This paper proposes that both the first‐come, first‐served rule and information externalities are important in causing contagious bank runs. The first‐come, first‐served rule creates a negative payoff externality among depositors. This payoff externality forces depositors to respond to early noisy information such as failures of other banks. Therefore, failures of a few banks may trigger runs on other banks. Contagious runs may occur even if (i) depositors choose the Pareto‐dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria and (ii) the deposit contract is chosen to maximize depositor welfare. The feasibility of reforming the FDIC to impose market discipline is also investigated.

We examine the effect of discount rate changes on stock market returns, volatility, and trading volume using intraday data. Equity returns generally respond negatively and significantly to the unexpected announcements; however, the effect of expected changes on equity returns is insignificant. Furthermore, our results indicate that equity prices respond to announcements within the trading period/hour after the information release. An indication of a return reversal is too small to cover the full transaction costs. Unexpected discount rate changes also contribute to higher market volatility although the volatility is short-lived. Similarly, unexpected changes in discount rates induce larger trading volume while expected changes do not. Abnormal trading volume occurs only in period t. Our results also support the notion that unexpected changes in the discount rates impact market returns irrespective of the Federal Reserve operating procedures.

Developing countries with highly unequal income distributions, such as Brazil or South Africa, face an uphill battle in reducing inequality. Educated workers in these countries have a much lower birth rate than uneducated workers. Assuming children of educated workers are more likely to become educated, this fertility differential increaases the proportion of unskilled workers, reducing their wages, and thus their opportunity cost of having children, creating a vicious cycle. A model incorporating this effect generates multiple stedy-state levels of inequality, suggesting that in some circumstances, temporarily increasing access to educational opportunities could permanently reduce inequality. Empirical evidence suggests that the fertility differential between the educated and uneducated is greater in less equal countries, consistent with the model. An earlier version of this paper was published in the AEA Papers and Proceedings, May 1999 and is also available here.