Valuation risk of a security—uncertainty about its fair value—is a subject of considerable concern in the mutual fund industry. If funds report different values for identical securities, investors cannot easily compare their performance. Yet it is not unusual to see identical illiquid stocks, small-cap stocks, stocks with high analyst dispersion, stocks with less analyst coverage, and newly listed stocks valued differently across mutual funds. An equity fund that has positive price dispersion in its portfolio holdings, that performs poorly, that belongs to a fund family with an inclination for aggressive reporting, that holds more stocks subject to stale prices, that holds more pre-IPO firms, or that experiences net outflows will tend to show positive price dispersion again in the next quarter. This behavior is significant in a volatile market. Aggressive reporting helps funds gain in the mutual fund tournament.

This article documents a new set of stylized facts on how pricing moments depend on product age and emphasizes how this heterogeneity is crucial for the amplification of nominal shocks to the real economy. Exploiting information from a unique panel containing billions of transactions in the US consumer goods sector, we show that our empirical findings are consistent with a narrative in which firms face demand uncertainty and learn through prices. Such a mechanism of active learning from prices can strongly influence an economy’s aggregate price level and can thus be important for assessing the degree of monetary non-neutrality. To quantify this, we build a general equilibrium menu cost model with active learning and exogenous entry that features heterogeneity in pricing moments over the life cycle of products. Under this setup, firms engage in active learning to deal with uncertainty on their demand curves. Firms choose prices not only to maximize static profits but also to create signals to obtain valuable information on their demand. In the calibrated version of our model, the cumulative real effects of a nominal shock are approximately three times as large compared to a standard price-setting model. The main intuition behind this result is that active learning weakens the selection effect. Price changes are mainly determined by forces of active learning and, hence, become more orthogonal to aggregate shocks, which reduces the aggregate price flexibility of the economy.

Extensive empirical research concerning the impact of taxes on corporate decisions has had trouble identifying seemingly obvious effects. Perhaps the problem is that the seemingly obvious tax predictions are not quite right. We provide an equilibrium model with both corporate and personal taxes. In the steady-state equilibrium, the corporate tax rate affects the level of production despite interest deductibility at the firm level, but not household-level taxes on interest earnings or dividends. We prove several other tax irrelevance results and document a Laffer curve in the corporate tax rate.

We examine a simple measure of operating leverage: the ratio of fixed costs (measured by depreciation and amortization plus selling, general, and administrative expenses) to the market (or book) value of assets. We find that this measure of operating leverage positively predicts returns. This operating leverage measure is not explained by common factors and performs better than the traditional measures of operating leverage. Furthermore, an exploratory two-factor model with the operating leverage factor works at least as well as, but does not subsume, the Fama and French five-factor model.

Discount rates affect stock prices directly via the discount-rate channel or indirectly via the cash-flow channel because expected future cash-flow growth varies with the discount rate. The traditional Macaulay duration captures the effect from the discount-rate channel. I propose a novel duration measure, the effective equity duration, to capture the effects from both channels. I estimate it around unexpected policies in the federal funds rates. I find that the equity yield curve is hump-shaped because expected future cash-flow growth increases with the discount rate. The effective equity duration captures information other than monetary policy risk.

Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC) have attracted considerable interest and its deployment on a global scale is imminent. However, CBDC face several challenges. They include: legal, technological, and political considerations. We summarize those challenges and add a few more that have not received much attention in the literature. We then focus on two forms of CBDC: a narrow version that only replaces notes and coins and a broader form with a deposit feature. The narrow CBDC is the most likely one to be first introduced. Next, relying on evidence of past episodes of financial innovation, and using cross-country data, we explore the hypothetical impact of CBDC on inflation and financial stability, based on the historical behaviour of the velocity of circulation and incorporating a CBDC’s impact using McCallum’s policy rule which sets the stance of monetary policy based on money growth. Our simulations suggest that CBDC need not produce higher inflation, but financial stability remains at risk. We provide some policy implications.

We investigate whether the U.S. stock market disciplines asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) liquidity guarantors who exploit a regulatory loophole that exempts at least 90% of the risk capital charge. We find that the market reduces liquidity guarantors’ franchise value when a short ABCP maturity causes the conduit credit losses to remain with guarantors rather than being transferred to investors. Banks with franchise value more sensitive to the ABCP guarantee cost maintain a higher risk capital buffer. We interpret our findings as evidence that market discipline–complexity of the shadow banking system notwithstanding–alleviates the consequence of regulatory arbitrage.

This paper investigates the effects of regulatory interventions on contracting relationships within firms by examining the impacts of the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act on CEO compensation. Using panel data of the S&P 1500 firms, it quantifies welfare gains from a principal–agent model with hidden information and hidden actions. It finds that SOX: (1) reduced the conflict of interest between shareholders and their CEOs, mainly by reducing shareholder loss from CEOs deviating from their goal of expected value maximization; (2) increased the cost of agency, or the risk premium CEOs are paid to align their interests with those of shareholders; (3) increased administrative costs in the primary sector (which includes utilities and energy) but the effect in the other two broadly defined sectors, services and consumer goods, was more nuanced; and (4) had no effect on the attitude of CEOs toward risk.

This paper examines whether and how individual auditors are disciplined for audit errors. Taking advantage of the long history of auditor identity data from China, we find that signing auditors with client restatements are likely to lose the privilege of signing the audit reports of public clients. However, auditors can avoid this consequence by issuing a modified audit opinion to warn of the potential misstatement. We show that auditors are more likely to be disciplined when their firms operate in less concentrated audit markets. Finally, we find positive outcomes from the disciplinary action of the audit firms. Firms that discipline their auditors for restatements have a larger decrease in the rate of client restatements and a larger increase in market share, compared to nondisciplining firms. Their clients have a higher earnings response coefficient after the disciplinary action. In summary, our results suggest that individual auditors in China can face career setbacks when they produce poor quality audits.