This paper presents a game-theoretic analysis of the competition for procurement contracts under different auction procedures. One procedure is a "discriminatory" auction in which contractors simultaneously submit sealed bids, and the lowest bidder wins. The other procedure is a "competitive" auction in which the bid price is lowered sequentially until only one interested bidder remains. The focus is on the effect of changes in procurement procedures and the number of bidders on expected procurement costs. If bidders in this model are risk averse, then the expected procurement cost is lower in a discrimatory auction than in a competitive auction.

This paper presents a game-theoretic analysis of the competition for procurement contracts under different auction procedures. One procedure is a "discriminatory" auction in which contractors simultaneously submit sealed bids, and the lowest bidder wins. The other procedure is a "competitive" auction in which the bid price is lowered sequentially until only one interested bidder remains. The focus is on the effect of changes in procurement procedures and the number of bidders on expected procurement costs. If bidders in this model are risk averse, then the expected procurement cost is lower in a discrimatory auction than in a competitive auction.

This paper reports results of committee voting experiments in which a fixed agenda specifies a sequence of binary decisions. The outcome depends on whether voting is myopic or strategic. Subjects initially voted in accordance with myopic-voting rules; strategic-voting behavior was more prevalent with experience. The use of the same induced preferences in successive meetings was more likely to induce strategic voting than the provision of public information concerning the numbers of voters of each preference type.

If prizes are to be awarded simultaneously at a specified time on a first-come- first-served basis, then individuals who queue for them will choose different waiting times through their arrivals at the queue. This choice of arrival time at a queue is similar to the choice of a sealed tender in an auction. An equilibrium for this "waiting-line auction" is obtained here using methods for analyzing sealed-tender auctions. When individuals are risk neutral it is shown that several alternative waiting-line allocation procedures result in the same transactions cost associated with waiting in line.

If prizes are to be awarded simultaneously at a specified time on a first-come- first-served basis, then individuals who queue for them will choose different waiting times through their arrivals at the queue. This choice of arrival time at a queue is similar to the choice of a sealed tender in an auction. An equilibrium for this "waiting-line auction" is obtained here using methods for analyzing sealed-tender auctions. When individuals are risk neutral it is shown that several alternative waiting-line allocation procedures result in the same transactions cost associated with waiting in line.