Exploiting staggered interstate banking deregulation as exogenous shocks to bank geographic expansion, we examine the causal effect of geographic diversification on systemic risk. Using the gravity-deregulation approach, we find that bank geographic diversification leads to higher systemic risk measured by the change in conditional value at risk (ΔCoVaR) and financial integration (Logistic(R^2)). Furthermore, we document that geographic diversification affects systemic risk via its impact on asset similarity. The impact of geographic diversification on systemic risk is stronger in BHCs located in states comoving less with the U.S. aggregate economy.

We propose a new, price-based measure of information risk called abnormal idiosyncratic volatility (AIV) that captures information asymmetry faced by uninformed investors. AIV is the idiosyncratic volatility prior to information events in excess of normal levels. Using earnings announcements as information events, we show that AIV is positively associated with informed return run-ups, abnormal insider trading, short selling, and institutional trading during pre-earnings-announcement periods. We find that stocks with high AIV earn economically and statistically larger future returns than stocks with low AIV. Taken together, our findings support the notion that information risk is priced.

We examine how management stock options affect corporate risk taking. We exploit exogenous variation in stock option grants generated by FAS 123R and use loan spreads to infer risk taking. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the spreads of loans taken by firms that did not expense options before FAS 123R (treated firms) significantly decrease after FAS 123R relative to firms that either did not issue stock options or voluntarily expensed stock options before 123R (control firms). We also find that the effect is stronger for firms with high agency conflicts associated with risk-shifting. Furthermore, loans taken by the treated firms are less likely to contain collateral requirements and are less likely to have covenants restricting capital investment post FAS 123R.

We examine the causal effect of limits to arbitrage on 11 well‐known asset pricing anomalies using the pilot program of Regulation SHO, which relaxed short‐sale constraints for a quasi‐random set of pilot stocks, as a natural experiment. We find that the anomalies became weaker on portfolios constructed with pilot stocks during the pilot period. The pilot program reduced the combined anomaly long–short portfolio returns by 72 basis points per month, a difference that survives risk adjustment with standard factor models. The effect comes only from the short legs of the anomaly portfolios.

In this article we examine whether and how changes in personal bankruptcy laws, viewed as a shock to employees’ expected personal wealth, affect corporate policies. Following a reform in personal bankruptcy laws that limits individuals’ access to bankruptcy protection, firms more affected by this regulation reform increase labor costs, reduce investment, and engage in less risk taking. The effects are stronger when employees have more bargaining power. Furthermore, firms in industries characterized by high unemployment risk reduce leverage. These results support the view that firms choose more conservative policies to mitigate employees’ expected welfare losses.