We study how involving employee board representatives in determining managerial compensation affects the within-firm pay ratio. The 2009 German Compensation Act shifted executive pay decisions to the entire supervisory board, amplifying employees’ influence at firms with parity employee representation. This reform resulted in increased manager-to-worker pay ratios, driven by higher managerial compensation, without corresponding changes in firm performance or manager turnover. The result is robust in matched samples and absent in falsification tests. Improved employee job security and weak wage increases point to a possible alliance between employees and managers, indicating shared governance may not necessarily reduce pay inequality.

How does demand uncertainty affect firms' investment decisions? We examine this question in the context of electricity‐producing firms' planned investments in new power plants. We measure uncertainty about future electricity demand using plausibly exogenous variation in temperature projections across scientific climate models. The results show that uncertainty increases investment in power plants with flexible production technologies, while reducing investment in less flexible technologies. Overall, the net effect of uncertainty on investment is positive when firms have access to flexible investment opportunities. These findings are consistent with models in which production flexibility shapes the investment response to demand uncertainty.