The model of Foster-Viswanathan (1990, FV) predicts that information heterogeneity among market participants generates patterns in volume, trading costs and volatility. In the Italian Treasury bond market, periodic information asymmetry is related to the arrival of block orders from international investors, which cluster soon after the opening of the market and, respectively, of the US market. Our evidence is that volume is lower and trading costs are higher after the two openings, consistent with FV. We find only weak evidence that volatility behaves as implied by the model.

Using a comprehensive dataset of Italian small and medium-sized enterprises, we find that differences between private and public information on firm creditworthiness affect the decision to issue bonds. Our evidence supports favorable (rather than adverse) selection in corporate bond markets. Specifically, holding public information constant, firms with better private fundamentals are more likely to access bond markets. These effects are weaker for opaque firms and stronger for firms with worse publicly observable risk. Additionally, credit conditions improve for issuers following the bond placement, compared with a matched sample of non-issuers. This is consistent with a model where banks offer more flexibility than markets during financial distress and firms use market lending to signal credit quality to outside stakeholders.