Blume and Easley (1992) show that if agents' have the same savings rule, those who maximize the expected logarithm of next period's outcomes will eventually hold all wealth (i.e. are ‘most prosperous’). However, if no agent adopts this rule then the most prosperous are not necessarily those who make the most accurate predictions. Thus, agents who make inaccurate predictions need not be driven out of the market. In this paper, it is shown that, among agents who have the same intertemporal discount factor (and who choose savings endogenously), the most prosperous are those who make accurate predictions. Hence, convergence to rational expectations obtains because agents who make inaccurate predictions are driven out of the market.

We consider a dynamic general equilibrium asset pricing model with heterogeneous agents and asymmetric information. We show how agents' different methods of gathering information affect their chances of survival in the market depending upon the nature of the information and the level of noise in the economy.

We identify a new mechanism through which cultural diversity affects economic outcomes, based on a model of culture as shared cognition. Under this view, cultural diversity matters because it increases strategic uncertainty. The model can help better understand a variety of disparate evidence, including why homogeneous societies can be more conformist, why diverse societies may get stuck in a low-trust trap, why companies with a strong culture may fail to adopt superior work practices, and why autocratic rulers in diverse societies may overinvest in state capacity.

The difficulties in properly anticipating key economic variables may encourage decision makers to rely on experts' forecasts. Professional forecasters, however, may not be reliable and so their forecasts must be empirically tested. This may induce experts to forecast strategically in order to pass the test. A test can be ignorantly passed if a false expert, with no knowledge of the data-generating process, can pass the test. Many tests that are unlikely to reject correct forecasts can be ignorantly passed. Tests that cannot be ignorantly passed do exist, but these tests must make use of predictions contingent on data not yet observed at the time the forecasts are rejected. Such tests cannot be run if forecasters report only the probability of the next period's events on the basis of the actually observed data. This result shows that it is difficult to dismiss false, but strategic, experts who know how theories are tested. This result also shows an important role that can be played by predictions contingent on data not yet observed.

We examine Popper's falsifiability within an economic model in which a tester hires a potential expert to produce a theory. Payments are contingent on the performance of the theory vis-à-vis data. We show that if experts are strategic, falsifiability has no power to distinguish scientific theories from worthless theories. The failure of falsification in screening informed and uninformed experts motivates questions on the broader concepts of refutation and verification. We demonstrate an asymmetry between the two concepts. Like falsification, verification contracts have no power to distinguish between informed and uninformed experts, but some refutation contracts are capable of screening experts.

It is well known that when agents are fully rational, compulsory public insurance may make all agents better off in the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model of insurance markets. We find that when sufficiently many agents underestimate their personal risks, compulsory insurance makes low-risk agents worse off. Hence, behavioral biases may weaken some of the well-established rationales for government intervention based on asymmetric information.

We analyze a model of participation in elections in which voting is costly and no vote is pivotal. Ethical agents are motivated to participate when they determine that agents of their type are obligated to do so. Unlike previous duty-based models of participation, in our model an ethical agent's obligation to vote is determined endogenously as a function of the behavior of other agents. Our model predicts high turnout and comparative statics that are consistent with strategic behavior.

Hume (1748) challenged the idea that a general claim (e.g., “all swans are white”) can be validated by empirical evidence, no matter how compelling. We examine this issue from the perspective of a tester who must accept or reject the forecasts of a potential expert. If experts can be skeptical about the validity of claims then they can evade rejection strategically. In contrast, if experts are required to conclude that claims backed by sufficient evidence are likely to be true, then they can be tested and rejected. These results provide an economic rationale for claim validation based on incentive problems.