strategy based on these fully-implied estimators outperforms several benchmark strategies, including various strategies based on historical estimates, index investing, and 1/N investing. The outperformance originates in crisis periods when information flow and information asymmetry are high. Although the historical benchmark strategies improve when more recent data are used, they never outperform fully-implied strategies. Thus, our results suggest that investors are better off relying on forward-looking information.

This paper provides the first empirical test of the diversification of opinions theory and the group shift theory using real business data. Our data set covers management teams and single managers of US equity mutual funds. Our results reject the group shift theory and support the diversification of opinions theory: teams follow less extreme investment styles, their portfolios are less industry concentrated, and they are eventually less likely to achieve extreme performance outcomes. These results hold after taking into account the impact of fund and family characteristics as well as manager characteristics.

We examine the dynamics of bond correlation using a broad sample of US corporate bonds, and document that bond correlation varies heavily over time. We attribute this variation in bond correlation to variation in risk factor correlation reflecting time-varying flight-to-quality behavior of investors. We show that risk factor correlation increases when investor sentiment worsens, i.e., corporate bond investors exhibit stronger flight-to-quality when their sentiment is bad. Thus, bad investor sentiment leads to flight-to-quality behavior and, ultimately, high bond correlation. Very good sentiment, in contrast, can cause risk factor correlation and bond correlation to be negative.

We examine intrafirm competition in the mutual-fund industry. We test the hypothesis that fund managers within mutual-fund families compete with each other in a tournament. Our empirical study of the US equity mutual-fund market shows that they adjust the risk they take depending on the relative position within their fund family. The direction of the adjustment depends on the competitive situation in that family. Risk adjustments are particularly pronounced among managers of funds with high expense ratios, which are managed by a single manager and which belong to large families.