The subjective probabilities implied by Savage's (1954, 1972) Postulates are finitely but not countably additive. The failure of countable additivity leads to two known classes of dominance paradoxes, money pumps and indifference between an act and one that pointwise dominates it. There is a common resolution to these classes of paradoxes and to any others that might arise from failures of countably additivity. It consists of reinterpreting finitely additive probabilities as the "traces" of countably additive probabilities on larger state spaces. The new and larger state spaces preserve the essential decision-theoretic structures of the original spaces.

Volunteer activity is work performed without monetary recompense. This article shows that volunteering is a sizeable economic activity in the United States, that volunteers have high skills and opportunity costs of time, that standard labor supply explanations of volunteering account for only a minor part of volunteer behavior, and that many volunteer only when requested to do so. This suggests that volunteering is a "conscience good or activity"-something that people feel morally obligated to do when asked, but which they would just as soon let someone else do.

While intercorporate shareownership is common among publicly traded firms, systematic empirical evidence on this particular aspect of corporate ownership structure is sparse. Based largely on aggregated ownership data provided by various stock exchanges, we know that intercorporate holdings represent a relatively large proportion (above 40%) of the total equity value of exchange- listed firms in Japan and Germany, and a relatively low proportion (less than 10%) in the U.S. and the U.K. Thus, the Anglo-American corporate governance system appears to produce substantially lower levels of intercorporate shareholdings than does the German– Japanese governance model. While financial institutions in Germany and Japan play an integral role in the governance structures of those countries, securities laws inspired by early populist sentiments in the U.S. have prevented American financial institutions from playing a similar active role.1 Much like the Anglo-American system, securities laws in Norway, the empirical laboratory of Bøhren and Norli (1997), also restrict the equity ownership and direct corporate governance participation of financial institutions. Perhaps as a result the level of intercorporate

Prior theoretical work predicts an underprovision of advance-notice contracts stemming from their enforcement costs. In the present model, it is rather the fundamental inability of workers to alienate their right to quit taken in conjunction with parameters central to job separation decisions that jointly determine the mix of notice and no-notice contracts observed in equilibrium. Not all equilibrium contracts are efficient, but there is no underprovision of notice. Mandating notice cannot improve on joint value and indeed may reduce it. Furthermore, although a mandate can be merely redistributive, there are cases in which it harms all parties.

This study examines the joint influence of board composition, leadership structure, and board ownership structure on the market's reaction to corporate antitakeover amendment proposals. The stock price reaction to antitakeover amendments is more negative when the board is dominated by inside and affiliated outside board members. Further, for firms in which the CEO also chairs the board, the reaction becomes increasingly negative as inside and affiliated outside board members increase their ownership stake in the firm and proportional representation on the board. In contrast, board composition and ownership structure have little power to explain the stock price reaction when the CEO does not chair the board. We conclude that monitoring by outside independent board members is important particularly when the CEO is also the board chair. The separation of ownership and control in the corporate form of business creates potential conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. These conflicts can be mitigated by such internal governance characteristics as the compo? sition, ownership structure, and leadership structure ofthe firm's board of directors. In this study, we analyze the joint effect of these board monitoring characteristics on the stock market response to antitakeover amendment proposals. The study of antitakeover amendments is of particular importance because of the unresolved nature of the theoretical debate surrounding the amendments and the conflicting empirical evidence. Various types of antitakeover amendments exist, but all ostensibly make the takeover of a target firm more difficult with? out the cooperation of incumbent management. The amendments can be either beneficial or detrimental, depending on how managers use them. Managers can use the amendments to extract a higher takeover bid or to entrench themselves at shareholders' expense. The empirical evidence on the market's reaction to amend? ment announcements is also mixed. For example, Linn and McConnell (1983) and

Alexander's (1994) finding that the National Recovery Administration's Codes of Fair Competition led to a change in the critical concentration level during the 1930s is questioned. No regime switch is detected when a common industry sample is employed. Also, when industries with and without codes are analyzed, codes appear to have no effect on price–cost margins during the period. This absence of effect is postulated to be a result of the unenforceability of trade practice provisions contained in many codes. The empirical results of this paper suggest that the existence of codes was not sufficient to enable industries to overcome cartel formation costs. Only easily enforceable trade practice provisions appear to have affected the structure–performance relation in the period following repeal of the National Industrial Recovery Act.

We study an incentive model of financial intermediation in which firms as well as intermediaries are capital constrained. We analyze how the distribution of wealth across firms, intermediaries, and uninformed investors affects investment, interest rates, and the intensity of monitoring. We show that all forms of capital tightening (a credit crunch, a collateral squeeze, or a savings squeeze) hit poorly capitalized firms the hardest, but that interest rate effects and the intensity of monitoring will depend on relative changes in the various components of capital. The predictions of the model are broadly consistent with the lending patterns observed during the recent financial crises.

Our simulation results show that tests for long-horizon (i.e.. multi-year) abnormal security returns around firm-specific events are severely misspecified. The rejection frequencies using parametric tests sometimes exceed 30% when the significance level of the test is 5%. Our results are robust to many different abnormal-return models. Conclusions from long-horizon studies require extreme caution. Nonparametric and bootstrap tests are likely to reduce misspecification.

Auditing, Auditor Judgment, Dilution effect, Accountability