Investment-cash flow sensitivity has declined and disappeared, even during the 2007–2009 credit crunch. If one believes that financial constraints have not disappeared, then investment-cash flow sensitivity cannot be a good measure of financial constraints. The decline and disappearance are robust to considerations of R&D and cash reserves, and across groups of firms. The information content in cash flow regarding investment opportunities has declined, but measurement error in Tobin's q does not completely explain the patterns in investment-cash flow sensitivity. The decline and disappearance cannot be explained by changes in sample composition, corporate governance, or market power—and remain a puzzle.

[The average cash holdings of Chinese-listed firms decreased significantly after the split share structure reform in China, which specified a process that allowed previously nontradable shares held by controlling shareholders to be freely tradable on the exchanges. The reduction in cash holdings is greater for firms with weaker governance and firms facing more financial constraints prior to the reform. The reform also significantly reduced the average corporate savings rate, as measured by cash-to-cash-flow sensitivity. These findings are consistent with the premise that the reform removed a significant market friction, which led to better incentive alignment between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders and relaxed financial constraints. Additional analyses show that the reform affects firms' cash management policies, investment decisions, dividend payout policies, and financing choices differently in private firms than in state-owned enterprises.]

[We decompose aggregate market variance into an average correlation component and an average variance component. Only the latter commands a negative price of risk in the cross section of portfolios sorted by idiosyncratic volatility. Portfolios with high (low) idiosyncratic volatility relative to the Fama-French (1993) model have positive (negative) exposures to innovations in average stock variance and therefore lower (higher) expected returns. These two findings explain the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle of Ang et al. (2006, 2009). The factor related to innovations in average variance also reduces the pricing errors of book-to-market and momentum portfolios relative to the Fama-French (1993) model.]

[Nonlinearity is an important consideration in many problems of finance and economics, such as pricing securities and solving equilibrium models. This article provides analytical treatment of a general class of nonlinear transforms for processes with tractable conditional characteristic functions. We extend existing results on characteristic function-based transforms to a substantially wider class of nonlinear functions while maintaining low dimensionality by avoiding the need to compute the density function. We illustrate the applications of the generalized transform in pricing defaultable bonds with stochastic recovery. We also use the method to analytically solve a class of general equilibrium models with multiple goods and apply this model to study the effects of time-varying labor income risk on the equity premium.]

We examine how various aspects of corporate governance structures affect the capital allocation inefficiency that drives the value discounts of diversified firms. Diversified firms with more effective internal or external governance mechanisms experience more efficient investment allocations at both the firm and segment levels and show less of a diversification discount. The efficiency of the investment allocation process is better for diversified firms with high board independence, low board busyness, high institutional ownership, high outside director ownership, high CEO equity-based pay, high audit quality, and strong shareholder rights. The results hold after controlling for other potential influences. Our evidence suggests that corporate governance considerations are important in assessing the relation between investment efficiency and firm value for diversified firms.

A buyer suggests prices to N sellers in a time period and buys from the seller who accepts the bid first. The number of bidding rounds is determined by how frequently the buyer can make an offer. We show that with no limit on the frequency and without discounting, the price path is either kept flat initially with large jumps at the end or increasing steadily over time. Which class of path occurs in equilibrium depends on the buyer's trade-off between committing to a price ceiling versus finely screening the sellers' costs. With discounting, limiting the number of rounds mitigates the delay caused by the reluctance to raise bids in the first class of equilibrium and therefore can benefit the buyer. This result suggests why, in reality, bargaining parties often take measures to make their offers rigid and consequently force themselves to make fewer offers.

This paper documents that classified boards substantially reduce the cost of debt. The evidence is not consistent with the argument that bondholders benefit from board classification because they are concerned about hostile takeovers. Instead, the results suggest that the lessened concern for takeovers associated with a classified board structure reduces managerial risk-taking, and increases managerial incentive for financial disclosure, with both effects inuring to bondholders’ benefit. Consistent with prior literature, classified boards on average are associated with a lower firm performance. However, under the circumstances that the agency conflict between shareholders and bondholders is severe, the performance effect of classified boards appears benign.

[Risks of rare economic disasters can have a large impact on asset prices. At the same time, difficulties in inference regarding both the likelihood and severity of disasters, as well as agency problems, can lead to significant disagreements among investors about disaster risk. We show that such disagreements generate strong risk-sharing motives, such that just a small number of optimists in the economy will significantly reduce the disaster risk premium. Our model highlights the "latent" nature of disaster risk. The disaster risk premium will likely be low and smooth during normal times but increases dramatically when the risk-sharing capacity of the optimists is reduced, e.g., following a disaster. The model also helps reconcile the difference in the amount of disaster risk implied by financial markets and international macroeconomic data, and provides caution to the approach of extracting disaster probabilities from asset prices, which will disproportionately reflect the beliefs of a small group of optimists. Finally, our model predicts an inverse U-shaped relation between the equity premium and the size of the disaster insurance market.]

This study reappraises banks’ productivity by using 42 Taiwanese banks during 1999–2007 as observations. It introduces an input-oriented generalized metafrontier Malmquist productivity index (I-gMMPI), while considering the latent effect of risk-taking behavior in the analytic framework. We learn that public and private banks should face separate short-term technological frontiers, while the econometric model considering risk input can portray banks’ operating frontiers better. Moreover, neglecting the influence of risk input would bring about distortions of efficiency, technology and TFP dynamic estimations for banks; meanwhile, the degree of scale economies would also be overestimated. The paper concludes that neglecting the risk-taking essence in bank performance evaluation is equal to allowing banks to barter risk-bearing as the term for further output growth. Consequently, the potential cost is that banks may excessively aggrandize their scales of business, implying the possibility of another financial crisis.

This paper investigates whether the empirical linkages between stock returns and trading volume differ over the fluctuations of stock markets, i.e., whether the return–volume relation is asymmetric in bull and bear stock markets. Using monthly data for the S&P 500 price index and trading volume from 1973M2 to 2008M10, strong evidence of asymmetry in contemporaneous correlation is found. As for a dynamic (causal) relation, it is found that the stock return is capable of predicting trading volume in both bear and bull markets. However, the evidence for trade volume predicting returns is weaker.