[In this article, we derive an analytic expression for the representative agent of a large class of economies populated by agents with "catching up with the Joneses" preferences, but who exhibit heterogeneous risk aversion. As Chan and Kogan (2002) show numerically, the representative agent has stochastic risk that moves countercyclically to the state variable. However, we show that heterogeneity of risk aversion alone is insufficient for explaining empirical regularities—namely the variability of the Sharpe ratio—that Campbell and Cochrane (1999) obtain in a model of a representative agent with stochastic risk aversion.]

We present an analytical solution for a pure exchange economy featuring a continuum of agents with disagreement, time-varying information quality, and reference-dependent preferences. Our general equilibrium model exhibits stationary dynamics. By examining the implications of the model, we find that the commonly studied asset pricing channels of disagreement have limited quantitative significance. On the other hand, variations in information quality, which affect disagreement levels, lead to substantial excess stock price volatility. This finding contributes significantly to explaining the equity premium and sheds light on empirical relationships between forecast dispersion and asset prices, the upward sloping real yield curve, and long-term yield movements.

In this article, we derive an analytic expression for the representative agent of a large class of economies populated by agents with “catching up with the Joneses” preferences, but who exhibit heterogeneous risk aversion. As Chan and Kogan (2002) show numerically, the representative agent has stochastic risk that moves countercyclically to the state variable. However, we show that heterogeneity of risk aversion alone is insufficient for explaining empirical regularities—namely the variability of the Sharpe ratio—that Campbell and Cochrane (1999) obtain in a model of a representative agent with stochastic risk aversion.