We examine the effect of corporate asset-backed securitization on managerial compensation. We find that CEO compensation increases after securitization of corporate assets, which is consistent with two distinct theoretical views: (1) asset-backed securitization improves the efficiency of performance-based compensation as corporate performance becomes a better signal of managerial effort and (2) securitization of corporate assets mitigates liquidity constraints so that firms can make more efficient investments. We find that securitization primarily affects short-term accounting components (bonuses) and less equity-based components of the CEO's performance-based compensation. Further investigation reveals support for the second view of liquidity but not the first view of moral hazard. The results are robust to controlling for both possible self-selection biases associated with the decision to rely on asset-backed securitization as a means of external financing and simultaneity between executive compensation and financial decisions (securitization and leverage).

In this paper, we investigate drivers of corporate venture capital investment announcements. Consistent with voluntary information disclosure theories, we find that a public announcement is less likely to be made when the start-up firm is in the seed stage but more likely when the parent company is large, active in concentrated markets and in non-high-tech industries; spends heavily on internal R&D and capital expenditures; has low leverage ratio; and faces more information asymmetry problems. In addition, corporate venture capital programs managed externally disclose more often than internal programs. We find that parent companies facing more severe asymmetric information problems enjoy the highest abnormal returns in response to announcements. This study contributes to the literature on voluntary information disclosure in that it evidences that larger corporations use disclosure of some of their investments in innovative startups strategically as a way to convey valuable information to the market.

This paper examines the dynamics of exit options for US venture capital funds. Using a sample of more than 20,000 investment rounds, we analyze the time to ‘IPO’, ‘trade sale’ and ‘liquidation’ for 6000 VC-backed firms. We model these exit times using competing risks models, which allow for a joint analysis of exit type and exit timing. The hazard rate for IPOs are clearly non-monotonic with respect to time. As time flows, VC-backed firms first exhibit an increased likelihood of exiting to an IPO. However, after having reached a plateau, non-exited investments have fewer possibilities of IPO exits as time increases. This sharply contrasts with trade sale exits, where the hazard rate is less time-varying. We further provide evidence on the impact of economic factors such as syndicate size and composition, geographical location and VC value adding, on exit outcomes.

The paper seeks to explain the huge cross country variation in private pension funding, shaped by historical choice made when universal pension systems were created after the Great Depression. According to Perotti and von Thadden [Perotti, E., von Thadden, E.-L., 2006. The political economy of corporate control and labor rents. J. Polit. Econ., 145–175], large inflationary shocks due to war damage devastated middle class savings in some countries in the first half of the XX century. This shaped political preferences over the role of capital markets and social insurance, and contributed to the Great Reversals documented by Rajan and Zingales [Rajan, R.G., Zingales, L., 2003. The great reversals: The politics of financial development in the 20th century. J. Finan. Econ. 69 (1), 5–50]. Wealth distribution shocks are indeed strongly related to private pension funding, as a large shock reduces the stock of private retirement assets by 58% of GDP. While the sample size is limited, the results are robust to other explanations, such as legal origin, original financial development, past and current demographics, religion, electoral voting rules, redistributive politics, national experiences with financial market performance, or other major financial shocks that were not specifically redistributive. Corroborating evidence indicates that such redistributive shocks help explain the cross country variation in social expenditures, state ownership of industry, financial development and employment protection measures as predicted by the political shift hypothesis.

Equity crowdfunding is a new form of entrepreneurial finance, in which investors do not receive perks or engage in pre-purchase of the product, but rather participate in the future cash flows of a firm. In this paper, we analyze what determines individual investment decisions in this new financial market. One important factor that may influence the behavior of investors is the way the portal allocates securities. We use unique data from four German equity crowdfunding portals to examine how the allocation mechanism affects funding dynamics. In contrast with the crowdfunding campaigns on Kickstarter, on which the typical pattern of project support is U shaped, we find that equity crowdfunding dynamics are L shaped under a first-come, first-served mechanism and U shaped under a second-price auction. The evidence also shows that investors base their decisions on information provided by the entrepreneur in the form of updates as well as by the investment behavior and comments of other crowd investors.

We examine the impact of lead arrangers' reputation on the design of loan contracts such as spread and fees charged. Controlling for the non-randomness of the lender–borrower match (self-selection bias), we find that the reputation of top tier arrangers leads to higher spreads, and that top tier arrangers retain larger fractions of their loans in their syndicates. These larger spreads are especially pronounced for borrowers without credit rating that have the most to gain from the certification assumed by virtue of a loan contract with a top tier arranger. This certification channel differs from the one found in public markets, where certification leads to a reduced spread offered to the best clients. These differences between public and private markets can be explained by differences in the way they operate and are structured. Interestingly, the effect is strongest for transactions done after the changes in the banking regulations (including the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994) that led to significant consolidations in the banking industry, including among the largest commercial banks.

In this study, we explored the presence of correlated investment choices (i.e., herd behaviour) among international buyout funds by distinguishing among the contemporaneous and the following herding of smaller funds towards the top market players (i.e., the top quartile in terms of the fund size). In our analyses, we found that the industry herding towards the largest ones is common in private equity (PE) but mostly during market contractions or the deterioration of general market conditions. Moreover, we also found that as capital inflows into the PE industry slow down, herding occurs more often. This finding is consistent with the increasing competition for new capital fundraising in downturns, which can induce PE funds to herd more. We also found that both types of herding generate higher fund returns and lower risk for funds that are capable of herding. Additionally, we documented the persistence in herding.

In this paper, we investigate whether fund-specific risk helps explain performance persistence in private equity funds, using detailed deal-level cash flow information at both the fund and deal levels. We further extend existing findings to international evidence on buyout and venture capital (VC) by testing the impact of various risk measures. We find that risk is an important driver of performance persistence and helps explain such persistence. We also find persistence in risk in private equity, in particular persistence in downside volatility for both buyout and VC funds. Finally, we document that fund performance is more strongly affected by fund managers able to minimize downside losses than selecting outperforming portfolio companies. This effect is strongest for buyout but, to a weaker extent, also holds for VC. Our results are further robust to controlling for legal factors at the country level.

This paper explores whether private equity firms that are new to the industry take excessive risks relative to funds from established firms. We use differences between the implicit incentives of managers of experienced and of novice funds as an identification strategy. We find that novice funds invest more slowly than experienced funds, contradicting the risk-taking hypothesis. However, the size of their investments, in value and as fraction of fund size, is larger; this could be consistent with risk-shifting by novice funds but also with alternative hypotheses. We find that the size difference increases over time and is absent from buyout investments. We also find that novice funds tend to underperform most dramatically for early large investments, and that the size of their investments increases after a first successful exit. These and other findings are in conflict with the excessive risk-taking hypothesis, but largely consistent with alternative explanations that emphasize differences in expertise.

This paper focuses on the strategic role of corporate venture financing carried out by a corporation (a headquarter). When the headquarter finances a venture through its corporate venture-financing arm, it can increase the complementarity between products of the venture and the headquarter. The effect of having an increase in complementarity is a softening of ex post product market competition with rival products. Hence, in deciding whether to finance the venture, the headquarter faces a trade-off between, on the one hand, being more aggressive ex post in the product market, and, on the other hand, using venture financing to soften ex post competition with substitute products.