We study the effects of Confucian social norms on savings rates in China. In our simple two-period model, parents have the option to invest in either a risk-free asset or their children’s human capital. We assume that the filial piety norms and thus the enforcement mechanisms for supporting old-age parents differ across regions. Consequently, the probability of children’s non-performance of their repayment obligations to parents and the returns parents can expect from investing in their children vary. We test the model predictions using data from the China Household Finance Survey. We find that stronger Confucian social norms reduce the gap in the savings rate between families with sons and with daughters. Modeling default by children as a function of the prevailing social norms gives us the flexibility to study the impacts of declining Confucian influence on consumption–savings trends in China.

The upsurge of shadow banking is typically driven by rising financing demand from certain real sectors. In China, the 4 trillion yuan stimulus package in 2009 was behind the rapid growth of shadow banking after 2012, expediting the development of Chinese corporate bond markets in the poststimulus period. Chinese local governments financed the stimulus through bank loans in 2009 and then resorted to nonbank debt financing after 2012 when faced with rollover pressure from bank debt coming due. Cross-sectionally, using a political-economy-based instrument, we show that provinces with greater bank loan growth in 2009 experienced more municipal corporate bond issuance during 2012–2015, together with more shadow banking activities including trustloans and wealth management products. China’s poststimulus experience exhibits similarities to financial market development during the US National Banking Era.

This study examines the relevance of modified audit opinions (MAO) in private debt contracting. We use the auditor׳s explanatory language to partition MAOs into Inconsistency opinions, resulting from an accounting change or a restatement; and Inadequacy opinions, arising from a material uncertainty or a going concern (GC) opinion. Using the loan contracts of firms with MAOs, we find that, compared with loans issued in the year after a clean opinion, loans issued in the year after an MAO are associated with higher interest spreads (17 basis points on average), fewer financial covenants, more general covenants, smaller loan sizes, and a higher likelihood of requiring collateral. We find that the effect on loan spreads (as well as on other non-price terms) varies by the type of MAO, ranging from no effect for an accounting change to an average increase of 107 basis points for a GC opinion. Additional analyses of GC opinions find that auditors communicate incremental information to lenders about clients’ credit risk. Overall, our empirical results suggest that lenders incorporate the information contained in MAOs into debt contracting.

We consider a general social choice environment that has multiple agents, a finite set of alternatives, independent types, and atomless type distribution. We show that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism, there exists an equivalent deterministic mechanism that (1) is Bayesian incentive compatible; (2) delivers the same interim expected allocation probabilities and the same interim expected utilities for all agents; and (3) delivers the same ex ante expected social surplus. This result holds in settings with a rich class of utility functions, multidimensional types, interdependent valuations, and in settings without monetary transfers. To prove our result, we develop a novel methodology of mutual purification, and establish its link with the mechanism design literature.

In a cross-country setting, we document that stronger religiosity is associated with lower loan interest spread. In addition, we show that this negative association is more pronounced in countries with weaker creditor rights, suggesting that religious values play a more significant role in constraining opportunistic behavior in a weaker legal environment. Our analysis reveals that stronger religiosity is also related to other favorable terms in loan contracting, such as larger facility amount, use of accounting-based performance pricing, and lower upfront fee. Corroborating our cross-country findings, we also show that in the U.S. setting, firms in regions with stronger religiosity enjoy lower loan interest spread. Our study contributes to understanding the important role religiosity plays in debt financing.

We provide causal evidence on the value of asset pledgeability by exploiting a unique feature of Chinese corporate bond markets: bonds with identical fundamentals are traded on two segmented markets with different rules for repo transactions. Using a policy shock that rendered AA+ and AA bonds ineligible for repo on one market only, we compare how bond prices changed across markets and rating classes around this event. When the haircut increases from 0% to 100%, bond yields increase by 39 bps to 85 bps. These estimates help us infer the magnitude of the shadow cost of capital in China.