Abstract This paper examines the interaction between default risk and interest-rate risk in determining the term structure of credit default swap spreads at different industry sectors and credit-rating classes. The paper starts with a parsimonious three-factor interest-rate dynamic term structure and projects the credit spread at each industry sector and rating class to these interest-rate factors while also allowing the projection residual dynamics to depend on the level of the interest-rate factors. Estimation shows that credit risk exhibits intricate dynamic interactions with the interest-rate factors.

We provide more direct evidence on the causal relation between the quality of financial reporting and investment efficiency. We examine the investment behavior of a sample of firms that disclosed internal control weaknesses under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We find that prior to the disclosure, these firms under-invest (over-invest) when they are financially constrained (unconstrained). More importantly, we find that after the disclosure, these firms’ investment efficiency improves significantly.

There is little research on how accounting information quality affects a firm’s external financing choices. In this paper, we use the occurrence of accounting restatements as a proxy for the reduced credibility of accounting information and investigate how restatements affect a firm’s external financing choices. We find that for firms that obtain external financing after restatements, they rely more on debt financing, especially private debt financing, and less on equity financing. The increase in debt financing is more pronounced for firms with more severe information problems and less pronounced for firms with prompt CEO or CFO turnover and auditor dismissal. Our evidence indicates that accounting information quality affects capital providers’ resource allocation and that debt holders help alleviate information problems after accounting restatements.

This study investigates the investment decision and dividend policy jointly from a non-steady state to a steady state. We extend Higgins, 1977, Higgins, 1981, Higgins, 2008 sustainable growth rate model and develop a dynamic model which jointly optimizes the growth rate and payout ratio. We optimize the firm value to obtain the optimal growth rate in terms of a logistic equation and find that the steady state growth rate can be used as the benchmark for the mean-reverting process of the optimal growth rate. We also investigate the specification error of the mean and variance of dividend per share when introducing the stochastic growth rate. Empirical results support the mean-reverting process of the growth rate and the importance of covariance between the profitability and the growth rate in determining dividend payouts. The intertemporal behavior of the covariance may shed some light on the fact of disappearing dividends over decades.

We test the predictions of Titman (1984) and Berk, Stanton, and Zechner (2010) by examining the effect of leverage on labor costs. Leverage has a significantly positive impact on cash, equity-based, and total compensation of chief executive officers (CEOs). Compensation of new CEOs hired from outside the firm is positively related to prior-year firm leverage. In addition, leverage has a positive and significant impact on average employee pay. The incremental total labor expenses associated with an increase in leverage are large enough to offset the incremental tax benefits of debt. The empirical evidence supports the theoretical prediction that labor costs limit the use of debt.

ABSTRACT: Managers have great discretion in determining forecast characteristics, but little is known about how managerial incentives affect these characteristics. This paper examines whether managers strategically choose forecast precision for self-serving purposes. Building on the prior finding that the market reaction to vague forecasts is weaker than its reaction to precise forecasts, we find that for management forecasts disclosed before insider sales, more positive (negative) news forecasts are more (less) precise than other management forecasts. The opposite applies to management forecasts disclosed before insider purchases. These results are consistent with managers strategically choosing forecast precision to increase stock prices before insider sales and to decrease stock prices before insider purchases. Additional analyses indicate that the impact of managerial incentives on forecast precision is less pronounced when institutional ownership is high or when disclosure risk is high, and is more pronounced when investors have difficulty in assessing the precision of managers' information. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available from the sources indicated in the text.

ABSTRACT We examine the commitment effect provided by mandatory disclosure and the information effect of voluntary disclosure on market illiquidity by exploring a regulatory change that allows smaller reporting companies to reduce the disclosure of certain information in their SEC filings. This regime change allows us to separate the commitment effect provided by mandatory disclosure from the information effect of voluntary disclosure. We find that firms that are eligible to reduce their disclosure, but voluntarily maintain their disclosure level, experience an increase in market illiquidity. We also find that the increase in illiquidity is more pronounced for firms with higher agency costs. These findings suggest that mandatory disclosure serves as a credible commitment mechanism and that losing such commitment by disclosure deregulation is costly in the absence of a loss of information. Our study suggests that while voluntary disclosure is effective in reducing information asymmetry, it cannot replace mandatory disclosure in addressing information problems. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the text.