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Dismantling internal capital markets via spinoff: effects on capital allocation efficiency and firm valuation

Journal of Corporate Finance 2005 11(1-2), 253-275
We investigate the linkage between changes in firm value and changes in capital allocation efficiency resulting from dismantling internal capital markets via spinoffs. We find no evidence of wholesale misallocation of capital pre-spinoff. On the average, excess value increases following spinoffs. Furthermore, changes in excess value are positively linked to changes in capital allocational efficiency following spinoff. We find that spinoff announcement returns are greater (smaller) when the parent allocates capital to the unit to be spun off in a seemingly less (more) efficient manner. Divested division capital expenditures move toward industry levels after spinoff, regardless of their relative investment opportunities.

Management turnover in subsidiaries of conglomerates versus stand-alone firms

Journal of Financial Economics 2004 72(1), 63-96
We compare turnover of subsidiary managers inside conglomerate firms to turnover of CEOs of comparable stand-alone firms. We find that, compared to turnover of CEOs, subsidiary manager turnover is significantly more sensitive to changes in performance and significantly more likely following poor performance. For subsidiary managers, the relation between turnover and performance is significantly stronger when the subsidiary operates in an industry that is related to the parent's primary industry. Results suggest that boards of directors are relatively ineffective disciplinarians of CEOs and despite their other apparent failings, conglomerate firms have relatively strict disciplining mechanisms for subsidiary managers.

The “CalPERS effect” revisited

Journal of Corporate Finance 2004 10(1), 157-174
Institutional investors have become more active in corporate governance with the relaxation of Depression Era securities laws. The California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) is a leading institutional activist. In this paper, we examine the relationship between CalPERS' public targeting and both short- and long-term stock returns to address what has been dubbed the “CalPERS effect.” Our results indicate evidence of an announcement effect and that, while there is also evidence of some long-term improvement, it is limited to 6 months from the announcement of the target list in the Wall Street Journal when more consistent empirical methodologies are employed.