There is a global trend in initial public offerings toward the increased use of book building. Relative to other methods such as auctions, a key feature of book building is that the underwriter has total discretion in allocating shares, allowing allocations to be based on long-term relationships between underwriters and investors. In a multiperiod model with endogenous (and costly) information acquisition, I show that the underwriter's ability to lower underpricing depends largely on its ability to favor regular uninformed investors. One implication is that the hybrid book building/open offer method, which is becoming increasingly popular internationally, will lead to higher underpricing than straight book building.

There is a global trend in initial public offerings toward the increased use of book building. Relative to other methods such as auctions, a key feature of book building is that the underwriter has total discretion in allocating shares, allowing allocations to be based on long-term relationships between underwriters and investors. In a multiperiod model with endogenous (and costly) information acquisition. I show that the underwriter's ability to lower underpricing depends largely on its ability to favor regular uninformed investors. One implication is that the hybrid book building/open offer method, which is becoming increasingly popular internationally, will lead to higher underpricing than straight book building.

[Using a unique dataset of complete bid information for every IPO auction in Taiwan during 1995-2000, we examine the behaviors and returns of two groups—institutional and retail investors—in a setting in which underwriters do not have pricing or allocation discretion. We find that the bids of institutional investors are generally consistent with the predictions of IPO auction theory for informed bidders, while those of individual investors are not. Specifically, returns are higher when more institutional investors enter the auction or bid higher prices, suggesting institutional investors are informed and are also able to shave bids adequately. However, individual investors as a group exhibit return-chasing behavior, are uninformed, and systematically overbid.]

[We examine how experience affects the decisions of individual investors and institutions in IPO auctions to bid in subsequent auctions, and their bidding returns. We track bidding histories for all 31,476 individual investors and 1,232 institutional investors across all 84 IPO auctions during the period from 1995 to 2000 in Taiwan. For individual bidders, (1) high returns in previous IPO auctions increase the likelihood of participating in future auctions; (2) bidders' returns decrease as they participate in more auctions; (3) auction selection ability deteriorates with experience; and (4) those with greater experience bid more aggressively. These findings are consistent with naïve reinforcement learning wherein individuals become unduly optimistic after receiving good returns. In sharp contrast, there is little sign that institutional investors exhibit such behavior.]

We examine the book-building method for marketing IPOs. In our model, the underwriter selects a group of investors along with a pricing and allocation mechanism to maximize (at minimum cost) the information generated during the process of going public. We also address the moral hazard problem faced by investors when evaluation is costly. When there is little need for accurate pricing, the expected gain from underpricing exactly offsets the investors’ costs of acquiring information. When pricing accuracy is important, however, the number of investors participating in the offering is larger, underpricing is greater, and investors can earn economic rents.

Using a unique dataset of complete bid information for every IPO auction in Taiwan during 1995--2000, we examine the behaviors and returns of two groups--institutional and retail investors--in a setting in which underwriters do not have pricing or allocation discretion. We find that the bids of institutional investors are generally consistent with the predictions of IPO auction theory for informed bidders, while those of individual investors are not. Specifically, returns are higher when more institutional investors enter the auction or bid higher prices, suggesting institutional investors are informed and are also able to shave bids adequately. However, individual investors as a group exhibit return-chasing behavior, are uninformed, and systematically overbid. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press [on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies]. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

We model the firm's decision to invest in liquid assets when external financing is costly. The optimal amount of liquidity is determined by a tradeoff between the low return earned on liquid assets and the benefit of minimizing the need for costly external financing. The model predicts that the optimal investment in liquidity is increasing in the cost of external financing, the variance of future cash flows, and the return on future investment opportunities, while it is decreasing in the return differential between the firm's physical assets and liquid assets. Empirical tests on a large panel of U.S. industrial firms support the model's predictions.

We examine how experience affects the decisions of individual investors and institutions in IPO auctions to bid in subsequent auctions, and their bidding returns. We track bidding histories for all 31, 476 individual investors and 1, 232 institutional investors across all 84 IPO auctions during the period from 1995 to 2000 in Taiwan. For individual bidders, (1) high returns in previous IPO auctions increase the likelihood of participating in future auctions; (2) bidders' returns decrease as they participate in more auctions; (3) auction selection ability deteriorates with experience; and (4) those with greater experience bid more aggressively. These findings are consistent with naïve reinforcement learning wherein individuals become unduly optimistic after receiving good returns. In sharp contrast, there is little sign that institutional investors exhibit such behavior. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

Earlier research indicates that attracting pre-offer investor attention yields long-term benefits to an initial public offering (IPO) issuer. For investors with limited attention, we model a way in which firms may attract attention: through underpricing their IPO, and using the expected allocations of underpriced shares to induce investors to attend the road show and consider the offering. Our model generates a novel set of predictions regarding the relationship between initial returns and attention, retention, expansion, and the benefits of attention, plus the asymmetry of the relationship with attention. Consistent with our model, investors’ attention is positively related to both initial returns and the magnitude of price revision. The relationship between attention and underpricing is asymmetric, and stronger when ex ante uncertainty is greater. Our work has implications regarding direct listings, is consistent with partial adjustment to public information, explains the relative unpopularity of gray market/when-issued trading and predicts that, even if the JOBS Act leads to more active pre-IPO trading (through crowdinvesting/equity crowdfunding), underpricing will still occur.