This paper studies liability management exercises (LME) by banks, which have comparable regulatory capital effects than contingent capital triggers. LMEs are concentrated on low capitalization situations, both in the cross-section and in the time series and are frequently associated with equity issuances. These exercises prove effective at improving bank capitalization levels. The market reaction to LMEs is positive and mostly accrues to debt holders. These findings strengthen the case for innovative liabilities securities as a tool to improve bank resilience. Received February 8, 2019; editorial decision May 16, 2019 by Editor Andrew Ellul.

[To study the role of talent in finance workers’ pay, we exploit a special feature of the French higher education system. Wage returns to talent have been significantly higher and have risen faster since the 1980s in finance than in other sectors. Both wage returns to project size and the elasticity of project size to talent are also higher in this industry. Last, the share of performance pay varies more for talent in finance. These findings are supportive of finance wages reflecting the competitive assignment of talent in an industry that exhibits a high complementarity between talent and scale.]

We investigate the development of an innovative and high-risk type of borrowing for local governments, known as structured loans. Using transaction data for more than 2,700 local governments in France, we show that the adoption of these instruments is more frequent for politicians from highly indebted local governments, from politically contested areas, and during political campaigns. Taking on structured loans helps incumbents win a reelection, and initially allows them to maintain lower taxes. Our findings illustrate how financial innovation can amplify principal-agent problems within the political system.

To study the role of talent in finance workers’ pay, we exploit a special feature of the French higher education system. Wage returns to talent have been significantly higher and have risen faster since the 1980s in finance than in other sectors. Both wage returns to project size and the elasticity of project size to talent are also higher in this industry. Last, the share of performance pay varies more for talent in finance. These findings are supportive of finance wages reflecting the competitive assignment of talent in an industry that exhibits a high complementarity between talent and scale. Received October 11, 2017; editorial decision September 4, 2018 by Editor Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh.

This study investigates how banks design financial products to cater to yield-seeking investors. We focus on a large market of investment products targeted exclusively at households: retail structured products. These products typically offer a high return under their best-case scenario—the headline rate—that is nested in a complex payoff formula. Using a text analysis of the payoff formulas of the 55,000 products issued in Europe from 2002 to 2010, we measure product headline rates, complexity, and risk. Over this period, product headline rates depart from the prevailing interest rates as the latter decrease, complexity increases, and risky products become more common. In the cross section, the headline rate of a product is positively correlated with its level of complexity and risk. Higher headline rate, more complex, and riskier products appear more profitable to the banks distributing them. Our results suggest that financial complexity is a by-product of banks catering to yield-seeking investors.

We study whether exit policies by financial institutions have financial and real consequences on the firms they target, using bank coal exit policies as a laboratory. In contrast to theories assuming high capital substitutability, we find large effects of these policies. Bank exit policies negatively affect both the financing and operation of coal assets. Substitution to other sources and providers of capital appears to be limited. Coal power plants owned by firms exposed to exit policies are more likely to retire, translating into lower CO2 emissions. Exit policies have reduced CO2e emissions from energy production by an estimated 0.62 gigaton.

Marketplace lending relies on screening and information production by investors, a major deviation from the traditional banking paradigm. Theoretically, the participation of sophisticated investors improves screening outcomes and also creates adverse selection among investors. In maximizing loan volume, the platform trades off these two forces. As the platform develops, it optimally increases platform prescreening intensity but decreases information provision to investors. Using novel investor-level data, we find that sophisticated investors systematically outperform, and this outperformance shrinks when the platform reduces information provision to investors. Our findings shed light on the optimal distribution of information production in this new lending model.Received August 29, 2018; editorial decision July 1, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

We investigate the development of an innovative and high-risk type of borrowing for local governments, known as structured loans. Using transaction data for more than 2, 700 local governments in France, we show that the adoption of these instruments is more frequent for politicians from highly indebted local governments, from politically contested areas, and during political campaigns. Taking on structured loans helps incumbents win a reelection, and initially allows them to maintain lower taxes. Our findings illustrate how financial innovation can amplify principal-agent problems within the political system.

This paper shows that securities with nonlinear payoff designs can foster household risk‐taking. We demonstrate this effect by exploiting the introduction of capital guarantee products in Sweden between 2002 and 2007. Their fast and broad adoption is associated with an increase in expected financial portfolio returns. The effect is especially strong for households with low‐risk appetite ex ante. These empirical facts are consistent with a life‐cycle model in which households have pessimistic beliefs or preferences combining loss aversion and narrow framing. Our results illustrate how security design can mitigate behavioral biases to increase mean household portfolio returns.

Borrowers' use of cashless payments improves their access to capital from FinTech lenders and predicts a lower probability of default. These relationships are stronger for cashless technologies providing more precise information, and for outflows. Cashless payment usage complements other signals of borrower quality. We rationalize these empirical findings using a framework in which borrowers signal their lower likelihood of diverting cash flows through payment technology choice, and screening accuracy is further strengthened by informational complementarities. The informational synergy we uncover provides a rationale for the joint rise of cashless payments and FinTech lending, as well as for open banking.