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Review of Economics and Statistics over the Past 100 Years: Content Explorer

The Review of Economics and Statistics 2019 101(1), i-iii
March 01 2019 Review of Economics and Statistics over the Past 100 Years: Content Explorer Asim I. Khwaja, Asim I. Khwaja Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Kunal Mangal Kunal Mangal Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Asim I. Khwaja Kunal Mangal Online Issn: 1530-9142 Print Issn: 0034-6535 © 2019 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2019The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology The Review of Economics and Statistics (2019) 101 (1): i–iii. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_e_00816 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation Asim I. Khwaja, Kunal Mangal; Review of Economics and Statistics over the Past 100 Years: Content Explorer. The Review of Economics and Statistics 2019; 101 (1): i–iii. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_e_00816 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsThe Review of Economics and Statistics Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 2019 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2019The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats through Performance-Based Postings

American Economic Review 2019 109(1), 237-270 open access
Bureaucracies often post staff to better or worse locations, ostensibly to provide incentives. Yet we know little about whether this works, with heterogeneity in preferences over postings impacting effectiveness. We propose a performance-ranked serial dictatorship mechanism, whereby bureaucrats sequentially choose desired locations in order of performance. We evaluate this using a two-year field experiment with 525 property tax inspectors in Pakistan. The mechanism increases annual tax revenue growth by 30–41 percent. Inspectors whom our model predicts face high equilibrium incentives under the scheme indeed increase performance more. Our results highlight the potential of periodic merit-based postings in enhancing bureaucratic performance.