In this paper we investigate the properties of the standard two‐pass methodology of testing beta pricing models with misspecified factors. In a setting where a factor is useless, defined as being independent of all the asset returns, we provide theoretical results and simulation evidence that the second‐pass cross‐sectional regression tends to find the beta risk of the useless factor priced more often than it should. More surprisingly, this misspecification bias exacerbates when the number of time series observations increases. Possible ways of detecting useless factors are also examined.

We show that banks expand mortgage lending in the home states of Senate Banking Committee chairs, and the effect is more pronounced in counties where the incumbent senator faces a competitive re-election race. Banks strategically target politically active borrowers. Consequently, banks’ profitability increases after favoring the incumbent politicians’ constituents, but they suffer a deterioration in mortgage asset quality in the long run. Our findings imply that political power could distort private capital allocation beyond conventional political contribution channels.

The decline of average stock return volatility in the 2001–2006 period provides an opportunity to test various theories on why the average return volatility increased in the pre-2000 period. This paper compares fundamentals-based theories with trading volume-based theories. While both fundamentals-based and trading volume-based theories explain the upward trend in the average volatility in U.S. stocks from 1976 to 2000 and international stocks from 1990 to 2000, only the fundamentals-based theories explain the volatility pattern for 2001–2006. Much of the variation in the stock return volatilities can be explained by the variation in the earnings volatilities and proxies for growth options, but not by trading-related variables. Evidence also shows that the explanatory power of the fundamentals variables is time varying.

This paper explores the reasons behind the discrepancy between interest rates in China’s two repurchase agreement (repo) markets, the interbank repo market and the exchange-traded repo market. The repo rates in the exchange market are at times, significantly higher than those in the interbank market, especially in the first three years of the 2000–2005 sample period. While market segmentation clearly hinders arbitrage, the causes of the repo rate discrepancy are related to the alternative investment opportunities available to market participants and to the volatility differences in the repo rates.

We propose an explanation for why corporate investment used to be sensitive to cash flow and why the sensitivity declined over time. The sensitivity stems from the informational role of cash flow in inferring the productivity of tangible capital in the old economy. Over time, however, more new-economy firms enter the market. These firms have reduced tangible capital productivity and reduced cash-flow predictability, which drives the decline in the average investment–cash flow sensitivity. Theoretical and empirical analyses support this explanation.

Derivative warrants typically have higher prices than do otherwise identical options. Using data from the Hong Kong market during 2002–2007, we show that the price difference reflects the liquidity premium of derivative warrants over options. Newly issued derivative warrants are much more liquid than options with similar terms. As a result, long-term derivative warrants are preferred by traders who trade frequently. In spite of their higher prices, short-term returns on long-term derivative warrants are, in fact, higher than the hypothetical short-term returns on options. The differences in price and liquidity measures decline as the contracts get closer to maturity.

We derive a model with qualitative implications for options pricing under counterparty credit risk and provide empirical evidence using the data from the Hong Kong derivatives market during 2005–2014. We find that the log-price difference between a derivative warrant with counterparty credit risk and an otherwise identical option without counterparty credit risk is significantly and negatively associated with the credit default swap spread on the warrant issuer. We also find that the prices of out-of-the-money put warrants are more sensitive to credit risk than those of other warrants. Our results show counterparty credit risk matters for derivative pricing.

Affine jump-diffusion models have been the mainstream in options pricing because of their analytical tractability. Popular affine jump-diffusion models, however, are still unsatisfactory in describing the options data and the problem is often attributed to the diffusion term of the unobserved state variables. Using prices of variance-swaps (i.e., squared VIX) implied from options prices, we provide fresh evidence regarding the misspecification of affine jump-diffusion models, as variance-swap prices are affine functions of the state variables in a broader class of models that do not restrict the diffusion term of the state variables. We apply the nonparametric methodology used by Aït-Sahalia (1996b), supplemented with bootstrap tests and other parametric tests, to the S&P 500 index options data from January 1996 to September 2008. We find that, while the affine diffusion term of the state variables may contribute to the misspecification as the literature has suggested, the affine drift of the state variables, jump intensities, and risk premiums are also sources of misspecification.

This paper studies generalized method of moments tests for the stochastic discount factor representation of asset pricing models when one of the proposed factors is in fact useless, defined as being independent of the asset returns. Analytic results on asymptotic distributions and simulation results on finite sample distributions both show that (i)the Wald test tends to overreject the hypothesis of a zero factor premium for a useless factor when the model is misspecified, (ii)with the presence of a useless factor, the power of the over-identifying restriction test in rejecting misspecified models is reduced, and in some cases a misspecified model with a useless factor is more likely to be accepted than the true model.