We study the effects of Confucian social norms on savings rates in China. In our simple two-period model, parents have the option to invest in either a risk-free asset or their children’s human capital. We assume that the filial piety norms and thus the enforcement mechanisms for supporting old-age parents differ across regions. Consequently, the probability of children’s non-performance of their repayment obligations to parents and the returns parents can expect from investing in their children vary. We test the model predictions using data from the China Household Finance Survey. We find that stronger Confucian social norms reduce the gap in the savings rate between families with sons and with daughters. Modeling default by children as a function of the prevailing social norms gives us the flexibility to study the impacts of declining Confucian influence on consumption–savings trends in China.

We construct a traded funding liquidity measure from stock returns. Guided by a model, we extract the measure as the return spread between two beta-neutral portfolios constructed using stocks with high and low margins, to control for their sensitivity to the aggregate funding shocks. Our measure of funding liquidity is correlated with other funding liquidity proxies. It delivers a positive risk premium that cannot be explained by existing risk factors. A model augmented by our funding liquidity measure has superior pricing performance for various portfolios. Despite evident comovement, this measure contains additional information that is not subsumed by market liquidity.

We show that socially responsible firms use cash as a commitment device to honor implicit commitments to stakeholders. Firms with better social performance hold higher cash balances, especially for firms with social performance related to stakeholders or requiring cash spending. This relation is also stronger for firms that benefit more from social performance, e.g., firms that face more competition in product and labor markets. Social performance related to stakeholders or requiring cash spending increases the marginal value of cash.

This study examines whether requiring the disclosure of audited financial statements disciplines managers’ mergers and acquisitions (M&As) decisions. When an M&A transaction meets certain disclosure thresholds, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires the public acquirer to disclose the target's audited financial statements after the merger is completed. Using hand‐collected data, I find that the disclosure of private targets’ financial statements is associated with better acquisition decisions. Furthermore, I find that this disciplining effect of disclosure is more pronounced when monitoring by outside capital providers is more difficult and costly, and when other disciplining mechanisms are weaker. Finally, these findings are robust to several alternative explanations, such as monitoring from blockholders and voluntary disclosures. In sum, the evidence suggests that the ex post mandatory disclosure of private targets’ accounting information disciplines managers’ acquisition decisions and improves acquisition efficiency.

Time-preference shocks affect agents’ preferences for assets with different durations. We consider longevity risk as a source of time-preference shocks and model it in the recursive preferences setting. This implies a consumption-based three-factor model, including longevity risk, consumption growth rate, and the market portfolio, where longevity has a negative price of risk. Empirically, this model explains many well-known cross-sectional portfolios. Notably, we find that longevity risk and the momentum factor share a common business cycle component, i.e., short-run consumption risks. Prior winners (losers) provide hedging against mortality (longevity) risk and thus have higher (lower) expected returns, because winners have higher dividend growth and shorter equity durations than losers. Time-varying longevity risk captures most momentum profits over time, including the large momentum crashes observed in the data.

We investigate the joint effect of managers’ self-inclusive language (SIL) and performance news on investors’ reactions to accounting disclosures. We identify two types of SIL: individual SIL, which includes first-person singular pronouns (e.g., I, me) and collective SIL, which includes first-person plural pronouns (e.g., we, us). When performance news is negative, individual SIL implies that a manager is claiming sole responsibility for the unfavorable event whereas collective SIL and SEL diffuse responsibility. Therefore, we predict higher perceptions of manager credibility for individual SIL relative to collective SIL or self-exclusive language (SEL) when performance news is negative, which, in turn, increase investment judgments. We use a between-subjects experiment to test our predictions. Results show higher perceptions of manager credibility and higher investment judgments for individual SIL relative to collective SIL or SEL when performance news is negative. Results of a maximum likelihood estimation suggest that perceptions of manager credibility mediate the effect of individual SIL on investment judgments, supporting the notion that individual SIL exerts an indirect effect on investment judgments. We supplement experimental evidence with an analysis of managers’ SIL in a large sample of earnings conference calls. We document a positive (negative) market reaction to individual (collective) SIL when performance news is negative, consistent with our Hypothesis. We also find a positive market reaction to individual SIL when news is positive. Overall, our study offers multi-method evidence of the impact of a subtle and easily overlooked component of managers’ language on investors’ judgments.

We explore how the expertise of a bank holding company's management team affects its asset securitization policies. We find management team members with an MBA degree and top management experience securitize more low risk loans while those with core functional executive positions securitize fewer high risk loans. In addition, internal liquidity, governance quality, and risk management quality moderate these effects. Moreover, risk management concerns are the main driver of the negative effect of the percentage of core functional executives on asset securitization. We also provide evidence that core functional executives deem securitized mortgage loans riskier after the subprime crisis.