Active equity mutual funds managed by insurance companies underperform peer funds by over 1% per year. There is no evidence that insurance funds make less risky investments; instead they have lower risk-adjusted returns and their fund flows are less sensitive to performance when they perform poorly. Across insurance funds, those with heavy advertising, directly established by insurers or using parent firms' brandnames, and those whose managers simultaneously manage substantial non-mutual-fund assets, are more likely to underperform. We conclude that insurers' efforts to cross-sell mutual funds aggravate agency problems that erode fund performance.

Abstract We introduce a pricing kernel with time-varying volatility risk aversion to explain the observed time variations in the shape of the pricing kernel. When combined with the Heston-Nandi GARCH model, this framework yields a tractable option pricing model in which the variance risk ratio (VRR) emerges as a key variable. We show that the VRR is closely linked to economic fundamentals, as well as sentiment and uncertainty measures. A novel approximation method provides analytical option pricing formulas, and we demonstrate substantial reductions in pricing errors through an empirical application to the S&P 500 index, the CBOE VIX, and option prices.

ABSTRACT We conduct two experiments with experienced accountants to investigate how fair value accounting affects managers’ real economic decisions. In experiment 1, we find that participants are more likely to make suboptimal decisions (e.g., forgo economically sound hedging opportunities) when both the economic and fair value accounting impact information is presented than when only the economic impact information is presented, or when both the economic and historical cost accounting impact information is presented. This adverse effect of fair value accounting is more likely when the price volatility of the hedged asset is higher, which is a situation where, paradoxically, hedging is more beneficial. We find that the effect is mediated by participants’ relative considerations of economic factors versus accounting factors (e.g., earnings volatility). Experiment 2 shows that enhancing salience of economic information or separately presenting net income not from fair value remeasurements reduces the adverse effect of fair value accounting. Our findings are informative to standard setters in their debate on the efficacy of fair value accounting.

ABSTRACT Using data on both fund stockholdings and fund returns, we examine whether actively managed equity mutual funds trade on and profit from the accruals anomaly. We find that few, if any, mutual funds trade on the anomaly. The top 10% of mutual funds that have the highest portfolio weights in low‐accruals stocks have a greater, but still relatively small, exposure to low‐accruals stocks. Nonetheless, these funds make significant profit net of actual transaction costs, exhibiting an average Fama‐French three‐factor alpha of 2.83% per year. We also find that these funds are smaller, less diversified, and exhibit higher fund return volatility and higher fund flow volatility.

This study examines how competition affects the profitability of mutual funds’ trading on the post earnings announcement drift (PEAD). Our results show that among funds actively pursuing this strategy, only those that manage to avoid competition deliver superior performance. Further, we find that funds avoid competition by investing in illiquid stocks. Our analysis shows that the outperformance of these low-competition funds is mainly attributable to their information advantage in identifying mispricing among illiquid stocks.

There is a long-standing debate on whether sell-side analysts learn from their experience to improve earnings forecast skills. This study shows that incentive is an important factor for understanding the “learning by doing” effect by analysts. We examine analysts’ response to a complex type of information – corporate pension underfunding. Pension underfunding negatively impacts future earnings and analysts on average underreact to such information in their earnings forecasts. More importantly, when there is a strong incentive for analysts to deliver accurate forecasts, analyst learning effectively reduces their underreaction to pension underfunding information. On the other hand, when such an incentive is absent, the analyst learning effect is not discernible in the data. Further evidence suggests that analyst learning and incentive jointly reduce stock market mispricing associated with corporate pension underfunding.