The industrial revolution in several East Asian countries over the last three decades is one of the most important economic events in the postwar era. Several recent growthaccounting exercises have found that their extraordinary rate of output growth was due primarily to an equally impressive rate of factor accumulation, with little due to technological progress (see Alwyn Young, 1992, 1995; Jong-Il Kim and Lawrence Lau, 1994; Susan Collins and Barry Bosworth, 1996 ) . Since these studies suggest that factor accumulation has been the lead actor in East Asia’s growth, many economists have reached the conclusion that the industrial revolution in East Asia can largely be explained in terms of transition dynamics in a neoclassical growth framework (see e.g., Paul Krugman, 1994; N. Gregory Mankiw, 1995). If this view is correct, the lesson from East Asia’s experience is that there are no easy solutions for a poor country that seeks to join the league of wealthy nations. Low levels of investment and education may be the result of bad policies. But once proper policies are enacted, a poor country faces the grim prospect of a further decline in its already low standards of living as it devotes more resources to investment and education. The central point of this paper is that, if East Asia’s growth was largely driven by capital accumulation with little technological progress, the return to capital should have fallen dramatically as capital accumulation encounters diminishing returns. For example, the capital–output ratio for Korea computed from the national accounts has increased at an average rate of 3.4 percent per year from 1966 to 1990 while that of Singapore has increased at an average rate of 3.7 percent per year from 1968 to 1990. By dividing the share of payments to capital in total income by the capital–output